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SUMMARY
The main emphasis of this thesis has been the study of joint ventures, 
with acquisitions being analysed as an alternative and comparable 
strategy.
The Introduction seeks to answer the questions of how many 
transnational joint ventures and acquisitions have taken place within 
the EEC in recent years, and how they have been distributed on a 
regional and industrial basis.
Chapter One examines previous studies on joint ventures with 
respect to the structural effects of co-operation on the industry, 
notably upon competition.
This theme is developed in Chapter Two, which looks at joint ventures 
in the light of EEC competition policy. The attitudes of the EC 
Commission towards co-operation are examined, together with attempts 
by the Commission to enhance the prospects for transnational 
co-operation and to create a more uniform competitive environment 
across the EEC.
Chapter Three then examines the firm's point of view, and is 
thus concerned with the relevant aspects of corporate strategy.
Different entry strategies for firms seeking to penetrate EEC 
markets are described, with an emphasis on joint ventures and 
acquisitions, together with some of the issues involved in planning, 
setting up and running such operations.
The thesis has concentrated on the mechanical engineering 
industry, background information on which is the basis of Chapter 
Four. This shows the importance of international trade, and thus 
highlights the relevance of transnational strategy, to this industry.
Chapter Five draws together themes from the earlier chapters 
and shows their influences on the central part of this thesis, a 
survey of engineering companies throughout the UK and EEC which have 
engaged in transnational joint ventures and acquisitions. This 
chapter also describes the methodology of the research programme.
The results of the survey are described in Chapters Six and 
Seven.
The study was financed by the Social Science Research Council, 
whose support is acknowledged.
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This study is concerned with transnational business collaboration
of all kinds in the Mechanical Engineering sector in the EEC, and with
Joint Ventures in particular. The EC Commission defines a joint
venture as follows : "A joint venture is generally defined as an
enterprise subject to joint control by two or more undertakings which
1
are economically independent of each other."
However, joint ventures (JVs) represent only one of the strategies 
available to companies for expanding their business. In order to 
assess the significance of the results, the study has also examined 
other strategies, in particular takeovers. The principal effect of this 
is that a comparison and contrast of JVs and takeovers, which have 
been examined in approximately equal numbers by use of a questionnaire, 
has been made possible.
There are no comprehensive figures on the numbers of joint vent­
ures, takeovers and share participations taking place in the EEC. The 
EC Commission does make some estimates, recorded in its annual Report 
onm Competition Policy. But although these statistics (discussed at 
greater length on pp. 3-g ) appear at first sight to be comprehensive, 
this is not so. Members of the Competition Policy Directorate (DGIV) 
at the European Commission pick reports on joint ventures out of 
selected European newspapers. The Commission then checks that the 
firms concerned have applied to the EEC for exemption from Article 
85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, contained in the Rules on Competition 
Policy, under the 'escape' clause contained in Article 85(3) (see 
appendix 2).
The collection of statistics is simply a by-product of this 
process and is not pursued as an end in itself.
In addition, the Commission's definition of a joint venture 
is confined to those cases in which a new joint company is created - 
the 'equity JV - and excludes what shall later be described as 
'the contractual JV'. Finally, of course, any venture which is 
not featured in those newspapers is not included in the JV statistics.
EC Commission, Fourth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels & 
Luxembourg, April 1975.
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In short, then, there is no record of the true number of 
joint operations taking place in the EEC.
The EC Commission has in recent years been concerned at
the domination of many markets by North American, and now increasingly
Japanese, multinational corporations. In 1973, for example, two
large multinationals in the construction equipment sector spent
as much on research and development as the entire UK mechanical
1engineering industry put together. Because of the large number of
firms, much of the European R & D would have represented duplication 
2
of effort.
Tha Commission would like to see some rationalisation, 
particularly at the lower end of the scale. It would like firms 
which are small and medium-sized on a national scale combine on a 
European scale in order to compete more effectively with these 
very large corporations.
There is some concern at the Commission, however, that co­
operation between large concerns would have rather different 
effects. The danger in encouraging co-operation is that large firms 
can enter price-fixing or market sharing agreements, which would 
contravene the EEC rule on Competition Policy.
Much of the literature on the subject of JVs (which is predomin­
antly from the USA) has concentrated on this question, of whether JVs 
do in fact produce anti-competitive effects, though there is evidence 
that US JVs frequently occur as a response to the very strong anti­
trust regulations which exist in the USA and which more or less prohibit 
mergers or takeovers of any significant size.
1
NEDC Industrial Strategy Report, Construction Equipment and Mobile 
Cranes Sector Working Party, September 1976, p.3
2
For evidence that JVs can eliminate duplicative R & D see pp. 3® and
20S.
_ 3 _
Much has also been written on JVs which are undertaken by 
(predominantly US) multinational corporations (MIMCs) in 
underdevdoped countries. Generally, however, these ventures are 
forced on such companies by political considerations or, indeed, /
because local legislation stipulates that a foreign company cannot 
own more than a certain percentage of a local enterprise.
In the EEC, no such regulations exist, though there may well 
be political pressures. Subject to such pressures, and also to 
national competition regulatory bodies such as the Monopolies 
Commission and EEC competition law (Article 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome, relating to concerted practices, and Article 86, relating to 
exploitation of a dominant position) , companies are free to set up 
by themselves in a 'greenfield' venture, take over other companies ; 
or set up joint ventures.
The EC Commission is unable to estimate the proportion of intra- 
EC trade done through JVs, although JVs are in most cases one 
possible strategy. But because of the lack of previous literature 
on intra-EC JVs, companies wishing to know more about this strategy 
can only learn from their own experience, which can be a very expensive 
way of learning.
The results of the present study show that JVs are generally
1
very small in relation to the size of the parent companies. US
writers who suggest that JVs are anticompetitive would claim, however,
2
that the importance of JVs extends beyond their mere size.
- Share Purchases, Joint Ventures, Takeovers and Mergers in the 
Community, 1973-80.
i) Type of Operation.
The total number of operations recorded by the Commission 
(bearing in mind that the Commission has no record of the true 
total), comprising takeovers and mergers, share purchases and joint 
ventures taking place in the Community grew from 1,638 in 1973 to 
2,419 in 1980 - an increase of almost 50% in the annual rate, 
although the 1980 figure represents a fall of 17% from the 1979 
total (see Table 1).
 ^See p 204 
2
The effects of the JVs and acquisitions surveyed in the present
study on competition and industry structure are discussed on pp 198—202
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By far the largest proportion of these is accounted for by 
share purchases, which increased their share from 952 operations 
(58%) to 1,905 (79%) over the period; the share of JVs has halved, 
from a third of the total to 15%. /
The growth in the total is due largely to the huge increase in 
national operations - some 172%, with share purchases increasing 
from 384 to 1,402 cases (60% to 81%) and the shares of takeovers and 
mergers and JVs, although growing in absolute terms, falling from 
21% - 8% and 19% - 11% respectively.
As far as takeovers are concerned, purchasing the majority of 
a company's capital does not necessarily give full control; depending 
on the proportion purchased, minority shareholders may still possess 
blocking rights - that is, the right to prevent decisions being made. 
The percentage of shares required for full control varies from 
country to country. On the other hand, control may be achieved 
at levels under 50%, depending on how widely dispersed the share 
ownership of the company concerned is. In addition, a company may 
be taken over in instalments, so that a small purchase of shares 
may result in full control being acquired. Because of the 
variations in national laws, then, the Commisssion classifies all 
international takeovers, mergers and share purchases as share 
purchases. That is, the purchase of 100% of the capital of a French 
company by a British firm counts as a share purchase, not as a 
takeover.
The number of international operations has actually dropped 
considerably. New JV numbers in particular have fallen steadily, 
and by 1980 stood at only 40% of their 1973 level. JVs accounted 
for only 26% of international operations in 1980, compared with 43% 
in 1973. This fall meant that by 1980 international JVs were 
outnumbered by their national counterparts.
Similarly, by 1980 only 26% of new share participations in 
the EEC were international operations, compared with 60% in 1973.
This is due to a 265% rise in the number of national operations 
rather than to any drastic fall in the number of international 
share participations.
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ii) Regional Distribution,
Table 2 shows how these international operations are 
split between those involving Community firms exclusively and 
those involving firms from non-member countries (IMMCs) , 
either exclusively or in combination with Community firms.
With the number of share purchases involving (MMC 
firms growing steadily since 1976, the proportion involving 
Community firms exclusively has dropped, after a brief 
revival in 1979, to only 45% of the total.
The number of international JVs in the EEC has shown 
a steady fall over the period, and this has been particularly 
pronounced in the numbers involving Community firms 
exclusively. Only 74 of these took place in 1980, showing 
a drop of 45% on the 1979 figures, which had themselves 
been following a steady declining trend. Thus in 1980 
only 42% of the JVs taking place in the Community involved 
EEC firms exclusively.
As a whole, then, the proportion of total international 
operations recorded by the Commission involving Community 
firms exclusively had fallen to 44% by 1980. The total 
number of operations in 1980 was 32% below the 1973 level, 
with internal EEC operations being 47% below their 1973 
level.
From their involvement in 55% of the share purchases 
and 58% of the JVs in 1980, firms from non-member countries 
can be seen to have made considerable inroads into Community 
markets.
Table 3 shows that France led the way in international 
operations in 1980, with 23% of the total being located 
there. The UK and West Germany followed closely behind, 
with 22% and 19% respectively. These three countries 
thus accounted for 64% of the recorded international 
operations in the Community in 1980.
- 7 -
TABLE 2
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS IN THE EEC - OPERATIONS INVOLVING EEC FIRMS ONLY 
AND OPERATIONS INVOLVING NON-COMMUNITY FIRMS.









NUMBER OF OPERATIONS :
1973 340 228 568 233 196 429 573 424 997
1974 234 177 411 207 194 401 441 371 812
1975 200 182 382 173 140 313 373 322 695
1976 198 171 369 165 197 362 363 368 731
1977 202 211 413 138 150 288 340 361 701
1978 187 212 399 166 112 278 353 324 677
1979 273 245 518 135 88 223 408 333 741
1980 227 276 503 74 101 175 301 377 678
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL :
1973 60 40 100 54 46 100 57 43 100
1974 57 43 100 52 48 100 54 46 100
1975 52 48 100 55 45 100 54 46 100
1976 54 46 100 46 54 100 50 50 100
1977 49 51 100 48 52 100 49 51 100
1978 47 53 100 60 40 100 . 52 48 100
1979 53 47 100 61 39 100 55 45 100
1980 45 55 100 42 58 100
EC = OPERATINS INVOLVING COMMUNITY FIRMS EXCLUSIVELY.
NMC = OPERATIONS INVOLVING FIRMS FROM NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES, EITHER EXCLUSIVELY 
OR IN COMBINATION WITH COMMUNITY FIRMS.
Source : EC Commision, Fourth - Eleventh Report on Competition Policy,
Brussels & Luxembourg, April 1975 - April 1982.
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Table 4 gives a breakdown by industry of the international 
operations recorded by the Commission within the EEC, and 
shows that the highest number of operations is that of the 
metal-using industries, with a 29% share in 1980. There 
are two possible reasons for the high number of service 
undertakings : a) as firms become more international in 
their outlook, service industries feel the need to be better 
represented abroad; b) service 'products' are subject to 
greater regulation and administration than industrial ones, 
and in many cases it helps to have the assistance of an 
on-the-spot partner.
Other statistics are provided by the Business
Co-operation Centre. This is a branch of the Commission
set up to promote transnational business collaboration
in the EEC by attempting to find partners for applicant
1
firms. The statistics , in Tables 5 and 6, indicate that
the largest share of activity is taken up by the metal-using
industries, which together accounted for almost 40% of the
Centre's work between 1973 and 1980. Mechanical engineering
took 20% of the total- The Centre's work is weighted towards
smaller firms, being aimed primarily at firms employing
2
between 50 and 400 persons . Tables 5 and 6 do not show 
any trend over time, and to do so would perhaps be mis­
leading; these were the first seven years of the Centre's 
existence, and the growing amount of business passing through 
its office every year may be attributable more to growing 
public knowledge of it than to any increased demand for 
international business co-operation.
1
The statistics, taken from the Centre's annual reports, record 
enquiries circulated among its contracts for partners (Table 5) 
and replies received (Table 6). See also pp. 13—14 And 
Appendix 1.
Although the Centre's work is biased towards smaller firms, there 
is no reason to suppose that the proportions of its work accounted fc; 
by the various industries should differ substantially from tne 
distribution of the unknown number of total transnational 
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- The promotion of co-operation and the Business Co-operation Centre :
In its memorandum of 1970 on a common industrial policy
1
for the European Community , the Commission suggested, inter alia, 
that it should actively promote co-operation by operating a 
'marriage bureau' to bring firms together, in order to increase 
their competiveness and help them to adjust to the expanded 
market.
The Business Co-operation Centre was set up in Brussels in 
1973 for this purpose. Unfortunately, despite the great response 
which it has had from companies both inside and outside the 
Community, the Centre has been run down in recent years. Whereas 
a member of the Centre's staff used to visit a company which had 
applied for a possible co-operation, this is no longer possible.
These meetings were very valuable, especially since many firms 
did not know the correct way in which to go about such an applica­
tion. Many of them were not specific about exactly what they 
wanted, and even less so about what they could offer in return.
The meetings were designed to pinpoint these matters, and left 
the firms concerned in a much clearer frame of mind. The Centre 
is thus unable to offer as effective a service as it would like.
The document BRE/3Ü/75-E, produced by the Business Co-operation 
Centre, and which gives an overview of its aims, is contained in 
Appendix 1.
Some of the Centre's work is in fact now being carried out 
by national organisations - notably the West German engineering 
employers federation, the VDMA, and a group of Chambers of Commerce 
in the Netherlands. Organisation such as this on a national 
scale may well be more efficient than a central office in Brussels.
It would, for example, be much easier to visit the firms, and 
would also result in a larger organisation overall, since effective 
co-operation on a European scale by the various national organisations 
should result in a larger and more efficient network.
1
Commission of the European Communities, 'Memorandum on Industrial 
Policy', Brussels, March 1970.
- 14 -
Attention is focussed on small and medium-sized enterprises 
because it is assumed that the larger firms can more easily 
afford their own economists, lawyers and accountants to solve 
their own problems.
Appendix 2, on Commission regulations, contains details of 
agreements which are excluded from the strictures of Article 
85(1) (also in Appendix 2) and which are therefore permitted.
- 15 -
CHAPTER ONE
PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON JVsT
The literature is considered under the following headings :
1. Definitions ;
2. Types of operation ;
3. Industries covered ;
4. Methodology ;
5. Economic benefits and justifications of JVs ;
6. Anticompetitive effects of JVs ;
7. Motives for entering JVs ;
a.  Weaknesses of previous studies and the development of the
present study.
1. Definitions
At the outset, it should be noted that there is some 
difficulty in defining the term 'Joint Venture' precisely.
Most commentators use the definition provided by Backman :
"A joint venture is the creation of a new business organisat-
2
ion which is owned by two or more enterprises". This gives
great flexibility in terms of the ownership structure, so
that a 50:50 and a 90:10 structure both come equally under
the heading. This is the 'equity JV'. Another type of JV,
excluded from the above definition, is the 'contractual JV',
which is "a special combination of one or more persons where
in some specific venture, a profit is jointly sought without
any actual partnership or corporate designation",^ The
basic characteristic of this type of venture is that
"investment and expenses are divided between the partners
4
according to fixed percentages".
1
This chapter concerns literature on the effects of co-operation
upon the structure of the industry. Literature on corporate
strategy is discussed in Chapter 3.
J.Backman p.7 (see Bibliography for full reference for this and 




Edstrom offered three alternatives for the equity JV ;
i) an acquisition of up to 50% of another company;
ii) two companies each extract some activities and form a
new, jointly - owned company to manage them, while
keeping the original companies basically intact ;
iii) two companies jointly buy a third company.
However, having defined an acquisition as "when one 
company has acquired at least 50% of all assets and liabilit­
ies of another firm", Edstrom admits that "the borderline 
between an acquisition and an equity JV is unclear in practice".
2. Types of operation
The literature is almost entirely concerned with 
domestic JVs in the USA. See, for example, Backman, Boyle, 
Friedman & Berg, Friedman, Berg & Duncan, Hlavacek & Thompson, 
Mead and Pfeffer & Nowak. Asch & Seneca also wrote about US 
ventures, but these were illegal collusions rather than JVs 
as such. Edstrom too wrote about national ventures, for 
both acquisitions and JVs, but these were Swedish. Gullander 
wrote about Swedish domestic JVs and international JVs in 
European industrialised countries involving at least one 
Swedish firm.
The present study looks at cross-frontier collaborations 
in the EEC, including both joint ventures and acquisitions, 
involving one British company in each case.
3. Industries covered
Most of the studies look at manufacturing industry in 
general. Mead looked at joint bidding behaviour in oil and 
gas resource markets and Hlavacek & Thompson considered 
technology based industries. Backman and Friedman & Berg 
studied the chemical industry, with Friedman, Berg & Duncan 







Backman wrote that the JV has become increasingly
important in the chemical industry, on account of "the
necessity for diverse technical abilities and special
knowledge in new fields of proposed activity. The use
of JVs has been most extensive for petrochemicals.....
...The technical problems involved, the high costs for
research and development, and the various time lags before
a profitable return could be earned have made petrochemicals
1
a suitable area for sharing capital expenditure".
Friedman & Berg, in concentrating on chemicals, touched 
on the benefit, and a potential problem, in isolating one 
industry for analysis : "interpretation is clouded by neither 
differential industry tecinolo^al oppoitunities nor by inter­
industry market structure effects. Unfortunately, the gain
in precision from reliance on a single industry carries the
2
danger of this industry being atypical".
The present study has also confined itself to one
industry - mechanical engineering - in order to avoid 
variations due to different industry characteristics.
4. Methodology
A number of the studies used an analysis of published
data at the firm level. Asch & Seneca looked at 51 firms
found guilty of collusion under the US Sherman Act, plus a 
control group of 50 non-collusive firms drawn randomly.
Others to use published data at that level were Boyle; 
Friedman & Berg ; Friedman, Berg & Duncan; Mead; and Pfeffer 
& Nowak. Boyle complained that since most JVs are privately 
held, the necessary data on them is not generally available 
from public sources.^ Edstrom's analysis was at the industry
Backman, p.p. 14-15 




level, and he admitted its weakness : "The reason for using
industry data instead of data for individual firms is the
difficulty in obtaining comparable data for individual
companies. The use of industry data makes any generalisation
about the behaviour of individual firms problematic. If
we are willing to accept that the firms engaged in
acquisitions, that contractual and equity JVs are typical
for their industry, then generalisations are justified,
1
but we have no assurance of this". Backman did no 
detailed statistical analysis.
It should be noted that only Gullander and Hlavacek 
& Thompson carried out personal interviews with JV managers. 
The latter study concentrated on 19 new-product JVs, whose 
formation had been publicised. Gullander added his series 
of interviews with top executives of 40 JVs involving at least 
one Swedish firm each to an extensive literature search 
on JVs in Europe.
The present study also uses the personal interview 
method, details of which are discussed in Chaf±er 5.
5. Economic benefits and justifications of JVs
Mead has pointed out that joint ventures may be
justified as being "the best means available of obtaining
2
entry in an industry or geographic market", and considered 
four justifications :
a) Absolute capital requirements, due to large scale




See also p.p. gg and gg ^
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(5 continued...)
b) Risks associated with entry and operation in a given 
industry or geographic market may be so great that few 
or no existing firms are able or willing to assume 
such risks alone ;
"It should be noted", wrote Mead, "that points a) and
b) are both justifications in terms of increasing 
competition in the industry entered whereas the normally
1
expressed fears are that JVs reduce competitive vigour".
c) Separate operations may be economically wasteful as a
means of performing some necessary function ;
d) A JV may be justified where a large investment is
expected to produce important external economies that
accrue indiscriminately to firms in a given industry, 
rather than primarily to the investing firm - it may, 
for example, produce non-patentable processes and
2
information that quickly becomes public property.
Mead rejected two additional justifications - the argument in
favour of "complementary and overlapping" technology because
"the new technology may be hired in the relatively free market
for technologists"; and Beckman's argument that "the partners
are able to diversify their activities with a smaller investment
than would be required if either one undertook the project alone"
because, claimed Mead, this "assumes that there are welfare
benefits which follow from increased diversification" and
that "this argument is the opposite of the specialisation and
4
division of labour thesis and is yet to be established".
But there may undoubtedly be benefits from diversification. 
It may reduce dependence on one product or geographic market, 
for example, and thus reduce the risk factor. And in the 
ICI - Montedison JV^ in 1977, if the firms had independently
1 Ibid, p.824
2 Ibid, p.p. 824-5
3 Backman, p.8
4 Mead, p. 825
5 See p. 66.
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built factories for the production of aniline for their 
own use, they would each have been left with substantial 
excess capacity at the cost of a very heavy investment.
But a factory between them would have just met their joint 
requirements, with a substantial saving resulting to both 
companies.
Moreover, Friedman & Berg stated that their results
were "consistent with Beckman's view that complementary/
overlapping technologies play an important role in JVs by 
1
chemical firms".
Backman added further economic benefits : "The JV 
permits the sharing of technology as well as managerial
talent...... Research and development' activités may be
broadened. Sales outlets may be obtained or the supply 
of raw materials may be assured. Economies in purchasing,
selling, handling and in other areas may be derived......
 Finally, in terms of its broader economic impact, the
JV adds to the number of actual competitors and to total 
capacity in the market and as a result often brings new
2
vigour to competition for the products and markets involved".
6. Anticompetitive effects of JVs
Mead also included three possible anticompetitive effects 
of JVs :
i) Restraint of competition between horizontally related 
firms;
ii) Foreclosure of markets; that is to say, in the case of a 
vertical relationship a JV may exclude competing independent 
suppliers from dealing with the parent organisations.
iii) Reduction in potential competition. Pfeffer & Nowak 
wrote that the JV "may preclude the independent entry into 
the market by both firms, or may forestall entry by another 
firm. And, horizontal JVs may raise industry barriers to 
entry by providing the joint subsidiary with financial and 
technical resources that would not be available to independent 
firms attempting to enter the market."^
1 Friedman & Berg, p.1336
2 Backman, p.8 See also the present study, p.200#
3 Pfeffer & Nowak, p.323
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7. Motives for entering JVs
Pfeffer & Nowak argued that JVs "are undertaken by 
firms to manage their competitive and buyer-seller inter­
dependence, and that JVs, if successful in reducing the 
uncertainty associated with these forms in interdependence,
are simultaneously successful in reducing competition in
1
the market place."
They formulated two hypotheses :
a) For vertically related industries, JVs are undertaken
"to manage the buyer-seller interdependence, with the
greater the interdependence, the greater the proportion
2
of JVs undertaken with partners in that industry".
b) In horizontal relationships, JVs "are undertaken not 
to control buyer-seller interdependence, but rather to 
overcome competitive interdependence. Therefore we 
argue that within industries, JV activity will be more 
strongly related to industry structure as measured, for 
example, by industrial concentration".^
They wrote that "the general advantage of managing inter­
im
dependence is the reduction of uncertainty" and noted that it 
has been argued^ that firms seek to reduce uncertainty and 
will even trade off profits for certainty. In the case of 
vertical interdependence, "the advantages include ensuring a 
stable and predictable source of supply of important materials 
or components, or ensuring reliable outputs and markets for 
the product".^
Pfeffer & Nowak hypothesised that at very low levels 
of concentration "horizontal JVs would have only a limited 
impact in reducing competitive uncertainty because there are
1 Ibid, p.316
2 & 3 ibid, p.329
4 Ibid, p.332
5 Richard E.Caves, "Uncertainty, Market Structure and Performance: 
Galbraith as Conventional Wisdom", in J.W.Markham & G.F.Papanek 
(eds.) 'Industrial Organisation and Economic Development', Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 283-302.
6 Pfeffer & Nowak, p. 332
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1
numerous firms that must be organised". • Where there are
very few firms in the industry, such JVs may not be necessary
to manage competitive interdependence, where other less formal
forms of co-ordination may be adequate. Thus JV activity
will be highest at intermediate levels of concentration.
Their results supported these contentions, showing that JV
activity is indeed highest at intermediate levels. "It should
be noted", they wrote, "that the difference in concentration
variable alone accounts for 30% of the observed variation in
2
the proportion of horizontal JV activity."
The results of the investigations into vertical 
relationships indicate that even more of the variance in 
the pattern of JV activity is accounted for by resource 
interdependence variables than in the formation of JVs.
Pfeffer & Nowak claimed that : "These results further 
support the argument we have developed. Joint subsidiaries 
are formed more often in industries which are vertically 
related to the industry of the parent firms. The fact that 
the concentration ratio for the industry of the joint 
subsidiary is much less important in accounting for the 
pattern of JVs indicates that JVs generally do not represent 
diversification into oligopoly markets by the parent firms, 
and that joint subsidiaries are not being extensively employed 
to enter (and thereby introduce competition to) highly 
concentrated industries."^
Pfeffer & Nowak concluded that the results are consistent 
with the idea that JVs are used to manage interfirm inter­
dependence, and that they are simultaneously successful in 
reducing competition in the market place.
1 Ibid, p.330
2 Ibid, p.331
3 Ibid, pp 336-337. The present study uses both subjective
concentration measures and direct questions on the importance
of competition in preference to concentration ratios (see pp# 166^67) •
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TABLE 7 Pfeffer & Nowak : Vertical relationships and JV activity
CORRELATION
Variable A B
Proportion of industry i's
sales to industry j .28* .27'
Proportion of industry i's
purchases from industry j .25* .42'
Proportion of industry i's 
total transactions with
industry j .28* .39'
Concentration ration in
industry j .16** .10’
Proportion of total employment 
engaged in R & 0 in
industry j (1) .25* .16'
* p <  .001 ** p <.05 ***p <. 1 0
( 1) The proportion of total employment engaged in R & D is used 
as a measure of technological intensity.
A ; Correlations of JV activity with interdependence and industry 
structure variables.
B : Correlations of the proportions of industry i's joint subsidiaries
in industry j with industry structure variables.
Source : Pfeffer & Nowak, pp333 & 336
— 24 —
Friedman, Berg & Duncan were rather more cautious about 
Pfeffer & Nowak's results : "These conclusions warrant more 
careful study. From the evidence they (Pfeffer & Nowak) 
present, one could argue that rivalry promotes time- 
economising activity, since a relatively competitive market 
structure puts a premium on early introduction of new products."
It is also possible that at intermediate levels (ie, 
where the smaller firms have not yet been squeezed out of the 
market) smaller firms may use JVs either with different large 
firms in a defensive balance (as suggested by Gullander, I) 
or with each other in order to survive against the very large 
competitors.
Another possible reason for JVs taking place in highly
concentrated industries might be that the concentration ratio
may reflect minimum efficient scale and JVs may be the chosen
2
means of obtaining available economies of scale.
Mead, writing in 1967 on joint bidding agreements for 
oil and gas leases in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico between 
1959 and 1965, examined the behaviour of 16 firms in Alaska 
and 14 in Mexico which had bid separately following the break-up
of an agreement. He found that only one of the Alaskan
firms, and two of the Mexican firms, had bid more frequently 
against former partners than non-partners within two years of 
the break-up. This represented deviations from the expected 
frequencies which were too great to be explained by chance, 
using a 0.01 level of significance.
He found, however, that the tendency toward restrained 
bidding between former partners disappeared over the following 
two-year period, and in addition, that bidding partnerships in 
one geographical area have no effect on bidding behaviour in 
another area.
1 Friedman, Berg & Duncan, p.103
2 A.Millington, Centre for European Industrial Studies at the
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Actual frequencies deviate from expected too far to be explained 
by chance, using a 0.01 level of significance.
The deviation of actual frequencies from expected could be due 
to chance, using a 0.01 level of significance.
Source : Mead, p,843
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Mead also discovered that joint bidding arrangements can 
lead to serious distortions in pricing. His data show that 
the high bid is a positive function of the number of bidders 
in both Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico, as shown by simple 
regression analysis :
ALASKA Log Y = .48529 + 1.28707 Log X = .31
(0.05416)
GULF OF MEXICO Log Y = 1.59697 + 1.35197 Log X R^ = .43 
where Y is the highest bid and X is the number of bidders.
However, Mead's conclusion of causality in the bid price > 
does not necessarily follow. It could well be (and very likely 
is) the case that more people will bid for a more attractive 
plot of land, and that it is the attractiveness of the plot, 
and not the number of bidders, which causes the highest price.
Boyle also looked at the competitive position of the JV 
vis-a-vis its parent companies and the nature of the 
competitive relationship between the parent companies.
As far as the former goes, Boyle found that 55% of the
parent companies were classified in the same two-digit
industry group as their subsidiaries, and that 44% manufactured
products in the same 4-digit industry as that of their
subsidiary. Since his data show that 85% of the non-horizontal
relationships between parents and subsidiaries involve some
form of vertical integration, "looking at the entire group
it appears that the parent companies and the subsidiaries
manufactured products in completely unrelated areas in less
1
than 10% of the cases".
1 Boyle, p.88 For a comparison with the present study, see p 164.
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Analysis of the competitive relationships between the
parents showed that "in about 55% of the cases, two or more
of the parent companies were direct competitors in the
production and sale of one or more products" (on a 5-digit
1
product class basis). Although Boyle admits that "this type
of analysis has one major shortcoming, however; because
estimates are not available of the dollar value of sales in
each product class, it is impossible to obtain quantitative
measures of the exact extent to which the parent companies
2
are in competition with each other", he claims that his 
data do suggest that more than one-half of the 276 joint 
subsidiaries included in his analysis (which he states 
represents a minimum of the domestic joint subsidiaries of 
the 500 largest US manufacturing corporations) "present at 
least one of the basic ingredients apparently necessary 
for a successful prosecution under Section 7 (of the US 
'Clayton Act'), namely, the fact that the parent companies 
are competitors."^
Boyle concluded that these parent companies "seem to be 
using the joint subsidiary as a means of increasing the 
existing integration between their presumably independent 
companies (a fact that suggests the importance of the joint
4
subsidiaries may far exceed their actual size)."
Backman took up the three arguments presented against
joint ventures in terms of their effect on the market that they
1) tend to limit the present and potential competition in 
the product market affected ;
2) tend to result in domination of the product market because
of the economic power of the parent companies; and
3) tend to lessen competition in other product lines in
which the two companies are already competing





Writing about the chemical industry, Backman rejected 
the first argument on the grounds that : "The fear that JVs 
may reduce potential competition ignores the possibility that 
neither company may be willing to enter the market on an 
individual basis and hence that in the absence of JVs the 
number of competitors will be fewer, not greater. Chemical 
companies are not looking for partners simply to share 
profits. Rather, JVs are formed because there are advantages 
to both partners and thus make possible the entry of a new 
firm or the development of a new product. It is probable that 
in the absence of the JV, a new entry otherwise would not have 
taken place in many, instances.
"The basic factor affecting decisions to enter a market
is the prospective economic development of a new product.
Where a demand levels off, the incentive to enter a market
may become zero. On the other hand, where strong growth
is in prospect, the incentive for new entry is increased
accordingly. It is not the existence of a JV which inhibits
entry in the static situation, nor will it prevent entry
where dynamic growth is anticipated. The role of the JV is
1
subordinate to this fundamental economic order."
A new joint venture will, said Backman, affect existing 
competition insofar as in a static market the JV can only 
gain a market share at the expense of existing companies.
But in an expanding market both the JV and its competitors 
can grow in absolute terms, although relative shares will 
change.
This situation of course applies to any venture, from a
greenfield venture to an expansion of existing operations.
In any situation in which one firm increases its relative
market share, at least one other firm must lose a share.
This is the effect of increased competition and the greater
competiveness of one (the growing) firm. As Backman
2




Competitiveness and efficiency can say more about competition 
than the number of firms in the market. In theory, as firms 
are eliminated from the market the remaining firms can adjust 
to take advantage of their increasingly dominant positions. 
Hence the best protection of competition is simply the 
elimination of barriers to entry and re-entry.
Backman refuted the second argument on the grounds that
"there has been considerable entry into many chemical markets
1
despite the organisation of JVs." He then mentioned
several others which, he claims, also indicate that market
dominance is neither the result not the abjective of JVs :
"First, the areas marked by the prevalence of JVs have
been markets in which the existing firms are large ones.
Secondly, the parents are not acquiring an existing firm but
almost invariably are creating a new competitor. Thirdly,
despite their large resources, the parents commit limited
resources to the JV and both parents usually must be in
agreement if these amounts are to be increased. Moreover,
because of their size both parents usually have large
competing demands from other activities upon their limited
(rather than unlimited) resources. Finally, JVs often provide
for research and development as a key element in their plants,
thus indicating that economic growth in terms of new and
better product lines, rather than market foreclosure, is the
2
primary motive in their formation."
Backman rejected the third argument on the grounds 
that : "Each company is under pressure, regardless of its 
corporate relationships in special areas, to compete vigorously 
in all markets in order to justify the investment required 
for the manufacture of each of its product lines. Anti­
competitive behaviour should not be inferred in all markets 
because of a business relationship in one market. Such an 
approach is based one guilt by association rather than proof 
of anticompetitve behaviour." 3
1 Ibid, p22
2 Ibid
3 Ibid , p.23
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1
Backman suggested a number of competitive effects of JVs 
on an industry which could be measured, namely :
1) Subsequent changes in the number of competitors, in 
capacity, and/or output, are existing producers forced 
out of the market ?
2) Countermeasures taken by existing producers :
a) Intensify their research and development and/or 
develop improved or new product lines ;
b) Improve services ;
c) Intensify selling by adding to sales force, by 
increasing advertising budgets, or by other means ;
d) Modernise their own capacity to lower costs or to
improve quality ;
e) Improve credit terms.
3) Changes in market shares.
4) Impact on prices and price practices - for example,
after one particular US chemicals JV was formed,a
competitor offered customers five-year contracts with 
guarantees against price increases and the benefit of 
any price cuts.
5) Are other firms able to enter the industry ?
Of course, where a JV is formed between two existing producers, 
it may prevent at least one of them from being forced out of 
the market, if the purpose of the JV is to ensure survival. 
Moreover, although the occurence of countermeasures may at 
first sight appear to be a response to the JV, they could just 
be due to a relative decline in the industry itself, which 
would force such measures as producers struggle to retain their 
absolute market share (ie, to increase their relative share of 
a shrinking market). JVs may simply be another response to 
this decline, or else just another means of achieving the 
same countermeasures.
Backman wrote that JVs should have no more effect on market 
entry than any other company of similar size and resource. He 
concluded : "These illustrations also underline the importance 
of examining each JV within the framework of its own market 
experience. Any per se approach which attempts to bar JVs 
would result in anticompetitive effects in many markets in the
1 Ibid, p14. The absence of a control group & the limited size of 
the present study meant that these effects could not be tested 
( see p. 46 ) .
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name of promoting competition."
Edstrom also wrote about industrial concentration,
concluding that "industry concentation and financial strength
are important determinants of both acquisition and JV
behaviour while differences in corporate goals and the
characteristics of the other party in the relationship
2
account for variations in behaviour."
He examined the following four hypotheses :
1) High industry concentration will lead to a high relative 
propensity to acquire other firms and to engage in 
co-operation. This effect ought to be more pronounced 
at higher levels of concentration ;
2) Firms acquire profitable and fast growing firms ;
3) Acquisitions will generally be more closely associated 
with financial strength than equity JVs,
and equity . JVs more closely than contractual Jvs;
4) Acquisitions will be used against firms which are 
financially weak while contractual and equity JVs will 
be used in relations with firms of equal financial 
strength.
Edstrom defined an acquisition as the purchase by one 
company of at least 50% of all assets and liabilities of 
another firm, though he admitted that the borderline between 
an acquisition and an equity JV is unclear in practice.
Being based on an analysis of Swedish manufacturing 
industry and hence freed from the antitrust restrictions which 
bind the US cases, Edstrom's analysis can be expected to be 
somewhat closer to the case in the EEC - though like his 
American counterparts Edstrom too concentrated on national 
operations.
Edstrom's results indicated that acquisitions are more common 
within the same industry sector while contractual JVs occur
1 Ibid, p.23
2 Edstrom, p.477
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most often between industry sectors in manufacturing (ie, 
vertical relationships) and equity JVs are weighted towards 
relationships between manufacturing and other industries - 
ie, conglomerate arrangements. "The use of equity JVs in 
relationships involving firms outside manufacturing may 
indicate a need to complement existing know-how within the 
firm. "
Edstrom found that the most common functional areas for 
equity JVs are in production and marketing, with 44% and 
4G% respectively of the total, and that joint production is 
to a large extent concentrated on new products.
A breakdown of contractual 3\J activity showed 38% in
marketing, 27% in product development, 22% in production and
13% in supply, showing relatively more JVs in product
development and supply and relatively less in production
2
compared to equity JVs.
"Even though there is a variation among individual 
acquisitions, equity and contractual JVs," he wrote, "the 
choice of strategy seems to vary with industry linkage and 
the size of the firms involved."^
TABLE 9
Edstrom: Classification of strategy according to industry linkage
With the same Between industry Before manufacturing 
industry sectors in and other
Strategy sector % manufacturing % industries %
Acquisitions 45 34 21
Equity JVs 20 31 49
Contractual JVs 31 45 24
Source : Edstrom, p.489
4
Edstrom drew the following conclusions from his results : 
Industry concentration provides a source of contingencies and 
uncertainty for firms in that industry which they try to
1 Ibid, p.489. See also p. 164 of the present study for a
comparison of results.
2 Edstrom, p.487
3 Ibid, p. 489
4 Ibid, pp 489-90
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avoid.or control, eg,, through acquisitions and co-operation.
Adaptive strategic actions require resources. The lack of 
important resources such as financial resources will restrict 
a firm's strategic action. The need for resources varies 
with type of strategic behaviour.
The use of acquisitions tends to vary with the nature of 
strategic change and hence with the size and industry of the 
other firm(s) in the relationship.
Both large and small firms tend to deal with contingencies 
in their own industry by acquisition of firms in that industry 
This is particularly so if prospects for acquisitions are 
characterised by high profits and growth.
Large companies (>► 500 employees) use contractual OVs with 
large firms in neighbouring industries to reduce uncertainty 
and cope with contingencies.
Large firms use equity 3\ls with firms in industries outside 
manufacturing as a first step in expanding their product/ 
market scope.
L Friedman & Berg presented two conflicting hypotheses for 
3\J motives : (i) the knowledge acquisition model; and (ii) 
the market power model of JV activity.
The theory behind the knowledge acquisition model is 
that rather than commit themselves to long term and expensive 
investment in technical knowledge, firms will look for R & D 
JVs, which will reduce both the time lag and the risk from 
the levels associated with exclusively in-house R & D activity 
However,Jv-ing firms face higher costs in the form of inter­
firm communication costs, shared returns, and so on. Hence 
the parent company's rate of return will be negatively 
correlated with its JV activity.
Since the market power hypothesis depends on the rate 
of return increasing in direct proportion in JV activity, the 
two hypotheses necessarily conflict.
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The following model was developed :
R. = R(R&D intensity; Size; Diversification; Joint Venturing) 
where R^ = Firm (i) observed rate of return.
.0 . (RD/S) + b^ (Log S J  + b,(Dj + b, (JV)^ +e.
"2R. = b + bZ°  ^~t ' ti ■ “2 ~i' ' "3'"i' ' "4 i "t1 0 i t  = - r
where :
(RD/S)^^ = R&D expenditure relative to sales in time t for firm i.
lil^ = Weights from a polynomial distributed lag.
S^ = Total firm sales in dollars for firm i.
D^ = Four digit diversification index for firm i.
(JV)^ = Whether (1) or not (0) firm has had a JV within the
previous three years.
The expected coefficients were :
bi >  0 ; ti2 >  0 ; tij < 0 ; b4 ^ 0.
If b^< 0 this backs the knowledge acquisition model, since firms 
pay more for quicker, less risky technical inputs ;
If b^ y  0 this backs the market power model, since JVs increase 
the rate of return.
Their results were as follows :
TABLE 10 Friedman & Berg
Cross Sections of the Rate of Return in Chemicals (SIC 28) 
Year N ^1 ^2 ^3 ^4
Firms Constant Lagged Log Diversi­ JVs r"
(R&D/S) Sales fication
1973 105 3.92 49.00 3.78 -0.35 -2.71 0.18
(1.71) (1.93) (3.61) (2.65) (1.35)
1972 75 2.94 91.78 3.54 -0.43 -2.93 0.35
(1.03) (3.77) (2.93) (3.28) (1.64)
1968 39 4.86 110.12 1.77 -0.21 -4.16 0.35
(1.25) (3.68) (1.12) (1.45) (1.84)
Source : Friedman & Berg p. 1335
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Friedman & Berg, noting that <  0, admitted that the
coefficients for 1973 and 1972 were not very significant,
and suggested that "the size of the coefficient may reflect
the fact that the managers of firms that engage in JVs
1
are more risk averse than are others."
An alternative suggestion, put forward by Asch & Seneca, 
is that ventures may be in response to past low profitability.
"Our tentative conclusion," wrote Friedman & Berg, "is
that neither theory nor descriptive/statistical evidence supports
the contention that the pro-competitive impacts of new entry by
2
JVs are outweighed by their market power effect."
Having added Duncan to their ranks, Friedman & Berg extended 
this analysis to two types of JVs for nineteen industrial 
groups over a period of ten years.
Their results confirmed their findings against the market- 
power hypothesis, indicating that "knowledge-acquisition JVs 
lower rates of return relative to non-JVing firms", and that 
"When firms participate heavily in knowledge-acquisition JVs, 
the industries tend to have lower rates of return than they 
would otherwise."^
However, they also state that "other JVs increase rates 
of return" without giving any further details or explanations. 
They noted that "the expected profitability of each firm is 
higher (or the risk lower) than in the absence of a JU."^
They suggested that a case-by-case rule should be used in 
evaluating the competitive effects of JV activity.
Friedman, Berg & Duncan then went on to measure the 
extent of JV and R&D substitution by considering the level 
of internal R&D which was performed by Jving firms relative 
to the level which was performed by non-JVing firms.




The functional firm for this substitution test was
R&D = a^ + a.S + a 3^ + a_CF/S + a JV 
0 1 2  3 4
where
R&D = R&D expenditures for 1973
S = Sales for 1973
CF = Cash Flow for 1973
JV = 0 if no JVs formed by the firm 
= 1 if a JV was formed.
The expected signs were : a^Z> 0; a^ ^  0; a^
The results were as follows :
TABLE 11
Friedman, Berq & Duncan :
R&D as a function of Sales and JV activity, 1973
a^ S SjCF/S a^JV
-6
Chemicals -7.59 0.0174 4.2x10 161.4 -12.6 0.820
(-1.41) (2.76) (2.90) (3.82) (-2.10)
Resource „
Processing -1.14 0.010 -3.6x10 -4.68 0.055 0.786
(-0.52) (6.56) (-2.32) (-0.198) (0.020)
-6
Engineering -16.3 0.0357 1.9x10 215.3 -14.9 0.933
(-5.2) (22.3) (-0.36) (5.77) (-2.59)
Source : Friedman, Berg & Duncan 
p.105
Thus for chemicals and engineering a ^ < 0  while for resource
processing industries a^ ^  0. Since Friedman, Berg & Duncan
describe chemicals and engineering as high technology industries,
they claim that these results support the view that knowledge-
acquisition JVs substitute for internal R&D expenditures of
technologically intense firms, while the hypothesis that all
1
industries conform to the same 3\J pattern is rejected.
Ibid, p.105 The present study confirms that 3\Js - and also 
acquisitions - may be used as a substitute for internal R&D (see p20S.)
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They concluded "The validity of interpreting 3\Js as an
innovative substitute for internal R&D expenditure depends
upon the specific industry that is being considered. Those
industries that do not engage in such substitution tend to
engage in distribution or resource risk-pooling ventures. The
data indicate that those industries and firms that have
relatively high R&D intensities can be presumed to be using
1
3\Js as innovative substitutes."
They provided the following distribution of 3\J character­
istics by industry :
TABLE 12
Friedman. Bero & Duncan ; Percentaoe Distribution of JV 
Characteristics by Industry, 1964-74
Industry SIC Technology/ Resource Marketing
Knowledge Construction
Computer 357 56.3 - 43.7
Instruments 38 61.1 - 38.9
Transport
Equipment 37 82.7 13.5 3.8
Electrical
Equipment 36 71.4 14.3 14.3
Chemicals 28 43.8 43.2 13.0
Non-Electrical 351 45.8 20.9 33.3
Miscellaneous
Machinery 32/35 52.8 36.1 11.1
Metal/mining 10/33 30.7 60.2 9.1
Petroleum 29 25.8 65.3 8.9
Source: Friedman, Berg & Duncan
Hlavacek & Thompson went on to write more about JVs in 
technology intensive industries, concentrating on new product 
JVs. Noting the lack of previous research in this area, they 
stated that their work was only exploratory, and that they did 
not intend to "prove" or "disprove" each of their hypothese 
in the classical sense.
Nevertheless, they did provide the following six working 
hypotheses :
1) New product JVs will original mostly in firms which are 
technology intensive and/or have changing technologies. 
Friedman, Berg & Duncan, p.108.
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Not surprisingly supported by the results, this perhaps 
seems obvious - but it does not surely apply only to JVs. 
New products themselves will no doubt originate mostly in 
such firms. 1
2) New product JVs will most often occur between a technical 
contributing firm and a marketing contributing firm
with the former as most often the initiator.
This was supported by the results - "in our sample, at
least, a "technology push" was more prevalent than a
1
"market pull" transfer of technology".
3) The technology-contributing partner will be smaller (in 
yearly sales volume) than the marketing contributing 
partner.
This too was supported by their results.
4) When one of the contributing firms is relatively 
larger, the larger parent will exert more influence 
after the new product JV is formed (and maybe before 
as well).
Hlavacek & Thompson's results suggest that potential
conflicts from parental size differences could be
avoided with a detailed JV agreement. "It is possible
that by thorough planning, incorporating the results
in a detailed legal document, most problems arising
from parental size differences can be avoided. Further
discussions with JV managers revealed that the differences
in corporate goals between large and small firms was the
2
major problem to resolve".
5) A more deliberate and analytical search, analysis and 
negotiation prior to forming a JV will occur when one 
or both of the contributing firms is large.
This was again supported by the results, but is also 
perhaps an obvious point. As Hlavacek & Thompson 
themselves admit, "five of the smaller JV partners stated 
that they did not have either the time or personnel to 
conduct such formal evaluation."^
1,2 Hlavacek & Thompson, p.38. See also p.p. 46, 115—H 6  and 194 
3 Ibid, p.39. See also the present study, p. 194#
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6) The close physical proximity of the JV to either 
contributing parent will interfere with the rapid 
integration of personnel into the new JV organisation. 
There was some evidence to support this view.
Asch & Seneca questioned whether collusion is profitable 
at all. "The -major finding of this paper," they wrote, "is 
the consistently negative and significant relationship between 
firm profitability and the presence of collusion. This 
result may indicate the inappropriateness of some common 
notions about the role of collusion and about the economic 
impact of public policies to prohibit collusion."
In criticism, though, it must be said that the direction 
of causality is not clear - Asch & Seneca cannot say whether 
collusion causes low profitability of vice-versa. They 
admit this weakness, and suggest three possible explanations 
of their results ;
a) Collusion may consistently lead to lower profitability 
(which they regard as being an unsatisfactory explanation);
b) Unsatisfactory profit performance may motivate firms to 
collude;
c) "It may be that antitrust prosecution centres largely
on the unsuccessful manifestations..... Simply put, poor
2
collusive performances are more likely to be discovered."
Asch & Seneca concluded that the latter two alternatives 
seem the most plausible, and may in fact reinforce each other. 
"That is, relatively favourable profit performances may induce 
overt collusive agreements which then proceed under conditions 
that are frequently discouraging to their success."^
It should be noted here that Asch & Seneca's sample was 
made up of illegal collusions picked up by the US antitrust 
authorities. These were cartel arrangements rather than JVs.
Asch & Seneca suggested that successful collusions were 
more likely to remain undetected by the antitrust authorities,
1 Asch & Seneca, p.7
2 Ibid, p.a 
Ibid.
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so that their sample only represented an unrepresentative 
part of the total.
This explanation is, it must be said, rather weak. There
is no convincing explanation of why a poor performance
should be more likely to be discovered than a strong one.
There is no reason why unsuccessful firms should be forced
into overt agreements, while successful firms have covert
agreements for which there is no evidence, since they are
not picked up by the antitrust authorities. Asch & Seneca
were unable to provide any evidence to support these 
1
contentions.
A number of JU writers have mentioned the question of 
firm size. As Boyle put it: "Firms joined together to 
achieve some specific function, typically some form of hori­
zontal or vertical integration, typically give as the basic 
reason for their ’associations' the argument that the 
participating firms are either technically or financially 
unable to engage in the desired activity alone, a line of 
reasoning that implicitly assumes, of course, that the parent 
companies are relatively small. In fact, however, such 
situations are rarely found. JVs themselves are typically
small manufacturing companies, while the parents are more
• 2
often the country's very largest firms".
Pfeffer & Nowak concurred with this, finding that joint 
subsidiaries are frequently relatively small organisations 
formed by large competing or vertically related firms. While 
their data did not cover the size of the JUs in their sample, 
the median level of assets of the parents concerned was #549.5 
million (in 1976). "It is difficult convincingly to argue," 
they wrote, "that firms of this size require JVs to achieve 
economies of scale. Further, it is not readily apparent
why firms of this size require JVs for risk sharing it
is hard to argue that much of the observed JV activity can
The present study seeks to resolve the question of the role of 
profitability by asking firms directly what part in their 
investment decisions was played by their own declining profitability
(see pp 4 4  ^ 170 and 177).
Boyle, p.92
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be explained by the requirements for raising capital to
1
undertake a venture."
Boyle claimed that there is a positive relationship between 
the size of a company and its participation in JVs. He 
pointed out that 42% of the 100 largest manufacturing firms 
in the USA have had joint subsidiaries, compared to only 
4% of the firms in the 401st to 500th largest size class.
Edstrom's results also showed a weighting towards larger 
firms in JV behaviour, as seen below:
TABLE 13
Edstrom : Classification of Strategy According to Company Size
Size of Company 
Strategy Large (%) Small (%)
Acquisitions: Acquiring firms 43 57
Acquired firms 5 95
Equity JVs 73 27
Contractual JVs 69 31
Source : Edstrom, p.488
He showed that while 95% of his acquired firms were small
( ^  500 employees), 57% of the acquiring firms were also
amsll. 73% of the equity JVs and 69% of the contractual JVs
2
involved large firms.
Reference has already been made (p. 3@) to Hlavacek 
& Thompson's results on potential conflicts from parental 
size differences. They found that new product JVs usually 
take the form of a 'technology push' by a small initiating 
firm with the other typically larger firm providing 
marketing and financial resources. They suggested that "a 
detailed JV agreement will protect the smaller contributing 
parent from the often more ambitious objectives of the larger
1 Pfeffer & Nowak, p.328. See also the present study, p 176.
2 Edstrom, p.488. His results have already been presented on pp 31— 33
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contributing parent" and that "by virtue of its possession
of the new technology, the technology partner can hold its
1
own regardless of size."
Finally, Gullander found that the major reasons for 
entering JVs are as follows :
i) to satisfy nationalistic demands ;
ii) to benefit from economies of scale, crtical mass and 
the experience curve effect ;
iii) to decrease dependency on other firms, and
iv) to circumvent market imperfections.
In a discussion on which stragegy suits particular 
types of firms, Gullander considered three alternatives : 
a) 'Go it alone'; b) Acquisition-merger; c) Joint Venture.
He wrote: "The 'go it alone' route would be suitable for 
firms which have a strong worldwide competitive position based 
on size, a 'world-beater' product, or any other quasi-monopoly 
advantage in the form of technology and management, for
instance both small single-product firms and large
diversified companies benefit highly from JVs. Large single­
product companies are more inclined towards.acquisitions or 
toward going it alone. The former choice becomes more likely
when concentration of the industry is heavy and the firm has
2
financial strength."
He concludes that "the JV is both a substitute for and 
a complement to the merger."^
The question of policy alternatives will be considered in 
Chapter 3, on 'Entry Strategies for E.G. Markets'.
1 Hlavacek & Thompson, p.39. See also pp 11;$—UL6 and 194
on the importance of a strong written agreement.
2 Gullander (II), pp1G5-107. See also ppl03—104 of the. present study
3 Gullander (I), p.114
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a. Weaknesses of previous studies and the development of the 
present study.
The literature is in the main confined to US national 
JVs. The joint venture is studied in respect of its use as an 
alternative to takeovers/mergers in an environment of 
strong antitrust laws which often precludes the possibility 
of the use of the latter stragies. The present study 
looks at joint ventures which have been undertaken for 
their own sake, not as a substitute for mergers or take­
overs, as well as examining takeovers in their own right.
Gullander's work comes the closest to the EEC case, in 
that he looks at the European industrialised countries.
His studies were limited to ventures involving at least one 
Swedish firm, and with a few exceptions most of the firms 
concerned were part of large multinational groups.
The US literature is based on national JVs, and as such 
does not consider JVs between one firm in the market and one 
outside. As will be demonstrated in this study, a JV may be 
used by one firm previously outside the market as a means of 
breaking into it. Horizontal international JVs may thus be —  
somewhat closer to vertical domestic relationships than to 
horizontal domestic relationships.
None of the previous studies has looked at British or 
intra-EEC ventures. This is a major gap in the literature.
The present study is therefore devoted to looking at these 
types of ventures, the survey covering transnational intra- 
EEC ventures involving one British firm in each case.
Neither does the US literature consider the role of a
culture gap in motives for JV formation. This will be shown
in the present study to be one of the most important aspects
of international joint venturing. Almost half of the 366
2
JVs which were recorded by the EC Commission in 1980 were
international operations, and the proportion had been higher 
in previous years. 3
1 See, for example, pp 1&4—185 and 202— 204*
2 Latest available statistics.
3 See pp. 4-6
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The role of profitability in motives for JV formulation 
is open to question. Other writers have been unable to establish 
the direction of causality on whether collusion leads to 
low profitability or vice-versa. It is difficult, too, to 
determine the profitability of a JV since such operations 
typically form only a very small part of the parent companies' 
activities. Even if JV profits were presented separately 
(and they are generally amalgamated with other group results 
in the parents' accounts) they could not say much about the 
success of such ventures. Profit figures can be manipulated 
through transfer pricing techniques or the charging of 
management fees; increased profits may not have been the 
motive for a venture; a venture may not be expected to return 
to profitability for some years in a long term investment.
In addition, it may be difficult to detect the purpose 
of a JV or takeover from its post-profit performance 
because intentions and outcomes are not necessarily the same 
thing. A number of the ventures examined in this study have 
failed, so that the purposes of the agreement could not be 
detected by any analysis of their subsequent performance.
Moreover, low profitability may be one reason why firms
should seek joint ventures^ but it can be a very important
reason why such firms will not be able to find a JV partner.
Few firms are willing to commit resources to a venture with
a financially weak partner, particularly when that partner
1
is in a foreign country.
The problem is resolved in the present study by asking 
firms directly, through the use of a questionnaire, how 
important a part was played by declining profits in deciding 
on the venture.
See pp. 39— 40 « 170 . and 177.
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Writers who claim that a joint venture is anti­
competitive if it results in an increase in market power 
for the parent companies should also be careful. By 
increasing their market shares, these firms may be 
demonstrating a greater efficiency which their competitors 
have been unable to match. If this forces those competitors 
to strive in turn for greater efficiency, the competitive 
effects may indeed be positive, and not negative.
On the question of industrial concentration, published 
concentration figures may be misleading for two reasons ;
i) they may amalgamate a number of separate markets, giving
an overall average where actual concentration may vary
widely ;
ii) there may be high export and/or import ratios for the
industry, so that concentration figures based on
production shares may be meaningless as far as the 
domestic market is concerned.
Published statistics may therefore not represent accurately 
the true position which faces firms.- The present survey 
therefore uses other methods of examining concentration.
Attempts have been made to provide a subjective estimate
of concentration and strength of competition through the
questionnaire. This has been done by asking firms (i) how
strong industrial concentration is on a scale of 1-10 (1 being
very low, and 10 being monopoly); (ii) how important
competition was in a) the home market and b) the JV market in
1
making the JV decision.
By concentrating on individual ventures, it is possible
to determine whether there has been an increase/decrease/no
change in the number of competitors in the market concerned,
2
and whether any restraint in competition has resulted.
1 See pp. 166-167 and 198-202 .
2 See p;200.
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Some of the other factors which have been mentioned by 
other writers and which are also covered here are : the role 
of the shortage of capital; risk; complementary/overlapping 
technologies; the competitive relationship between the parents 
(horizontal, vertical, conglomerate); and firm size. The 
shortage of data, together with the fact that some of these 
operations took place some years ago, makes it impossible 
to examine any of the countermeasures which Backman (see 
p. 3Q ) suggested might be taken by other producers in 
response to a JV.
Hlavacek & Thompson's point (p. 36) about the strength
of the JV agreement will be taken much further. This will
be shown to be a very important practical issue in
1
international joint venturing.
Other factors to be examined may relate more to Chapter 
3 on corporate strategy. These include: joint venture 
motives (listed in order of importance); partner search; 
ownership and control; problem areas; and lessons learned by 
the firms concerned.
As far as methodology goes, most of the studies have
relied on published data, with only Gullander and
Hlavacek & Thompson using personal interviews with JV
managers. Edstrom wrote that the use of industry data can
lead to ^rreralisations being made unjustifiably, but that
2
data for individual firms is difficult to obtain .
The weaknesses of using published data have been pointed 
out, however, and in spite of Edstrom's reservations on obtaining 
data on individual firms it is considered that only through 
the collection of such data is it. possible to carry out an 
adequate analysis?
The present study is therefore based on personal interviews
1 See pp 1X5—116 and 194.
2 Edstrom, p.479.
3 For the success of this method, see pl58— 63 on response rates.
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1
using a detailed questionnaire.
In order to avoid variations due to different industry
characteristics, the present study is confined in general to
the mechanical engineering industries (though one electrical
engineering and two instrument engineering ventures are
included). The reason for choosing mechanical engineering
is that while accounting for 9% of industrial employment and
12% of output, the UK industry accounts for some 3G% of UK
international trade. The industry thus has a highly
international flavour, as indicated by its relatively high
import and export ratios (see Chapter 4, 'The Mechanical
Engineering Industry', pp 123 ) - The industry also
accounted for 20% of the work of the Business Co-operation
2
Centre between 1973 and 1980.
None of the other studies have been restricted to this 
one industry.
1 See Chapter 5 for details.
2 See Tables 5 & 6, pp 11—12.
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CHAPTER TWO
EEC POLICY ON CO-OPERATION
The object of this chapter will be to first discuss the 
thinking and philosophy which lies behind EEC policy on 
co-operation between enterprises, and then to discuss the 
application of EEC legislation to specific issues.
The fundamental philosophy underlying EEC policy on
co-operation is the preservation and enhancement of competition.
This is seen by the EC .Commission as being quite central to
the economic structure of the Common Market and to improvements
in both technology and the general standard of living within the 
1
Community.
At first sight, co-operation between companies would appear 
to represent an impairment of competition through reduding the 
number of competitors in the market, but the two concepts are 
not necessarily incompatible.
The Commission wants to encourage co-operation as a means 
of furthering or speeding economic and technical development and 
in helping European firms to compete more effectively against US 
and Japanese multinational companies. Also, by encouraging 
small and medium-sized firms to co-operate it can increase 
competition by reducing the possibility of customer dependence 
on a few oligopolistic firms. In addition, commercial and • 
industrial co-operation helps to shift the Member States towards 
the economic integration which is the eventual aim of the European 
Commission.
However, encouraging co-operation lays the Community open to 
market sharing agreements, domination or market foreclosure 
operations between the larger firms, and other anticompetitive
See Commission of the European Communities (herinafter referred to 
as 'the Commission'), First Report on Competition Policy, p.11, for 
a statement on the importance of competition.
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measures. Simply limiting agreements on the basis of company
size would not be an adequate answer, however, as the Commission
recognises that co-operation among large enterprises can also be
economically desirable without presenting difficulties from
1
the angle of competition policy.
Furthermore, such developments may well be necessary if the
Commission wants to transform Community enterprises from 
being nationally-based into European operations.
The problem is thus achieving a balance between co-operation 
and anticompetitive measures.
In answer to the question on which side of the argument 
the Commission will descend, it has declared the ultimate and 
wholly essential good as being the preservation of competition.
That is, no matter how great the advantages from economic and 
technical progress or improvements in production and distribution, 
a co-operation agreement may be ruled inadmissible by the 
Commission if it results in an impairment of competition. Whether 
or not the agreement will be disqualified is left, however, 
entirely at the discretion of the Commission. Its approach has 
been to place the emphasis on the economic effect of a co-operation 
just as much as its intention.
Since the economic advantages and competitive consequences 
of agreements naturally differ according to their individual 
circumstances, it is not possible to legislate on a broad basis 
beyond the guidelines presented in the lules on competition policy 
in the Treaty of Rome, and Commission judgements are thus made on 
a case by case basis.^
See EC Commission, 'The European Community's Competition 
Policy' , p.6.
The Commission has, however, created block exemptions for 
agreements of minor importance (see Appendix 2 for details) and for 
specialisation agreements below a certain size (see Regulation 2822/71 
in Appendix 2 for details).
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The framework of EEC Competition Policy is contained in 
Article 05 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Collaboration between 
companies is covered by Article 85. Where effective competition 
does not exist because of the existence of a dominant position 
by one or more companies, prevention of the exploitation of such 
a position is catered for by Article 36.
The object of Article 85 is to permit collaboration, but in 
a controlled way.
The problem with Article 86 is that while it prevents the
exploitation of a dominant position, it does not actually forbid
a dominant position at all, nor the manner in which it is acquired,
and thus ignores the question of why a firm should seek to acquire
such a position in the first place. Once the dominant position
has been attained, the competitive structure of the.industry has
already changed. Article 86 thus takes a static view of the
competitive situation, whereas a dynamic approach would take
account of market conduct which affects market structure and thus
1
changes the competitive situation over time.
The acquisition of a dominant position brings up the question 
of mergers and takeovers, which are not mentioned specifically in 
the Treaty of Rome. There is therefore a gap in the EEC Competition 
Policy, which the Commission hopes to fill with new legislation - 
namely, the proposed Merger Control Regulation, which is also discussed 
in this chapter.
While recognising that collaboration can result in benefits, 
the Commission's commitment to free and undistorted competition is 
such that it will not favour co-operation where the end of technical
2
or economic progress, etc., can be achieved without a collaboration.
1 See A.Jacquemin, p.137, for a criticism of Article 86 along these 
lines.
2 See Official Journal of the European Communities (hereafter referred 
to as 'OJ') L 30, 5.2,1976, p. 19 for a statement of this commitment.
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That is, it is not sufficient for a collaboration simply to result 
in benefits. It must constitute an improvement on the situation 
that would otherwise exist, not merely on the present situation.
The Commission's philosophy is that co-operation should be 
employed as the most effective means to an end, not as an end in 
itself. For this reason, it is concerned that any collaboration 
should not continue for longer than necessary and that the 
participants should afterwards be able to regain their economic 
independence without difficulty. Any other prospective outcome 
would imply co-operation for its own sake, and the Commission's 
view is that this would very likely lead to concerted practices in 
any of a number of different areas, from research and investment 
to marketing.
The case by case approach of the Commission to co-operation 
agreements means that an analysis of its attitudes can best be 
carried out by examining different types of agreements. This is 
done in part b) of this chapter, which also examines the extent 
to which the Commission will allow firms to agree not to compete 
with each other, together with any other factors, such as the market 
power of the joint venture's customers, which the Commission may 
take into account in its decision. This section is completed by 
a case study of the only prohibition decision so far adopted under 
Article 85.
Having covered the matter of co-operation, the question still 
remains of how to actively encourage firms to become 'European' 
in their attitudes. The Commission is concerned with providing the 
conditions necessary for this process, which introduces the subjects 
of company law and corporate taxation. The Commission believes 
that differences in corporate legal and fiscal systems are a barrier 
to understanding and to the transnational process in the EEC. The 
creation of uniform conditions will therefore encourage both firms 
and investors to develop a more European outlook and thus aid the 
creation of a single Community market. It believes that this will 
ensure that the widest possible choice will be available to customers 
and will also aid economic integration within the Community.
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If in the course of becoming European in nature it will be 
necessary for firms to merge or form joint subsidiaries across 
borders, a common corporate form will be called for which can 
circumvent the legal, fiscal and psychological impediments. This 
reasoning is the basis for both the European Company and its later 
and simpler modification, the European Co-operation Grouping.
Where such a corporate .form is not necessary, such as when 
firms do not wish to co-operate, companies still face problems in 
trying to establish a European presence because of the different 
fiscal and legal systems which operate in the EEC- Before a single 
European market can be established, then; it is first necessary 
to create uniformity in corporate taxation and company law. The 
company law directives seek uniformity in information, accounting 
behaviour and company structure, while proposals in the area of
taxation are aimed at preventing distortions in the free
movement of capital.
Harmonisation of these issues, which are discussed at greater 
length in pait c)of this chapter, is again not an end in itself 
but is seen as being the means to the overall end of economic 
integration in the EEC.
Topics to be covered in this chapter are thus :
Part a): Competition Policy in the EEC.
The application of Articles 85 and 86;
The proposed Merger Control Regulation.
Part b): The EC Commission's decisions on joint ventures.
General attitudes;
Types of joint ventures;
Other considerations;
Case study; ICI-Wasagchemie, 1978.
Part c): The Company in Europe.
The European Company;
The European Co-operation Grouping;
Harmonisation of Company Law;
Harmonisation of Corporate Taxation.
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Part a): Competition Policy in the EEC
1
The application of Articles 85 and 86.
i) Article 85
Article 85 is designed to eliminate agreements which have 
the object of effect of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition within the EEC, and are liable to affect trade 
between Member States- To qualify for exemption, an agreement 
must result in an improvement on the situation that would 
otherwise exist. That is, it must :
a) help to improve the production or distribution of goods; or
b) promote technical or economic progress;
c) allow consumeis a fair share of the resulting profit;
d) not result in any restrictions on the firms involved which
are not indispensable to the attainment of the agreement's 
objectives; and
e) not result in an elimination of competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the goods concerned.
The Commission may prohibit an offending agreement, in
which case it is automatically void, it may exempt it from the
prohibition under clause 85(3), or it may grant the agreement
a 'negative clearance' by stating that the facts available to
2
it reveal no need for action.
It is helpful to distinguish here between horizontal and 
vertical agreements. Horizontal agreements are those concluded 
between companies at the same stage of the industrial or 
commercial process. Joint sales/purchase organisations or 
cartels are examples. Since the companies concerned are 
involved in the same product market, and are at least potential 
competitors in the same geographic markets, there may be a 
significant chance of a restriction of competition.^
1 Articles 85 and 86 are reproduced in full in Appendix 2.
2 The regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 are contained in
Regulation IMo. 17 of the Council of 6.2. 1962, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p.204,
3 See J. Temple Lang, p.31, for a development of this argument.
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Although a horizontal cartel would only be permitted
by the Commission if its market share were unimportant, or
if it were a common sales/purchase organisation operating
outside the EEC only, contractual restrictions on
competition between a joint venture and its parents may
be permitted if it does not infringe upon competition which
would exist without the formation of the JV. On the other hand.
Article 85(1) would apply if the parents required the JV to
perform activités with respect to which they were formerly
actually or potentially competing. This holds whether the
1
restriction is by agreement or by effect.
Vertical agreements are those concluded between firms in
successive stages of the industrial or commercial process. An
example is an agreement between a manufacturer and an agent 
2
or distributor.
While exclusive dealing contracts^ may well fall within 
Article 85(1), exclusive agency agreements do not. This is 
because the party which appoints the agent is free to decide 
the product and/or geographic market within whictr the agent should 
operate. In the same way, in the case of Christiani 8T Nielsen 
(1969),^ the Commission decided that the imposition of marketing 
restrictions by a parent company on its wholly-owned subsidiary 
could only be considered as a division of tasks within the 
economic organisation of the group as a whole. As Mathijsen 
has pointed out, "where there is no economic autonomy there 
can be no competition and therefore no restriction of 
competition.
1 See H-G Koppensteiner, p.308, on this point.
2 For a description of these strategies see Chapter 3, pp 84—86.
3 de Jong notes (pp 43-44) that exclusive dealing is only objectionable
if agreements between independent trading partners contain export 
prohibitions to other areas.
4 As stated by the Commission in OJ 139, 24.12.1962 p.2921.
5 OJ L 165, 5.7.1969, p.12
6 P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, pp.80-81.
- 55 -
The Commission regards the decisive criterion which
distinguishes the commercial agent from the independent
■trader as being whether the agent assumes the risk arising from
the transactions. If he does so, his function becomes akin
1
to that of an independent trader. An example of an illegal
exclusive distributorship - by which a producer attempted
to maintain a price differential between two countries by
preventing a distributor from re-selling in the more expensive
market - was provided by the Commission's decision to
2
prohibit the Grundig-Consten agreement.
In case of a licensing agreement,^ restraints on the - 
licensee can only fall under Article 85(1) to the extent that 
they are not covered by the legal scope of the protective 
right under licence. On the other hand, restraints on the 
licensor cannot come under the protective scope of the licensed 
right, since that scope includes only prohibitive rights on 
the part of the owner, and may therefore come under Article 
85(1).^
ii) Article 86
The Commission's definition of a dominant position is when 
an enterprise has the power to behave independently • 
without taking into account, to any substantial effect, 
its competitors, purchasers and suppliers.^
In order to be able to assess the extent of an 
enterprise's power, the Commission needs to know such 
factors as : the firm's market share; the competitive 
structure of the industry; the firm's product range; the 
extent of its technological leadership; the ability of new 
firms to enter the market; the existence,of substitutes; 
and the mar.ket power of the customers.^
1 OJ 139, 24.12.1962, p.2921.
2 OJ 161, 20.10.1964.
3 Competition rules on licensing agreements are contained in the
'Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements,' OJ 139, 24.12.1962, p.2922.
A description of this strategy is given in Chapter 3, pp89— 92.
4 This point is followed up by Oberdorfer et al., p.59, who along with 
Bellamy & Child give an extensive treatment of Articles 85 and 86.
5 This was established in the Continental Can case, OJ C 68, 21.9.1973, p.33,
6 See Open University, pp.39-40, for a further analysis of these
indicators.
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The Commission's policy on the application of Article 86
to takeovers is that the acquisition of a competitor by a
dominant firm, with the result that only undertakings remain
in the market which are dependent on the dominant firm and which
do not constitute an adequate counterweight, amounts to an
1
abusive exploitation of dominance.
The proposed Merger Control Regulation.
While Article 86 may thus apply post hoc to concentrations
which result from a strengthening of market dominance and which
substantially impair competition, the Commission wishes to
strengthen this policy through a regulation which would assess -
2
mergers and takeovers prior to their being carried out, 
regardless of whether they arise from a previously existing 
dominance of one of the enterprises concerned. This is the 
basis for the proposed Merger Control Regulation.
This draft regulation, issued in 1973^, sought to prohibit 
any merger by which a firm could acquire or enhance the power 
to hinder effective competition in a substantial part of the 
Common Market. Firms below a certain size would be exempted.
The Commission suggested in its amended proposal that this 
limit should be drawn at 20% of the turnover of the product 
concerned and its substitutes in the Common Market, and at an 
aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned of 500 
million EUA. The Economic and Social Committee of the Council 
of the EEC accepted the proposal, subject to the proviso that 
the Commission should not see planned mergers in black and white 
terms just because of the market share criterion. The 
Committee also proposed that the turnover limit should be 
fixed at 350 million EUA, with a periodic review.
1 Stated in EC Commission, Third Report on Competition Policy, 
para.1, and confirmed by the Court of Justice in the Continental 
Can case, OJ C 68, 21.9.1973, p.33.
2 A description of this strategy is given in Chapter 3, pp*92—98*
3 Original proposal : OJ C 92, 31.10.1973, p.1. Amended proposal : 
OJ C 36, 12.2.1982, p.3.
4 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, OJ C 252, 27.9.1982
p. 16.
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The Commission believes that this regulation would give
it the means to take effective action at Community level
against any irreversible structural evolution which could
seriously jeopardise competition. For this reason the
European Parliament, in its Resolution on the Ninth Report
on Competition Policy expressed considerable disquiet that
the Council had still not adopted the regulation, sentiments
which have since been echoed by the Economic and Social 
2
Committee. The reason for the delay by the Council is that 
its discussions on the subject have revealed significant 
differences of opinion, relating mainly to the scope of the 
regulation and to the division of decision-making power 
between the Commission and the Council.
Despite the proposed regulation, the Commission does not
believe that enterprise concentration is per se necessarily
a bad thing; indeed, it has believed for many years that
concentration could achieve rationalisation benefits and
economies of scale, and thus help to counter competition
from large US and Japanese multinational corporations.^
Moreover, it is possible that acquisition as a means of market
entry by a firm outside the market may disturb the status quo
in the market and, if it results in a struggle for market
U.
shares, may result in a rejuvenation of competition.
1 OJ C 144, 15.6.1981.
2 OJ C 252, 27.9.1982, p.15
3 See 'Effective competition between oligopolistic enterprises 
is in keeping with the Treaty objectives', 1965 Commission 
Memorandum to Governments of Member States on Concentration 
of Enterprises in the Common Market.
4. This point is developed by J-F. Beilis, p.25. See also the 
present study, p. 200.
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Part b): The EC Commission's Decisions on Joint Ventures
General attitudes.
The definition of a joint venture (JV) used by the
Commission is : an enterprise subject to joint control by two
or more undertakings which are economically independent of 
1
each other. The weakness of this definition is that it does
2
not cover the 'contractual' JV, which does not take a
corporate form. A better definition would be that a joint 
venture is a collaboration 
or more areas of activity.
between two or more firms in one
3
However, the Commission's definition is flexible. In 
the case of GEC-Weir Group (1977) the co-operation was purely 
contractual, although the arrangement had all the most 
essential characteristics of a JV in that it provided for 
joint control by the two firms of all the activities relating 
to the product concerned, including planning, financing, 
research, development, manufacture and sale. The Commission 
saw no distinctiarr between a case of this sort and its normal 
definition of a JV, which requires a new company.
The policy is that exemption under Article 85(3) should 
be refused wherever the formation of a JV does not offer 
substantial economic benefirs and wherever there is a chance 
that competition on the relevant market may be appreciably 
reduced. Co-operation between large firms in different Member 
States which have either the object _or the effect of co­
ordinating their market activity will thus generally meet with 
an unfavourable Commission reaction, as will any JV whose 
benefits could be achieved by less restrictive means. The 
Commission will, however, consider whether competitive
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 37.
2 See p.15;
3 This definition was first suggested by V.Horah, p.136. For
other definitions see pp. 15-16.
4 OJ L 327,20.12.1977, p.26.
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restrictions could be minimised by a uatered-doun agreement
including the imposition of obligations and conditions on
1
the partners before refusing exemption for a JV.
This point was illustrated by the decision on the Bayer/
2
Gist-Brocades agreement of 1975, where a joint venture was 
not regarded as indispensable, although a specialisation 
agreement was permitted.
Two years previously^ the Commission had described cases 
in which problems can arise as generally being those in which 
JVs operate as genuine economic entities for the purpose of 
producing or distributing goods or services, with the likely 
effect of inducing the controlling undertakings to adopt a 
policy of mutual non-competition by means of the actual 
creation or management of a JV.^ This involves a partial 
integration of the parent companies. In order to assess its 
significance, the Commission has to consider the importance 
of the parents, the spread of their activités and the 
relative size of the JV within this, market structures, and 
the possible effect on the interaction between the parents 
in other markets. Again, this necessitates a case by case 
approach.^
The Commission has stated that in heavy industries, in 
which investment expenditure is considerable, the joint 
formation of a major production unit may qualify for exemption 
if the new joint production capacity remains below the capacity 
of each of the parents and as long as the parents retain 
independence with respect to the marketing of the joint product.^
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 59.
2 OJ L 30, 5.2.1976, p.13
3 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 37.
4 See Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 41.
5 The Commission bases this view on its experience in cases under
Article 66 of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) 
Treaty - see Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 42.
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Where the Commission does make an exemption, its duration
is not uniform, but depends on the particular circumstances
of the case. The Commission may confine its authorisation to
a relatively brief period (between five and ten years) in order
to stress the provisional nature of the co-operation in a JV.
This would apply where the JV is formed to enable one of the
participants to enter production more quickly by having
access to the knowhow and experience of the other. It could
also apply in the development or manufacture of new products
where serious technical difficulties or financial risks are
encountered, necessitating co-operation between two or more
firms for a transitional period, as in the case of Vacuum 
1
Interrupters. On the other hand, it may be that the
objectives of co-operation could only be achieved in the
long term, and exemption would be pointless unless it were
2
granted for a relatively long term. In the KEWA case 
(nulear fuels reprocessing), the Commission fixed this period 
at fifteen years.^ In any event, on termination of the 
venture both parents must be free to benefit independently 
from the results of the co-operation.
There are conflicting views on a 50/50 ownership structure ^ 
in a JV. One view is that such a structure can yield important 
feelings of co-operation and equality, regardless of the
U
respective sizes of the parent companies. The Commission 
sometimes sees it rather differently. In the cases of ICI- 
Wasagchemie (1978)^ which was eventually prohibited - though 
not for that reason - and GEC/Weir Group (1977)^ the Commission 
feared that joint control of the JV would mean that neither 
parent would be able to make independent business decisions on 
any matter of importance relating to the product. The effect 
of the JV and of the agreement would be to change each party's 
position of autonomy in this respect to one of joint activity 
concerning planning, financing, research, development and sale, 
with each party abandoning its individual freedom of action in 
relation to these activities. This may affect not only the
1  OJ L 48, 19.2.1977, p.32.
2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 59.
3 OJ L 51, 26.2.1976, p.15.
4 See, for example, Gullander (1), p.110. See also pc 2X7—2X8 on
the results of the present study.
5 OJ L 322, 16.11.1978, p.26.
6 OJ L 327, 20.12.1971, p.26
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running of the 3\J itself, but also the parents’ own activities 
in the same field.
The Commission has thus sometimes seemed to fear that
1
the power of veto in a 50/50 J\J could prove to be a restriction 
of competition. However, in the event of such a veto being 
used, the breach of trust and lack of confidence which inspired 
it would in any case mean that the joint venture may well 
have been doomed to failure in the first place. Nevertheless, 
the joint management and control of the 3\J by the parents 
does mean that the activités mentioned above can become group, 
rather than company, policies. In fact, agreements which cause 
the limitation or control of production, markets, technical 
development or investment are specifically mentioned in Article 
85 (1b) as examples of restrictions on competition.
Types of joint ventures.
In order to avoid the dangers of excessive generalisation, 
this chapter now considers the Commission's attitudes to 
co-operation at different stages of the industrial/commercial 
process. The types of joint venture considered here are :




5. Sales and purchase organisations.
Research and Development
The Commission's policy here is that joint research agree­
ments do not generally restrict competition on condition that 
the parents are not restricted in respect of their own research 
activities, and that the results of the research are made
available to all participants in proportion to their 
2
participation.
1 See also pp, 112—1X3,
2 See the Commission's 1968 Notice on Co-operation between
Enterprises' in Appendix.
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1
In one case, the oligopolistic structure of the market
concerned and the great technical homogeneity of the products
therein, together with high entry barriers, meant that the market 
position of firms and their opportunities for growth were
largely determined by the degree of technical progress and
innovation. The Commission consequently adjudged that 
competition in the field of research was extremely important, 
and that the prohibition of Article 85(1) could apply to an 
agreement between two of the largest firms.
All joint R & D is likely to meet one of the conditions 
2
for exemption, namely that of promoting technical or economic 
progress. However, the benefits of research to consumers 
are virtually impossible to guage accurately, since they will 
accrue from future discoveries. The Commission thus often 
required periodic progress reports, and reports on extensions 
of the research, as conditions for exemption.
Freedom of the parties to maintain individual research is 
a standard condition for exemption. The Commission is not 
keen on co-operation in R & D being extended to production and 
marketing; it feels that such co-operation will inevitably 
lead to joint planning and pricing policies.
Where a product is developed from the research, its 
exclusive production by the JV is only regarded as an 
indispensable condition if it is limited to an initial period
sufficient to launch the product successfully. Such a 
condition was allowed in the De Laval-Stork JV^ which 
the American company time to penetrate the EEC market.
1 The first Henkel-Colgate decision (1971), OJ L 14, 18. 1.1972, p.14
2 See p. 53,
3 OJ L 215, 23.8.1977, p.11
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An interesting point is the change of attitude shown
by the Commission to the issue of licences to third parties
in the Henkel-Colgate case, between 1971 and 1978. In 1971
the Commission took the view that an agreement not to allow
licences to third parties except by mutual agreement of the
joint venture partners was not restrictive, but was the normal
1
consequence of a research agreement. But by 1978 the
Commission's view was that such a restriction on the issue of
licences would mean that the parties were not free to use the
results of their research independently; and that in an
oligopolistic market surrounded by high entry barriers it
would make it unreasonably difficult for third parties to
2
penetrate the market. The agreement was, as a result, 
terminated in May 1978 before the Commission had time to adopt 
a decision on it.
Another interesting case, is that of Beecham-Parke Davis, 
where provisions which would have extended the scope of the 
co-operation from joint research and development in 
pharmaceuticals to cover the marketing of the products 
manufactured by each partner had to be deleted at the 
Commission's request? Although an agreement was permitted, 
it is doubtful whether a JV (which was not applied for) would 
have been regarded as indispensable to the co-operation.
The KEWA agreement was, however, permitted since it was 
designed to enable the four German firms concerned to proceed 
as rapidly as possible to the industrial stage of nuclear 
oxide fuel reprocessing by enabling them to pool their activités 
in research and development and to transfer technology between 
them in a new industry, which is of such a king that isolated 
effort from oœ firm alone is ineffective.
1 See First Report on Competition Policy, point 33.
2 See Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 90.
3 Ibid, point 94.
4 OJ L 51, 26.2.1976, p.15.
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The Vacuum Interrupters JV enabled two firms which would 
otherwise have had to invest a large amount of risk capital 
to spread that risk at a lower cost to each and to combine their
technical skills in a highly specialised field. The Commission
1
noted that the agreement would enable the vacuum-type 
interrupter to be developed, manufactured and sold to consumers 
within the EEC on a competitive basis with those available 
for import from the United States and Japan. Moreover, consumer 
benefits were derived from the facts that durable, efficient 
interrupters would become available at a reasonable price and 
that models capable of handling higher voltages would be 
developed in time.
The Commission has taken a favourable stance on the joint
formation of new business units that will enable the
participants either to penetrate new geographic markets or to
overcome the technical difficulties and face the major financial
risks linked with the development of advanced-technology
products, or to place the manufacture of intermediate products
2
used by the parent companies on a profitable footing. This 
approach was taken in the De Laval-Stork, GEC-Weir Group and 
ICI-Montedison joint ventures.
It believes that development joint ventures can have 
definite advantages over less formal agreements, with JVs 
resulting in: a closer sharing between the parties of all their 
complementary skills and facilities than would, for example, 
a cross-licensing and disclosure of information agreement; 
each party gaining a greater experience of and insight into 
the work of the other than would be possible through a 
specialisation agreement, better interaction between the parties 
in relation to problems; improved and more rapidly achieved 
technical solutions; and consequent lower levels of funding 
required by the parties and hence by their customers.^
1 OJ L 48, 19.2.1977, p.32.
2 See Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 150.
3 See GEC-Weir Group judgement, OJ L 327, 20.12.1977, pp. 33-34.
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2. Co-ordination of Investment
Co-ordination of investment is likely to mean co-ordination 
of production. Such collaboration in setting output levels for 
the industry will, if it affects trade between Member States, fall 
within Article 85(1).
United Reprocessors (URG), however, a JU for 
reprocessing nuclear fuels, was held to meet the conditions 
of Article 85(3) because of the particular economic context 
which included the public interest of three Member States.
The primary object of this agreement is to co-ordinate 
investments relating to the reprocessing of nuclear oxide 
fuels, and each party undertakes to refrain from making any 
investment outside the programme. Other objects are the 
fixing of prices and allocation of work between plants.
The Commission believed that unless a co-ordinated 
approach was made in this case, the European reprocessing 
industry would become structured on the basis of national rather 
than Community requirements. It therefore held that the 
co-ordination of investment was an indispensable condition 
of the agreement. It would mean that uneconomic plants would 
not be set up and would enable the parties to wait until 
market conditions were most favourable before setting up highj- 
capacity plants. This would reduce costs considerably because of 
the sunstantial scale effect in this industry; give the project 
the chance to benefit from the very latest technical progress; 
and improve customer service by raising safety standards and 
by stabilising irradiated fuels reprocessing services. Even 
so, exemption was only granted for a transitional period 
sufficient for the industry to achieve conditions of effective 
competition.
Full details of the decision may be found in OJ L 51, 26.2.1976.
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3. Production.
It has been claimed that production JWs are often formed
to overcome urgent problems in the short - to medium-term and
are not intended to last longer than necessary; and that for
this reason many such agreements have been dissolved, rather
1
than abandoned as a result of conflict between the parents.
The proposed ICI-Montedison JU of 1977 laid its claim to
exemption on the important economies of scale which would
2
have resulted from their joint investment. If the two 
firms had each built a factory for the production of aniline
for their own use, they would each have been left with
substantial excess capacity at the cost of a very heavy
investment. But a factory between them would have just met
their joint requirements, with a substantial saving resulting 
to both companies. Thus, although Montedison, which did not 
at the time possess the necessary technology, could have obtained 
that expertise and was therefore a potential competitor for 
the product in question, the Commission was willing to grant 
an exemption in this case. The principal reason why it was 
willing to do this was that on the termination of the 
agreement, Montedison would have been able to use its newly- 
acquired knowledge to become an independent competitor.^
However, the Commission was against the JV selling the product 
itself, which would have enabled the parent companies to 
concert their sales practices. Unfortunately, the story did 
not have a happy ending as far as the two firms were concerned. 
Under heavy pressure from environmentalists, the joint venture 
never got off the ground and was finally abandoned.^
1 See L.Ritter & C.Overbury, p.630
2 See also ppl9-20, and also p.99.
3 See Seventh Report on Competition Policy, points 156-159.
4 The venture was abandoned before the Commission could take a
formal decision.
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1
The De-Laval-Stork 3\] was permitted for the same 
principal reason. In this case, the eventual termination of 
the 3\J agreement was to leave the American company. De Laval, 
able to compete effectively within the Common Market.
As with other types of venture, the Commission does not
want co-operation in production to spill over into other
areas, but prefers the participants to remain as independent
as possible. If the co-operation were to extend to marketing,
this would influence the marketing policies of the ,parents.
In addition, restrictions should not be imposed on the
participants with respect to output shares and purchases from
the J\J• It is essential that they are afterwards able to
benefit independently from the JV, and that the J\J must not
continue for longer than is economically justifiable. This




Specialisation agreements normally involve each party 
sacrificing part of its production but remaining free in respect 
of output and investment in its own specialised field. The 
partners can thus use each other's sales and distribution 
networks, and through concentrating on one product each can 
take advantage of economies of scale. It has been claimed that 
frequently, the only competition restricted us the possibility of
3
each firm extending production (into the other's range ). However, 
if one or more JVs are formed in order to produce or market the 
specialised goods, this will bring into co-ordination the parties' 
policies with regard to these functions in respect of all the 
production involved.
Specialisation agreements are essentially agreements not 
to compete in a range of products, but to concentrate production 
and cross-supply each other. They are covered by a Commission
1 QJ L 215, 23.8.1977.
2 For a further discussion of these conditions for exemption 
see Ritter & Overbury, pp. 632-633.
3 See Korah, p.80
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1
block exemption up to a certain size only.
In the earlier versions of the Bayer-Gist Brocades agreement 
there was no provision for separate action on the market 
independently of the specialisation arrangements. Originally 
the plants were to be transferred to joint subsidiaries in 
which both firms were to hold shares and appoint directors.
The formation of these joint subsidiaries would have had the 
effect of bringing production and investment under joint 
control; moreover, since each firm was to be equally 
represented, both in the management of the subsidiaries and 
on the associated co-ordinating committee, either would have 
been able to veto any management decision with which it did 
not agree. The result would inevitably have been that output 
would have been determined by joint agreement; neither firm 
would have been able to increase its production to compete 
against the other. The Commission could not regard such an 
extensive competitive restriction on investment and 
production as indispensable to the specialisation agreement.
While the agreement itself was permitted, then, the 3\J was not.
5. Joint sales and purchase organisations.
2
The Commission made it know officially in 1968 that the 
establishment of a joint export service does not in itself 
conflict with the objectives of the EEC Treaty where the 
service acts merely as a joint market prospection agency and 
does not constitute an intermediate stage in distribution.
Policy in this area is rather clear-cut. If the members of 
an organisation account for a substantial part of the Community 
market, the organisation may remain responsible for marketing on
1 See Regulations 2821/71 and 2822/71 in Appendix 2.
2 Case of Alliance de Contructeurs Française de Machines-Outils,
GJ L 201, 12.8.1968.
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the respective domestic markets (if no exclusive brand/standard 
labels are involved) and on export markets outside the EEC.
On the other hand, exports to Common Market countries must 
remain the responsibility of the individual members (the 
manufacturers and their dealers).
The principal aim pursued here by the Commission,
particularly in the fertilisers sector, where such agreements
have been common, and where in the past there had been little
trade between Common Market countries, is to remove the
obstacles which restrictive agreements linking large firms
are liable to place in the way of the formation of a real single
1
market between the Member States.
2
Another decision in 1966 held that the provision of 
Article 85(1) are applicable to agreements between purchasers 
in the same way as they apply to those concluded between sellers.
Other considerations.
i) Non-Competition clauses.
This concerns agreements by firms not to compete with 
each other. Such clauses may be allowed by the Commission 
if they are subject to either party's freedom to act 
independently where a potential customer declines to 
contract with the OU or where the other party declines 
to support the OU in the acceptance of a particular order. 
These conditions applied in the GEC-Weir Group and Uacuum 
Interrupters cases.
In the Commission's first OU decision^ in 1974, one 
type of non-competition clause was allowed while another 
was not.
By the first, Chevron and SHU had each agreed not 
to compete without the prior consent of the other 
regarding distribution of the (petroleum) products covered 
by the agreement. This clause provided SHU with the 
assurance that the assets transferred by it to the joint
1 See Second General Report of the European Communities, 1968, p.47
2 Case of SOCEMAS , 00 L 276, 14. 11.1968.
3 SHU - Chevron, 00 L 33, 12.2.1975, p.14
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subsidiaries would not lose value as a result of 
competition by Chevron with those subsidiaries. The 
Commission held that this clause could not be said to 
involve an appreciable restriction of competition in 
view of the fact that Chevron had no industrial or 
commercial interest which could imaginably lead it to 
compete with its 50%-owned subsidiaries, and given 
also that SHU would disappear as an independent whole­
saler on the petroleum product market, with no likelihood 
of ever returning.
Where a non-competition clause agreed by parent *•
companies does not concern a JW*s area of activity, however,
it is generally to be considered a restriction of competition
within the meaning of Article 85(1), whether the JU is
1
regarded as a restrictive agreement or as a merger.
SHU and Chevron had included a clause whereby they agreed 
not to compete in respect of petroleum products not 
distributed by their joint subsidiaries. After objections 
were voiced by the Commission, the companies deleted 
this clause from their co-operation agreement.
2
In an earlier case, a non-competition clause was 
permitted because the parties to the agreement represented 
only a relatively insignificant part of the Community 
market; in addition, the situation on the relevant market 
(machine tools) did not seem likely to warrant, in the 
near future, efforts to diversify the range of machines 
produced, but was in fact tending to encourage 
specialisation.^
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 61.
2 Alliance de Contructeurs Français de Machine-Outils, GJ L 201, 
12.8.1968.
3 See Bulletin of the European Communities, 9/10 (1968), Chapter 
II, sec. 5.
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ii) Market power of the JV's customers.
The Commission accepts that restrictive effects
are limited if the JV's customers are powerful. The
GEC-Weir Group JV's two customers were able to
negotiate from a position of strength because they were in
fact the only customers. In fact they actually encouraged
the co-operation of the parties in the development of
sodium circulators through a JV. They thus knowingly
and deliberately gave up the benefits to them of
competition for the compensating advantage of a composite '
technical solution from the JV to which the parties
contributed their separate but complementary specialised




A further problem from the angle of competition can 
arise over the JV personnel. This can occur when senior 
employees of both parties are seconded to the JV, but 
remain on the original party's payroll and under its 
administrative control. These employees may well retain 
interests in their employers' activities outside the field 
of the JV. So through their continuing association 
with each other within the JV, the coincidence of interests 
of the parties in other areas can perhaps be expected 
to lead to an impairment of competition between them 
also in these other areas. This question was raised in * 
the GEC-Weir Group case, but was not considered serious 
enough to refuse the JV exemption under Article 85(3).
OJ L 327, 20.12.1977, p.33
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Case study : ICI Wasagchemie, 1978.
This case study is included here because it was the first 
prohibition decision adopted by the Commission under Article 
85, and could also have involved Article 86. It concerns a 
JU betueen a subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) 
and members of the Wasagchemie GmbH group (WASAG) for the
1
manufacture and sale of blackpowder, a lowpower explosive.
At the time, ICI, which no longer had its own production
facilities for blackpowder, had a 100% or near 100% share of
the sale of blackpowder in the UK, WASAG produced blackpowder
and had around 50% of the sales in the Federal Republic of 
2
Germany. Both parties had separate interests in other 
explosives, and were natural competitors in each other's 
national home markets, and indeed throughout the EEC, in safety 
fuse, an important downstream product of blackpowder.
Under the agreement, the JV would have appointed ICI 
and WASAG to be its sole distributors in the UK and West 
Germany respectively, and would have controlled the production 
for not less than 58% of the sales of blackpowder in the 
Community, Pursuant to the JV arrangements, ICI would (in 
view of its UK monopoly) have purchased blackpowder for 
substantially the entire UK demand only from the production of 
the JV and would not have been free to procure blackpowder for 
resale on the best terms from time to time available from other 
sources. Presumably the company was not concerned about this 
limitation.
In view of ICI's control of distribution and transport 
facilities for explosives in the UK, the effect would have 
been to block the blackpowder market in the UK to other
1 WAIMO Schwarzpulver, OJ L 322, 16. 11.1978, p.26. See also the 
Eighth Report on Competition Policy, points 134-136.
2 Market information recorded in the Commision's Decision.
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producers in the EEC, for example in France and Italy, who 
already had substantial overcapacities.
The Commission could not accept the companies' 
submission that a pooling of resources and technology would 
have enabled manufacture on a scale to bring about develop­
ments since manufacturing methods in the industry had 
remained essentially the same for centuries. Neither could 
it accept an application on the basis of security of 
supplies to the UK in circumstances of considerably under-used 
production capacities in the blackpowder industry as a 
whole. The overriding reason why the Commission could not 
grant an exemption was that competition for supply to the 
UK would have been ruled out if ICI had participated in the 
JV.
The matter went further than this, however. The 
Commission believed that the two companies intended to use 
this collaboration to enlarge their common interests in other 
areas, specifically that of safety fuse. In this market, ICI 
was the only manufacturer and supplier in the UK and WASAG 
the only manufacturer in West Germany, and the two could again 
have been regarded as natural competitors in both each other's 
home markets and throughout the EEC. Together they accounted 
for two-thirds of the Community's safety fuse production. Not 
only would this have given them opportunities and strong 
inducements for co-operation in aligning their prices and in 
the sharing of markets for safety fuse, but they would also 
jointly control the quantities and prices of any blackpowder 
to be sold by the JV for safety fuse production by any third- 
party competitors.
The Commission therefore warned the two companies that 
implementation of the JV agreement could additionally have 
amounted to an abuse of ICI's dominant position in the UK 
blackpowder market, which would have constituted an 
infringement of Article 86,
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Follouing receipt of the Commission's objections, the 
parties informed the Commission that they no longer intended 
to go ahead with the JV agreement; but the Commission decided 
that the matter was important enough to adopt a Decision 
anyway, in order to establish the ground rules more clearly. 
Usually, howëver, no decision is taken after an agreement 
has been abandoned.
Part c): The Company in Europe
Moves towards the creation of a single European identity 
can take two forms within this sphere.
One approach is to create uniform legal and fiscal
conditions across the EEC in order to encourage firms to 
cross their national boundaries, given confidence by the 
existence of consistent laws. The other approach, accepting 
that the first is an ambitious programme which is unlikely to
be fully achieved in the short term, aims at providing
companies with a corporate structure which can be used as a 
vehicle for co-operation. The Commission's belief is that 
this will facilitate a rationalisation of industry on a 
European, rather than national, basis through enabling firms 
to merge and co-operate across national boundaries without 
difficulty. In addition, it would result in access for such 
firms to all the capital markets of Europe, making such 
markets more competitive, and encourage transnational 
investment in Europe.
Two forms of common corporate structure are under 




The Commission believes that industrial reorganisation at 
a national level might tend to fragment markets and so constitute
1 See D.Thompson, pp.20-21, for a more detailed discussion in 
favour of a common European corporate form.
2 See 'Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European 
Company Statute', EC Bulletin Supplement 8/70 and OJ C 124,
10. 10.1970.
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1
an impediment to economic integration, but has acknowledged
that the establishment of European undertakings meets with
2
legal, financial and psychological difficulties. The object 
of the European Company is thus to provide a common corporate 
form, subject to a consistent constitution, which will 
permit companies in different Member States to merge, form 
a joint holding company or form joint subsidiaries.^
The original proposal for the European Company was made 
4
in 1959, but there is as yet no sign of its adoption. The 
reason for this failure has been disagreement in the Council 
over certain aspects of the constitution, in particular on 
the matter of worker participation on the company board.
The argument centres around the proposed dual board 
structure, which has a Management Board administering the 
company's affairs under the supervision of a Supervisory Board 
by whom it is appointed. This latter board would consist 
of representatives of both employees and shareholders, together 
with members representing general interests and independent 
of the other two parties, although elected by them.. This 
board structure is the same as that proposed in the Fifth 
Directive on Company Law. The degree of worker participation 
has been unacceptable to Member States in which such a structure 
is unknown, and the European Company will thus not come into 
being in its present form until the Fifth Directive is accepted.
Although subject to uniform rules regarding the 
presentation of accounts, it would be necessary for national 
taxation levels to apply to the European Company until 
corporate taxation rates are common throughout the EEC.
1 Commission, 'Statute for European Companies : Amended proposal 
for a regulation', p.11.
2 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the inability to form
European mergers was found to be an insignificant motive for
collaboration in the present study (see p. 1 7 7 )*
3 See European Parliament Secretariat, para 2.33.
4 See A.J.Easson (1980, p.187n) for a note on the origins of the idea.
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Otherwise, companies will only adopt such a corporate form 
if it results in a lighter tax burden. Furthermore, the 
formulation of a fiscal system solely for the European 
Company may result in a decrease in national tax revenue.
Member States are unlikely to agree to this.
If harmonisation of company law and taxation were 
achieved, of course, there would be no need for the European 
Company.
The European Co-operation Grouping.
With the European Company running into problems, the
Commission is attempting to introduce other legislation to
help small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) co-operate
across national boundaries in order to maximise their
competitive impact on European industry. It believes that
such firms have a key part to play by virtue of the innovative
potential and employment opporunities they offer, but that
they find it more difficult to establish transnational
co-operations than larger firms. The Commission is concerned
that this situation exists at a time when the greater
sensitivity of SMEs to the uncertainties of the economic
climate require, on the contrary, that operations of this
1
kind should be made easier.
The current fact that SMEs co-operating across borders have
to choose a specific (i.e., national) legal structure places
one partner on unfamiliar ground. The purpose of the ECG is
thus to create an instrument common to all Member States which
is easy to use and which can transcend the problem of national
legislation. The Business Co-operation Centre (the arm of
the Commission which actively promotes co-operation between SMEs)
believes that the psychological importance of using this
2
Statute will often be decisive for SMEs.
These opinions were published in an informal introductory note 
concerning the amended Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing 
a European Co-operation Grouping, 23.10.1981.
Sixth and Seventh Progress Reports of the Business Co-operation 
Centre (1978 & 1979), C0M(8G) 448 final, 24 July 1980, p.9.
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The ECG, which may not have more than 500 employees and 
is thus limited to SMEs, is not a separate economic entity 
and may not exercise management functions in respect of the 
business of its members. It does not aim, therefore, to 
make a profit for itself but only to facilitate or develop 
the business of its members by: a) providing services 
exclusively to its members; or b) producing, processing or 
packaging goods exclusively for its members. Its legal 
structure gives its members considerable freedom of action 
over foundation, operation and winding up.
1
Originally proposed by the Commission in 1973 and 
2
modified in 1978 following favourable opinions from the 
Economic and Social Committee in 1975^ and by the European
If
Parliament in 1977, the ECG has not yet been adopted due to 
delays in discussion by the Council. However, the Commission 
believes that a majority of delegations to the Council's 
Group on economic questions are favourable to the establish­
ment of the ECG, and the concept is now under active
5consideration.
Harmonisation of Company Law.
The Company Law directives have, in general, the purpose 
of promoting the functioning of a European capital market by 
co-ordinating rules for public limited companies on the 
presentation of accounts, disclosure of information, and 
capitalisation requirements. They aim to protect shareholders 
and creditors and, through making this information broadly 
consistent and comparable, to help the cause of transnational 
investment in the EEC.
1 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/74, 1974.
2 GJ C 103, 28.4.1978.
3 OJ C 108, 15.5.1975.
4 OJ C 163, 11.7.1977.
5 'Progress Report of the Commission to the European Parliament on
the activities of the Commission with regard to small and medium­
sized enterprises within the Community', SEC (82) 1347, Brussels, 
3rd August 1982, p.16,
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Directives which had been passed by the Council by the
1
end of 1982 were: the first, which deals with the disclosure
of information and requirements for the publication of
2
accounts; the second, which concerns capitalisation 
requirements and the payment of dividends; the third^ 
which covers national (but not transnational) merger
legislation and requires approval for a merger of the
4 5
shareholders of both companies, the fourth, on the
co-ordination of the presentation and content of annual reports
and accounts; information to be made available to the public;
and the requirement of accounts to be audited; and the sixth^
concerning the co-ordination of information to be provided by
companies in order to obtain a Stock Exchange listing, and
the setting up of competent authorities in each Member State
to check this information.
Three other proposed directives have not yet been passed:
7
The proposed fifth directive is somewhat different to 
the others in that it seeks employee representation, not merely 
in a consultative capacity, on the supervisory bodies of public 
limited companies.^ This proposal has caused considerable 
controversy, and the issue is still a long way from being 
settled.
g
The purpose of the proposed seventh directive is to 
institute a system of Community legislation on consolidated 
accounts. Arguing that the group accounts of large companies 
cannot by themselves give an accurate view of their position, 
this proposal would require multinational companies to publish 
group accounts relating to all their subsidiaries around the 
world, in order to make clear the relationships and activities
1 OJ L 65, 14.3.1968.
2 OJ L 26, 31.1.1977, pp.1-13
3 OJ L 295, 20.10.1978, pp.36-43.
4 The directive covers mergers both by acquisition of another company
and by formation of a new company, and notes that protection of 
employees' rights in the event of a merger is covered in
OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p.26.
5 ' OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, pp.11-31.
6 OJ L 100, 17.4.1980, pp.1-26.
7 See OJ C 131, Dec.1972, and Supplement 10/72 of the Bulletin of the
European Communities for the proposal.
8 The proposed dual board structure is described on p.75*
9 OJ C 121, 2.6.1976, pp.2-10. Amended proposal: OJ C 14, 17.1.1979,
pp.2—23
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within the group. While this has also met with some
opposition, notably from the multinational companies, the
1
Commission has reported that the positions of Member States 
seem to be moving somewhat closer on this directive, and that 
a form of compromise may be passible.
The proposed eighth directive covers the establishment of 
standard minimum qualifications for auditors of public limited 
companies.
Proposals for the ninth and tenth directives, concerning 
the structure of groups of companies and the winding up of 
solvent companies respectively, had not been published by the 
end of 1902.
From the point of view of improving company information
for shareholders and potential investors, then, the company law
directives have been fairly successful. Indeed, it has been 
2
claimed that the consequence of the fourth directive is that 
more than a million companies in the Community will, in future, 
be presenting comparable annual accounts, which will make 
co-operation between comapnies in different Member States 
easier, and should stimulate transnational investment in the 
Community. However, attempts to harmonise European company law 
for social ends will, by the experience of the proposed fifth
directive, be likely to meet with considerable opposition .
Harmonisation of Corporate Taxation.
The Commission does not intend tax harmonisation to serve 
the purpose of instituting a tax policy similar to that applied 
by the Member States, nor does it see it as an end in itself,
but wishes it to be employed as a means to the end of economic
integration.
1 Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 7/8, 1982, p.17
2 See D,Evans, p.178
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The aim is to use harmonisation of taxes to eliminate 
distortions in the free movement of capital (such as double 
taxation). The policy cannot be described as a success so far; 
of the five proposals presented by the end of 1982, not one has 
yet been passed.
The reason for this is essentially that no Member State 
government has so far been willing to surrender sovereignty 
over taxation rates. This would reduce the variety of fiscal 
instruments at the government's disposal, and also result in 
a possible reduction in national tax revenue. Politically, 
it would be an extremely sensitive issue, since the government ' 
would be surrendering the right of the people to 'vote their 
taxes'.
The proposals put forward so far cover :
1. Harmonisation of corporate taxes and withholding taxes on
1
dividends.
2. The application of the above proposal to dividends received
2
through the intermediary of investment funds or unit trusts.
3. Mergers, divisions and contributions of assets involving 
companies from different Member States.^
4. Taxation of parent companies and subsidiaries in different
4
Member States.
5. The elimination of double taxation in the adjustment of 
profit earnings between associated undertakings.^
Another problem facing the first proposal is that 
harmonisation of the rates of taxation can be meaningless where 
the computation of profits for tax purposes varies widely from 
one country to another. Harmonisation is thus also necessary 
in definitions of allowable expenses, depreciation, valuation 
of assets, etc.^ The Commission does appreciate that
1 OJ C 253, 5.11.1975.
2. QJ C 184, August 1978.
3 OJ C 39, 22.3.1969.
4 Ibid.
5 OJ C 301, 21.12.1976, pp.4-7
6 See Easson (1981), p.339 for a fuller discussion on this point.
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harmonisation of tax rates and credits must take place along­
side the gradual harmonisation of systems of assessing
7companies' taxable profits, but the European Parliament has 
delayed discussion on the issue until such time as the Commission 
can draw up proposals for introducing these changes.
The second proposal is tied to the first.
The purpose of the third proposal would be to defer the
taxation which would otherwise arise from a transnational merger
or similar operation between Community firms, such as a capital
transfer tax or a tax on unrealised capital gains, due to the
possibility of assets being transferred abroad, until such time
2
as the assets are realised or the reserves are distributed.
The Commission believes that the effect of this proposal 
would be to remove some of the tax obstacles to transnational 
co-operation between enterprises wishing to concentrate or 
disperse their activities.^ Serious differences of opinion 
exist in the Council, however, resulting in deadlock. Problems 
of differing tax rates feature here, but the principal fear is 
that the proposal could be used to relocate a company's manage­
ment outside the Member State in which the head office is
situated, and thus avoid worker representation on the company's 
4
board.
The fourth proposal has also been held up by the absence 
of any harmonisation of corporate taxation rates.
Finally, disagreement still exists over the fifth proposal, 
which aims to eliminate double taxation arising from transfer 
pricing policies, since the proposal makes no attempt to prevent 
the actual practice of artificial transfers of intra-group 
profits across borders through transfer pricing policies.^
1 See European Parliament Interim Report, 2nd May 1979; Rapporteur: 
M.IMyborg.
2 See Easson ( 1980), pp.182-183, for a more detailed analysis of this
proposal.
3 Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 4, 1980, point 2.1.32.
4 00 C 183, 21.7.1980, pp.25-26.
5 00 C 18, 23.1.1978, pp.27-30.
—  82 —
The European Parliament believes that the only
satisfactory solution to the problem of tax distortions will
be found in a gradual harmonsation of taxation and, more
generally, in the economic and monetary union which is the
1
eventual aim of the Commission.
1 See OJ C 163, 11.7.1977, p.25.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENTRY STRATEGIES FOR E.C. MARKETS.
Firms may wish to enter EC markets for a variety of reasons,
such as market size and growth rate, the need to maintain close
contact with customers, or poor prospects in the firm's own
market. A firm may expand into a foreign market independently,
through an intermediary, through co-operation with another firm,
1
or through acquisition.
The object of this chapter will be to examine the available 
entry strategies, together with some of the issues involved in 
planning, setting up and running an operation.
The entry strategies considered here involve:
Agents: Independent individuals or companies who sell goods for 
a commission, but do not take ownership of the goods;
Distributors: Wholesalers who buy from the manufacturing company 
and re-sell in the market;
Greenfield ventures/sales subsidiaries: Setting up a new, wholly-
owned subsidiary;
Licensing: Selling or leasing production know-how, patents or
trademarks for a royalty payment;
Takeovers/mergers: Acquisition of a firm already established in
the market in question;
Joint Ventures: Co-operation with another firm in one or more
areas of activity.
The main focus of attention will be on joint ventures and 
takeovers, which form the basis of the survey in this study. In 
addition to covering the advantages and disadvantages of these 
strategies, then, this chapter will also consider certain aspects 
of acquisition and in particular joint venture strategy.
The other issues examined in this chapter will be :
Risk and return: setting financial objectives;
Prior research: deciding whether or not the venture will be viable;
1 The alternative of not entering the market will not be
examined because the study does not contain a control group.
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Structuring the venture: determining ownership and control and 
setting up the venture;
Problems and conflicts: common reasons for failure.
1
Agents
The strategy of using an agent is a low-risk one. Investment 
costs are minimal. The agent's function is to win orders for his 
principal; who then delivers direct to the customer.
Other advantages for the firm with no experience in the market 
in question are that it obtains the services of a national with 
local knowledge of commercial, legal and social affairs and customs, 
with a ready knowledge of the commercial outlets for the product.
It is a means of gaining early market experience for the exporter, 
and is often used as such. Benefits may be immediate, as there are 
no setting-up costs involved.
There are,however, disadvantages in using an agent. Unless 
specifically agreed otherwise, an agent will not normally carry 
any responsibility for after-sales service or the provision of 
any technical information or help. All liability is borne by the 
exporter. Furthermore, success is entirely dependent on the 
motivation of the agent. If the product is difficult to sell, he 
is unlikely to spend much time on it at the expense of his more 
successful products. Similarly, the agent will lose interest if 
his principal does not provide a full and efficient support service.
In addition, the agent may not possess the resources to fully
exploit a market of true potential; and finally, where sales do
progress over time, the exporter may find that the agent's commission
becomes dispoportionately expensive in relation to alternatives
2
such as a wholly-owned sales subsidiary.
1 For the application of EC Competition Policy to agents, see pp,54*“55
2 These points are developed by L.S.Walsh, pp.65-66, who also 
provides an excellent agency selection list and the framework 
of an agency agreement (pp. 149-55).
_  85 _
Good agents can be difficult to find. Before appointing one, 
an exporter must be satisfied by the candidate's ability to sell 
the product successfully, involving the spread of his operations, 
existing sales outlets and, if necessary, ability to provide a 
spares/servicing/stockholding facilities.
Arguements against agencies can apply whether the product in 
question is easy or difficult to sell. In the first case, agents 
will take a high commission where the exporter could have sold 
•the product himself, since it is easy. In the second case, the 
agent may have other goods to sell, and will not really try to 
sell the product. He may then present the excuse that the product 
is not selling because it does not suit the local market, whereas 
the real reason may simply be that he is not committed to selling 




A distributor differs from an agent in that by buying from the 
manufacturer and re-selling in the market he takes ownership of 
the product. Hence his remuneration is not a commission but the 
'turn' - i.e., the difference between his buying and selling prices. 
The distributor is therefore a wholesaler.
He thus undertakes greater responsibility and commitment than 
an agent. It is up to him to provide warehouse facilities, maintain 
inventories - in fact, carry out all the functions normally carried 
out by a firm selling its own product. Some of these functions 
may involve some co-operation with the supplier.
The distributor is not restricted to selling the exporter's 
products, and may have similar arrangements with other suppliers; 
however, the supplier may be able to prevent the distributor selling 
competing products, by agreement. In return for this, the distributor
1 For the application of EC Competition Policy to distributors, 
see p p . 54-55*
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will normally be granted the exclusive sales rights to a given 
geographic market.
In some respects, however, a distributor presents the same 
problems as an agent. Again, the key issue can be one of commitment. 
The distributor will tend to put more emphasis on selling products 
which are relatively easy to sell and which generate a significant 
part of his profits than for other products, which thus stand to 
be neglected. Again, the manufacturer of these latter products 
may do rather better by trying to sell them himself. It is 
therefore vital, again, that the exporter should provide the 
distributor with a full support service, such as technical help.
One question which will be shown in the survey to be important 
is that of continuity.^ Either the supplier or the distributor 
can end a relationship. The willingness of customers to purchase 
from the distributor often depends on the assured continuing 
availability of matching equipment and spare parts. In such cases, 
then, it is vital for the supplier and distributor to be able to 
display a strong, stable relationship with full support and 
commitment from both sides.
In practice, a good distributor with adequate sales outlets 
toes not alreai 
difficult to find.
who do eady have existing and stable commitments may be
2
1 See p*205*
2 R.L.T. Bickers believes that for this reason, for capital 
equipment and consumer durables, a manufacturer’s own operation 
is the best solution (p.24). The same writer also provides
a useful specimen agreement between a principal and a 
distributor. See also R.E. Ross (pp.83-86) for a list of 
characteristics and performance functions pertaining to the 
distributor, together with a list of major factors in determin­
ing an exporter's distribution needs.
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Greenfield Ventures/Sales Subsidiaries
A greenfield venture involves entering a market by setting up 
an entirely new manufacturing operation in the country in question. 
Sales subsidiaries do not require a production base, but only 
a sales office.
In favour of the greenfield venture is the fact that control 
is complete - perhaps even more so than in a 100% takeover, since 
there are no dividend loyalties or wishes to adhere to old values 
and practices. There may be less time spent in reaching and 
implementing a decision. In addition, using standardised and known 
systems and methods throughout the corporate group may result in 
better internal communication, and speed and efficiency in general. 
Finally, of course, the profits are not shared with anyone else.
The cheapest form of entry for setting up an overseas sales 
subsidiary is to form a new company registered in the host country. 
The firm may thus balance its commitment against its needs in this 
market. Acquisitions of local marketing organisations are likely 
to be expensive in terms of goodwill, and the acquiring firm 
inherits all the other products sold by the previous owners. And 
the acquired firm still has to be able to adjust to the 
organisational requirements of the new foreign owner.
A sales subsidiary may be justified where the sales cost per 
unit is expected to be less than the distributor's margin. Benefits 
may include : concentration on one product, rather than the wider 
range carried by a distributor; control over marketing operations; 
and closer customer contact, including a possibly improved spares 
and after-sales service.
1
It has been pointed out, however, that an overseas sales 
subsidiary is not automatically successful in generating increased 
sales, and that if the market is limited,uncertain or risky, 
firms may find agency representation or direct selling more 
appropriate. But the existence of a proven and growing market may 
well justify such a commitment.
IMewbould, Buckley & Thurwell, p.198.
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lAn overseas sales subsidiary represents a much smaller 
commitment than an overseas production subsidiary since the cost 
of establishment are lower.
Disadvantages of greenfield and overseas sales ventures 
include:
a) The risk is wholly borne by one party.
b) The firm may suffer from a lack of local knowledge on legal;
economic and commercial; social and political affairs and
customs.
c) The firm may encounter language difficulties as well as a
culture gap.
d) Nationalistic barriers will be more difficult to overcome
by entering the market as a foreign firm than would be the 
case with a domestic partner/intermediary.
A greenfield venture may be' forced on the firm because of a
lack of suitable takeover victims or joint venture partners, since
there may be few available in the product or geographic market
within which the firm wishes to operate. In addition, where a
takeover is possible the firm may find that to take over a successful
company would be expensive, whereas to take over an unsuccessful
company, while cheaper, would involve inheriting all the acquired
2
company's faults and problems.
Finally it has been suggested that the new wholly-owned 
subsidiary would be suitable for firms which have a strong world­
wide competitive position based on size, a 'world-beater* product, 
or any other quasi-monopoly advantage in the form of technology 
and management, for instance.^
1 See pp. 202—204*
2 See G.D. Newbould et al., p.75




This occurs when a manufacturer sells or leases the use of his 
patents, production know-how or trademarks to an independent foreign 
producer in return for royalty payments. Essentially, this means 
that the manufacturer substitutes an export of technology for the 
export of his own products.
There are a number of possible benefits to both licensor (the 
seller of technology) and licensee (the buyer) , which are as follows:
Advantages to the licensor :
a) Licensing requires very little investment, and is thus a very 
inexpensive means of achieving market penetration. There are 
no labour costs, and licence income is largely pure profit.
A minimum royalty income can often be guaranteed.
b) Risk is therefore also very low.
c) Licensing is a relatively easy method of obtaining market
exposure abroad. The limited capital requirements involved
mean that it is possible, by operating a number of licences,
to take advantage of other firms' marketing organisations
around the world and thus quickly become international despite
2
having little previous experience abroad.
d) Licensing is a means of circumventing entry barriers such as
import restrictions, transport costs, or local preferences
to buy from domestic manufacturers.
e) Royalty payments may help to finance the licensor's own 
expansion programme.
1 For the application of EC Competition Policy to licensing, see p.55*
2 See, for example, Jones pp.80-81 and Walsh p.71.
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Advantages to the licensee:
a) Expansion of the product range improves its size, risk and 
profitability. In the case of diversification, the firm can 
also buy in the licensor's experience of marketing 
techniques.
b) Savings in research costs and time mean that the licensee 
can market the product more quickly than if it developed it 
itself.
c) The licensor does not interfere in the licensee's decision-
taking activities, beyond controls determined in the licensing
1
agreement and the power to end the agreement.
d) The licensee can get access to the licensor's continuing 
development.
e) Payments (royalties) are financed out of cash flow from the 
new product.
Suitable cases for licensing:
Licensing may be an advantage where :
1. Transport costs are proportionally very high, as in the case 
of high volume, low value products, so that local manufacture 
is a distinct advantage.
2. The product demands installation or service support better 
than an agent can provide, but to which the producer is 
unwilling to divert resources.
3. Where a product contains high and low value components, the 
high value units can be exported direct to the licensor, who 
can add the low value components and assemble the product.
Dunning suggests (p.404) that from the licensee's viewpoint, 
this may be the main merit of licensing agreements.
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Where a good deal of management involvement is required, however, 
the licensor may decide that control of the operation can best be 
achieved by a more direct form of investment.
It is passible that licensing can be used by firms as an
important strategy with which to control competition within an
industry/market, since licensors can potentially give exclusive
rights for particular uses and geographic areas. This control can
be entended by the use of cross-licensing agreements. This can
1
bring licensing agreements into the area of antitrust policy. 
Disadvantages to the licensor :
a) It is possible that when the licence expires, the licensor
may find that it is in competition with the licensee. One
of the firms in the present study found that its licensee in 
West Germany was manufacturing under its own name and 
competing with the licensor in the USA. The high cost of 
lengthy legal proceedings deterred the firm from taking legal 
action. In other instances, however, the firms have become 
more closely associated and have followed the licence with a 
joint venture or an acquisition by the licensor.
b) The licensor loses control over production and marketing. He 
thus has to have confidence in the licensee's ability to fully 
exploit market opportunities, and to meet his product quality 
standards.
c) The licensor generally obtains a lower rate of return than
would be possible from exporting or equity investment. For
licensing to be the preferable route requires the right type
of product, such as in an innovative industry in which the
licensed right will only be of advantage for a relatively
short period of time. For long run manufacturing on any
significant scale, it would be more advantageous for the
potential licensor to enter the market independently and
2
thus retain all the profits from the venture.
1 See Lowe & Crawford, pp.8-9, for a full discussion of the anti­
competitive consequences of licensing agreements.
2 See, for example, R.E. Caves pp.272-273, and R.T.Jones p.82.
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d) Quality control is difficult. This can cause embarrassment 
for the licensor, as the product is often sold under his 
brand name.
e) Disagreements with the licensee. It is important that the 
two firms share the same objectives. Problems can be 
minimised by prior negotiation and an extensive licensing 
agreement.
In certain circumstances, a joint venture may be preferable 
to a licensing agreement. This will usually occur when the potential 
licensor wishes to retain a more consultative influence over the 
way in which his products will be presented to the market. The 
firm may, for example, wish to ensure high product standards so 
as to preserve its reputation. In order to gain some management 
control, then, the firm may ask for equity rather than a royalty 
fee in exchange for its technology. This may have the additional 
effect of improving communication links, and hence interaction, 
between the originating firm and the new venture, and thus aid 
technology transfer. The awareness that licensing agreements 
could be improved in these respects has in some cases led to them 
being replaced by joint ventures.
2
Takeovers/Merqers.
A. Reasons for Acquisitions
1. The purchasing company obtains a ready-made market
position. Revenue earning is therefore immediate. The 
acquisition may comprise production facilities, an 
established marketing and distribution organisation, 
market knowledge and contacts, and trained and 
experienced local staff. The firm may thus quickly achieve
Checklists for drafting-a licensing agreement are provided 
by Channon & Jalland Cpp.199-200, Jones (pp113-115) and Walsh 
(pp.72-74). Channon & Jalland also provide lists of factors 
important for success (p. 198) and factors leading to failure 
(p.199) in licensing.
For the application of EC Competition Policy to takeovers/ 
mergers, see-pp. 56^5T.
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the necessary critical size for it to become an effective 
competitor. Through acquisition it may broaden its 
customer base and open new market capabilities. The 
fact that the acquired company already exists in the 
market should, in addition, enable the firm using this 
as an entry strategy to circumvent many cultural, legal, 
management, and other start-up problems.
Acquisition can, however, result in significant problems.
Integration of the acquired firm with the rest of the
group may take a long time and produce important human 
1
problems. Furthermore, in a comprehensive recent
study on mergers and acquisitions, D.C.Mueller et al.
concluded that if acquisitions resulted in an increase
in market power, they would appear to be offset on
2
average by a decline in efficiency. There is further 
evidence that motives for acquisitions are predominantly 
to gain increased control of the market - and hence 
achieve a reduction in uncertainty - and to defend 
market and industrial positions.^
2. The acquiring firm obtains resources which would other­
wise be impossible or costly to gain in any other way -
for example, greater product and technical sophistication; 
management skills; essential marketing skills; research 
capabilities; improved quality control over a previous 
licence agreement; improved communication with a previous 
distributor.
3. Pro-merger theory holds that this strategy results in
greater efficiency, and that complementary factors will
lead to the earnings of the combined enterprise being 
greater than those^of the separate companies. In
See pp. 116-117, 188-189 and 196.
2 D.C.Mueller (ed.), p.309
3 See the study by G.D.IMewbould (1970), p. 160
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particular, opportunities may be created for excess
capacity to be utilised, and economies of scale to be
1
obtained in marketing, production and other areas.
This is explained by the notion that the combined 
production demands, allowing for plant product special­
isation, would result in longer production runs and a 
consequent relative reduction in fixed costs. The 
end result is held to be greater efficiency, higher
levels of economic activity, and a faster rate of 
2
growth. This analysis is wholly dismissed by Mueller 
et al., whose extensive analysis (published in 1961) 
consistently rejected the economies of scale motive, 
and further suggested that mergers have not lead to 
efficiency gains.^
4. Acquisition may eliminate a potential competitor.
5. Acquisition may represent a lower risk than a programme 
on internal development because the acquired firm has 
already produced known results.^
6. The acquiring firm can take advantage of surplus cash 
of its own, or benefit from a previous tax loss 
carried forward by the acquired firm, thus reducing 
future tax liability. Furthermore, the possibility of 
issuing shares in payment may minimise the actual cash 
requirement for the purchase.
7. Time can be an important reason for making an 
acquisition. Through this strategy, a firm can save 
the development time for a new product made by the 
acquired firm, as well as the time taken to develop a 
sales and distribution network and a market share.
The firm can also benefit from learning curve effects.
1 See pp.169 and 176.
2 See, for example, M.A.Weinberg et al. p.35; T.Fikri pp.291-93;
F.R.Root p.41.
3 Mueller pp. 302-306.
4 See p*Xj:5.
5 See p.169.
6 The learning, or experience, curve effect is that unit costs
decrease as production increases over time, due to improvements 
in efficiency as the company gains more experience in the 
manufacturing process. Speed of entry to the market is 
confirmed by the results of this study as being the most
important reason behind the JVs and takeovers in the sample. See S
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a. In the case of a vertical relationship, the acquiring
firm can ensure raw material supplies or a sales outlet.
9. If there is a falling return on investment in the buyer's 
own industry then diversification in order to reverse 
this trend is a possible solution. This strategy 
will reduce the company's dependence on a limited area 
of growth and spread its activities to different 
industries with different business cycles. However, 
since diversification leads the firm into unfamiliar 
territory, this may affect not only its original 
judgement, but also its ability to run the acquired 
firm afterwards. This may result in an unsuccessful 
outcome.
10.. Financial reasons:
a) Discounted assets : the firm may be able to acquire
the assets or shares of another firm at less than
1
the value which the buying firm places on them.
b) Discounted earnings: the firm may acquire the right
to its "victim's" profits at a lower multiple than 
the stock market places on the buying firm's own 
profit. That is, it may acquire a company with a 
lower share price/earnings per share (P/E) ratio 
than its own. The effect of this is to increase 
the purchasing firm's earnings per share (EPS). 
However, if the rate of growth of the acquired 
firm's EPS is lower than that of the purchasing 
firm, this benefit will only accrue over the short 
run, unless the buyer can, through making more 
facilities and financial backing available to the 
new firm, improve the letter's EPS growth rate. 
Otherwise the effect will be, despite the initial 
boost, to slow the parent's own EPS growth rate.
A previous study on acquisitions in Europe found that financial
2
reasons were relatively insignificant factors in takeovers. This 
confirms the view that such operations are undertaken for reasons 
other than maximising efficiency.
1 See p
2 See J,Hitching, pp.138-189
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Disadvantages of Acquisitions
1. 'Good' candidates may not be available. In addition, 
shortcomings in information may make valuation difficult. 
Differences in accounting systems, poor company 
information systems and attempts by the existing management 
to conceal faults can all contribute to this problem.
2. There is a possibility of over-payment, as it will be 
in the present owners' interest to overestimate the 
value of the company and of its assets. The true value 
really depends on its worth to the acquiring firm. In 
that the acquisition has yet to be integrated with the 
rest of the group, this value will be earier to assess 
after the event, which may be too late.
3. Integrating the acquired company into the firm can be
a very difficult process. The two companies may have
different methods, philosophies and organisational
systems, and attempts at integration can cause resentment
and friction. Cultural differences may exacerbate any
problems. It is also possible that an emphasis on
restructuring of the acquired firm can take precedence
over the original intentions:of the takeover, and can
indeed result in some of the original attractions of
1
the purchased firm being lost.
4. Host government assistance, such as regional grants, which
may be readily forthcoming in the case of a greenfield
venture are unlikely to apply to takeovers. Indeed, there
may well be strong host government opposition to the 
2
acquisition, unless the firm can demonstrate that it 
will not result in a transfer of operations and assets 
abroad, with a consequent decline in local employment.
1 See Hovers p.114, Young pp.42 and 137, Levinson p.6 6, and Ualsmsley 
p.4 for a more detailed analysis of this problem. Also see the
present study, pp.116-117, 188-159 a.ncL 196.
2 See, for example, p. 215,
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C. Who gains 7
Previous research indicates that whereas management 
may benefit from an acquisition, in general shareholders, 
employees and the economy do not. Studies by IMewbould (1970), 
IMewbould & Luffman (1978) and Mueller et al. (1980 all 
concluded that mergers do not increase economic efficiency, 
as evidenced by profit and growth increases. Indeed, IMewbould 
& Luffman went as far as to state, that shareholders did 
progressively worse (in terms of rates of return on their 
investments and capital losses on their shares) the more 
heavily their companies pursued a policy of acquisition, and
1
best with companies that relied entirely on internal growth.
These results conflict with neoclassical theory of merger
outcomes, and indeed with the traditional perception of
management's role in profit maximisation. Acquisition
strategy appears instead to be based on management motives.
These may stem from feeling of achievement, status and
prestige that controlling a larger company may bring. It
may be that management remuneration increases with firm
size, in line with responsibilities; increasing the size of
the firm may make it less susceptible to being taken over
itself; or, alternatively, acquisitions may simply be made as
2
being the most convenient way of entering a market.
D. Acquisition Strategy
The best means of formulating an acquisition strategy 
is this:
Having decided on the market to be entered, the firm should 
first conduct an extensive self-examination, in order to find 
out to what extent it could enter the market on its own. If 
it is decided that this would raise some difficulties, the 
firm should then identify its specific shortcomings, which may 
be the lack of an established distribution system, people 
with a detailed knowledge of the market in question, time or 
finance. It can then decide if it can overcome these problems
1 See IMewbould & Luffman, p.55
2 See p.l
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by, say, employing suitably qualified local nationals.
This self analysis means that when the firm eventually 
gets round to looking at local firms for acquisition/ 
co-operation, it can identify the most suitable ones by the 
specific characteristics of which it is short. Only then 
should it decide on the most appropriate stategy. The most 
suitable firm may, for example, not be available for take­
over, but may be willing to enter a co-operation agreement.
It may well be better to have a part share of a successful
1
operation than 100% of a less successful one. The strategy 
of acquisition should thus be considered along with other 
strategies, with the most appropriate one chosen to fit the 
circumstances.
A previous study of transnational acquisitions in
Europe has concluded that the chance of success mounts
in direct relation with the share of the market purchased,
and with the profitability of the target company. Hitching's
analysis found that European acquisitions are characterised
by a high failure rate, with 21.6% of cross-border
acquisitions involving only European firms being classified
by the companies, concerned as 'failures', and with a further
27.4% being 'not worth repeating'. That is, the success
rate in his sample was only 51%. The study concluded that
the key factor in developing an acquisition strategy is to
do everything possible to ensure increased market share,
2
earnings per share growth, and sales growth. The fact that 
so many firms in Hitching's study did not pay sufficient 
attention to these factors implies that where firms have 
failed, it is generally due to inadequate planning. The 
present study will develop this theme further.
1 See p. 197.





Joint ventures (Jvs) are another means of penetrating 
a new geographic or product market. In many ways, the reasons 
for using this strategy are essentially the same as those 
for takeovers, in that they entail an implicit recognition 
of the fact that the firm is unable to achieve its aim with 
its own resources alone, and that some form of collabora­
tion would offer a better solution. The main difference 
between the two stragies is that a joint venture involves 
giving up a share of the profits, in return for a reduction 
in the risk. Another important difference is that a JV 
involves co-operation rather than the control and subjection 
of one management to another which occurs in a takeover.
The JV possesses an inherent flexibility in that it can be
designed to suit the individual requirements of the
1
companies in question.
Some of the potential benefits may be :
1. Access to technological information or local cost benefits.
2. Local management skills, including knowledge of legal, 
economic, social and political affairs and customs. This 
may be particularly useful in a first incursion into
the market in question.
3. The addition of another marketing force means that the
firms can take advantage of production economies of
scale which would otherwise have resulted in difficult
2
marketing problems.
4. By pooling its resources with another company and sharing 
project and capital costs, a firm may be able to undertake 
a joint project with would be beyond its own financial 
resources.^
1 See lilalmsley, pp.3-5, on this point,
2 See pp. 169 and 176*
3 See pp.18 and 66*
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1
5. Spreading the risk of loss of capital.
6. Strengthening a vertical relationship through, for 
example, assuring a source of supply. A JV can also 
be profitably used where, for example, the firm sees
a distributor with a good marketing network and after­
sales service in trouble because it is under­
capitalised or because the quality of Sb present
2
products is inadequate.
7. Speed of entry into the market through acquiring 
immediate marketing expertise or a distribution network.' 
In addition, a JV partner may be more committed to the 
success of a project than may an agent or distributor 
with a variety of conflicting interests.
a.  The firm can expand its product line or by diversifying 
avoid cyclical/seasonal instability.
9. In some overseas markets, joint ventures are forced 
upon a firm by government legislation. Although this 
is not the case in the EEC, in sectors in which the 
government or a state industry is a major customer, 
pressures on a foreign firm may be severe unless there 
is some form of local involvement. Other customers may 
also have nationalist preferences which the JV may help 
to assuage.
10. JVs are useful where the firm wishes to invest in a 
number of countries at the same time and hence needs to 
limit the capital investment in each.
In a study by Stopford & Wells, 99 U.S. multinational corp­
orations placed the importance of the JV partners' contributions
in the following order :
1. General knowledge of local economy, politics, customs.
2. Speed of entry.
3. General managers.
4. Access to market for local goods.
1 See pp.169 and I 7 6 .
2 For an extension of this point see Bickers, p.28.
3 See p. 1 7 4 .




7. Access to local raw materials.
fl. Production, personnel, R & D skills,
9. Access ta market for foreign goods.
It should be noted that these firms were large multi­
nationals involved in JV/s all over the world, and as such were 
often involved with non-technical local partners. This may account 
for the relatively low importance given to the partners’ technical 
abilities. In the EEC, it is likely that both partners may 
contribute technology, and the importance attached to the technical 
ability of the partner is consequently expected to feature much 
more strongly in reasons for collaboration.
Finally - and this is what most concerns the European Commission 
- it is possible that firms may enter JVs in order to eliminate 
competitive uncertainties; that is, to substitute a ’negotiated’ 
business environment and degree of competition for a more free 
market structure. Smaller firms may opt for such agreements in 
order to protect themselves from severe competitive pressure from 
large oligopolistic companies, by whom their existence may be 
threatened]
B Disadvantages of JUs
By entering a JV, a firm gives up a share of the profits 
of a venture, although it is possible that this part share could 
still be more than the full share of a wholly-owned route, depending 
on how successful the different strategies would be.
Another problem is the loss or dilution of management 
control. This can be crucial issue where one or both partners 
wants the JV to behave in line with group policies, instead of as 
an independent entity. This will create clashes between the partners 
if one firm attempts to maximise its own profits from the venture 
at the expense of the JV itself - for example, by manipulating 
transfer prices or attempting to prevent the JV from competing 
with another subsidiary in export markets. A difference in
See p.199,
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attitudes to risk and short term cash flow can also cause
disagreements where, for example, one partner is willing to
sacrifice short term profits in return for an increase in 
1
market share.
A further drawback is that in entering a JV, a firm may be 
helping its partner to become a stronger competitor in the future, 
especially where a transfer of technology is involved with a 
partner who possesses the capital resources to exploit it.
Other difficulties for a tansnational JV may arise from
differences in legal, fiscal and accounting systems; differences
in business practices; communication problems arising from
language and cultural differences; and EEC antitrust legislation
which requires JVs between firms above a certain size to be
2
notified to the European Commission.
C Joint Venture Strategy
Joint venture strategy should be formulated in essentially 
the same way as acquisition stragegy, with an analysis of the 
firm’s aims and requirements being followed by an examination 
of the market and of the available entry strategies. The JV 
path should then be followed where in the circumstances it is 
deemed to be the most attractive means of market entry.
In addition to the JV aimed at market entry or at achieving 
economies of scale, this strategy may also be used where firms 
wish to become more closely integrated through a merger, but wish 
to eliminate some of the uncertainties about whether or not 
their organisations are compatible. This can permit a period 
of adjustment and working together without making an 
irreversible commitment. The JV may, of course, itself be 
a form of further integration, possibly resulting from an earlier 
distribution or licensing agreement between the firms concerned.
1 See Channon & Jalland, p.202 for a further development of this
issue.
2 See Appendix 2 on ’block exemptions’.
3 See Gullander (I) pp. 106-109 for suggestions of three different
types of JV strategy: a networked system of JVs; the standard short 
term JV; and the successive integration strategy.
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This chapter will now examine characteristics of JVs and of 
the potential parents themselves which may influence their 
decision whether or not to use this strategy :
a) Firms attracted to JVs
- technological firms: Such firms may be attracted to JV/s 
if the technical sophistication of their products is such 
that a single national market would be inadequate to 
exploit it, and they do not have the financial capacity
or international structure to do so. This can also be done
through a licensing agreement; but many firms prefer an
1
equity stake to a straight royalty payment.
- diversified firms: The firm with highly diversified products 
may be short of an organisational back-up structure for some 
of those products. It may therefore need help on marketing 
and distribution in the foreign market, together with local 
management knowledge. A JV with a local company providing 
such facilities would thus help the firm enter the market 
much more quickly than it could do otherwise. Speed of 
entry is thus expected to be an important reason for 
collaboration.
Hitching has found that diversification into new products
via a transnational takeover in Europe is negatively correl
2
ated with success. Introducing a new product abroad through 
a JV, however, reduces the risk and also the firm's exposure 
to many of the possible organisational problems.^
- small single-product firms : Such firms may not have the 
financial strength for either an independent expansion or a
1 Killing (I) pp. 43-46 gives further details of the JV requirements of 
high-technology firms.
2 See Hitching, pp. 61-72,
3 See Brooke & van Beusekom p.119; Gullander (II) pp.106-7; Franko pp.5 
and 72; and Stopford & Wells p.68, for a discussion on the suitability
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takeover, and may thus see JVs as a means of achieving the 
size advantages of economies of scale or critical mass 
(necessary minimum input level) required for a project.
The same situation may apply to divisions or subsidiaries of 
large diversified firms who may have management autonomy.^
b) Firms against JVs
- large single-product firms: These firms do have the
financial strength for an independent expansion. Their
size and specialisation is such that they are unlikely to
require technical help and should be fully conversant with
the requirements of their customer group. A study by
Franko has found, in fact, that such firms find sooner or
2
later that they cannot live with JV partners.
- marketing-oriented firms: Firms which specialise in 
marketing techniques are unlikely to take kindly to 
interference by a JV partner with its own marketing skills, 
and clashes over policy would be likely in the case of a 
JV. Moreover, such a firm is likely to be confident about 
exposure to the market and would not be expected to require 
the assistance of a local firm. It may, however, be willing 
to consider a JV which involves marketing another firm's 
products.
- production rationalisation firms:^ Such a firm will wish to 
make a JV conform to group policies rather than to behave
as an independent entity. The firm will allocate production 
among its subsidiaries and co-ordinate their marketing 
operations so as to maximise the profits for the group as a 
whole. This approach will make severe conflicts with a JV 
partner inevitable. The partner - who may also wish to use 
the JV for his own ends - will at least want to maximise JV 
profits. This means that he will strongly oppose any attempt.
1 This point is extended by Gullander (II), p.107.
2 See Franko, p.5
3 See also p.18?.
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by the firm to re-allocate production to another part of the 
group, or any attempts to constrain the JV's export 
potential where it might compete with one of the firm's other 
subsidiaries. The policy objectives would thus be 
incompatible, and such firms therefore tend to avoid joint 
ventures.
c) Firm size differences
Where significant differences exist between the sizes of the 
partners, this may result in the JV being much more important 
to the smaller firm than to the larger one. The small firm 
may thus wish to give far more time and attention to the 
needs of the JV than the large company. Where additional 
resources are called for, however, the smaller firm may 
be less able to afford an increased contribution. This may 
put pressure on the larger firm to buy out the operation, 
or at least to take an increased share.
d) Shared or dominant management 7
For a dominant partner, this may be more likely to result in
consistency of policy, and hence less uncertainty about the
JV. Of course, the reverse may apply for the minority
partner. From the point of view of the firm entering a
foreign market, a majority (large enough to determine
policy) JV gives it the advantages of control together with
2
the benefits of local participation, A problem for the 
minority partner, however, is sustaining the motivation 
to work in the JV, particularly if it is unable to have an 
influence on policy.
1 See p. 205*
2 IMewbould, Buckley & Thurwell found (p.74) that for these reasons 
firms are likely to find ownership of between 75% and 99% of an 
overseas subsidiary the most successful structure. Hilling 
recommends (II, pp.121-7) that shared management should only
occur where the continued operational involvement of both firms, as 
opposed to a one-off transfer by one firm, is necessary.
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e) Risk
Levels of risk may vary between the partners. For example, 
a firm contributing technology may place the same value on 
its input as a partner contributing cash. However, the 
firm putting up the finance is the one which is taking the 




There is no substitute for extensive planning for a JV, 
or indeed any other venture. The firm should ensure that 
all potential problems are ironed out before the venture 
starts. It is far better for a JV to fail in the planning 
stages than after it has started, and resources have 
been committed. While flexibility is necessary, a JV 
cannot work where the true objectives of the partners are 
incompatible. It is essential that both firms should be 
prepared to enter frank discussions about their aim, so as 
to agree on objectives, which should be included in the 
written JV agreement.
Risk and Return
Risk is defined as 'a condition under which either the occurrence 
or the outcome of alternatives is not certain but is assigned 
probabilities*.^ The difference between risk and uncertainty is 
that the latter is unmeasurable.
1 See p. 188.
2 See pp 108-111 and. 193-^ 94 .
3 The definition is that used by Ansoff, p.155n.
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If a firm is to invest in an alien environment involving greater 
uncertainty, and therefore risk, than it faces in its present markets, 
it should demand a higher return from its investment than it could 
obtain by expanding its present operations, to compensate for this. 
Otherwise it would be better off investing in its current markets, 
where it has a detailed knowledge of the business environment.
Rates of return on overseas investment should, however, be compared 
with marginal returns on domestic investment, rather than with 
existing average returns. Where the home market is saturated, for 
instance, marginal returns will approach zero, and the only possible 
room for expansion (in the same product market) will be overseas.
1
A previous study of overseas production investments found,
however, that over half the firms in the survey had invested abroad
without setting any financial objectives for the investment. It
concluded that the firms which did set financial objectives were on
2
the whole more successful than those which did not. This is only 
to be expected, since not all the proposals subjected to risk analysis 
would have been accepted as being viable or worthwhile propositions, 
and some would consequently have been dropped.
Essentially, risk analysis depends on the original background 
research.^ The more research is done, the more will be known about 
local economic, industry and business factors and their effects on 
the variability of cash flow and return on investment. The firm can 
thus make more effective estimates of market share and growth 
performance. Other factors must also be borne in mind - for example, 
a change in exchange rates can put great pressure on a foreign 
investor and place an entire venture in jeopardy.
1 IMewbould, Buckley & Thurwell, p.111. 40% of the participants in the
present study also carried out no financial planning for their ventures 
(see pp. 206-207) .
2 Similar results were obtained in the present study (see pp. 206— 207)*
3 See, for example, pp. 207— 208 of the present study.
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The exchange between prospective gain (return on investment) and
risk is a subjective matter and can only be left to the individual
decision-maker to judge.
Prior Research
The purpose of prior research is to increase market knowledge,
1
thereby reducing uncertainty and hence risk. The firm which is not 
concerned with undertaking prior research is not interested in 
reducing its risk. It is difficult to see how this can result in
anything but harm to the firm in the long run.
If a proposed venture is going to be successful, it is possible 
that the non-researching firm will make a slightly greater profit 
than the researching firm because of the letter's additional 
research expenses; although it is possible that this research will 
have led to strategic modifications resulting in a larger profit 
overall. But in the case of a proposed venture which (although not 
known at the time) is going to be a failure, the non-researching 
firm stands to lose its entire investment.. The researching firm, 
on the other hand, has a good chance of identifying the weaknesses 
of the project during the research stage, in which case it would 
lose only its research expenses - very minor in comparison with the 
non-researching firm.
The cost of the research is a few weeks' work and a comparatively 
small amount of money. The potential savings must heavily justify 
the expense.
Despite this, the study by IMewbould et al. found that 60% of the
firms covered sought no market information other than what they
already knew from exporting to the market in question or having an
2
agency or sales subsidiary there.
1 See pp,207-208.
2 See Newbould, Buckley & Thurwell, p.88, and also the present study 
pp. 106 aXLd 179—81,The need to do sufficient background research 
was the main lesson learned by the participants of the present 
study (see pp.193-194)*
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The prospects for success in a JV can be helped by the sharing
of research by the prospective partners. This joint operation will
help to identify any problems both in the product/industry and in
any working relationships between the two firms. It will help to
develop common targets and enable both companies to demonstrate
their commitment to the project before finally committing their 
1
resources.
This research will be considered under the headings of : (i) 
the country; (ii) the prospective partner/victim; (iii) the industry; 
and (iv) the product.
(i) The Country: Examples of issues to be examined here are :
- Taxation;
- Size of GIMP and growth rate - in a country with a healthy economy 
and fast GIMP growth rate, the chances are that the venture will 
also do well;
- Inflation rate;
- Local sources of finance;
- Control rights conferred by certain percentage shareholdings;
- Labour laws;
- Regional investment policies.
Where government inducements are offered, it should be remembered
that this is usually for a good reason: there may not be an
adequate transport network; the region may not be economically
developed; there may not be a suitably trained local labour
force. Any such investment decision should therefore be able
to stand on its own merits, since the firm has to ensure that
it can still run the venture as a profitable concern after
2
the government incentives have weakened.
See Hlavacek & Thompson p.39 and Walmsley p.69 on the virtues of 
undertaking joint research.
These views are confirmed by the results of the IMewbould, Buckley & 
Thurwell study, pp.118-19, and by Walmsley, pp. 63-64. Comments on 
this point in the present study may be found on p.213.
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(ii) The Prospective Partner/Victim: An initial self-analysis
means that the firm can identify potential partners/victims 
by the specific characteristics which it requires. A 
number of questions still need to be asked, however. The 
firm needs to know whether or not the partner can pull 
his own weight, and whether or not the two organisations 
will be compatible. Examples of topics which might be 
investigated are ;
- The potential victim/partner’s financial performance and 
current position - profitability, capitalisation, etc.
- Structure of the organisation, information and accounting
1
procedures; is the firm run by an owner-manager ?
- Market position : level of, and changes in, market share; 
reputation; market practices; vertical relationships - 
e.g., dependence on one customer or supplier.
- Quality and efficiency of production; investment and 
innovation; capacity utilisation.
- Possibility of language problems.
In order to gain a clear understanding of the firm's market 
position and commercial relations, it may be necessary to 
conduct interviews also with suppliers and customers, who 
may have criticisms of the potential partner's organisa­
tion or products which the partner itself may not mention. 
The purpose must be to leave as little as possible to 
chance.
Previous research has indicated that larger companies spend
more time on prior research than smaller firms because their
size enables them to carry out a more rationalised approach
2
and search procedure. This is only to be expected, 
since smaller firms are unlikely to be able to afford the 
same commitment of financial resource or management time to 
such research.
1 See pp 189— 192.
2 See Hlavacek & Thompson, pp. 39-40, and Newbould et al., pp.60-61;
also the present study, pp,38 and 194.
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(iii) The Industry : The firm needs information on such issues as :
which are the leading products and why; 
levels and trends in profit margins; 
strength of competition and market shares; 
number and strength of customers;
the importance to customers of : price; delivery; reliability;
quality; after-sales service;





marketing techniques and organisation.
(iv) The Product : Finally, an analysis of the product concerned 
should cover such points as : 
the purpose of the product;
advantages/disadvantages compared with competing products;
the level and price elasticity of demand for the product;
substitutability of other products;
2
the level of servicing required.
A more extensive outline for industry analysis is provided by 
Ansoff, p.126.
More detailed checklists covering all these subject headings are 
provided by: B.I.M.; Bean, pp.150-153; Hovers, pp.133-55; Walmsley, 
p.68; Williams, pp.34-38; Young, pp.173-77. Walmsley also 
recommends that the research should include a detailed feasibility 
study to assess the viability of the venture.
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Structuring the Venture
a) Determining percentage shares
1. Outright control may be achieved with ownership of over 
67% in France, and over 75% in West Germany. In France, 
however, one should not initially acquire more than 80% 
of a local company, transferring the remainder after the 
fifth anniversary of the original purchase. The purchasing 
company is otherwise liable to pay a registration tax of 
16.6% of the 'goodwill' value involved in the transaction,
or 17.6% TVA (VAT) on the level of stocks held by the acquired
company. This liability is at the discretion of the French 
1
tax authorities.
IMewbould, Buckley & Thurwell's study of first overseas
production subsidiaries found that 75% - 99% ownership
was the most successful, since it combines outright control
2
with the benefit of local participation and knowledge.
The problem with this approach is that a strong partner 
may not agree to such a structure, whereas a firm which 
will agree to it may not be in a strong position.
Moreover, outright control can lead to decisions being 
imposed rather than agreed, which can seriously affect 
relationships between the firms concerned.
2. Management control, giving the right to nominate management 
and control the day-to-day activities of the company, is 
typically achieved with 51% of equity.
3. 50/50 JVs? This structure can be both an advantage and a
disadvantage. In favour of the 50:50 JV is that it can 
create a spirit of true co-operation and equality, whatever 
the respective sizes of the parents. It also means that 
decisions must be taken by mutual agreement. Both partners 
are protected in this respect. However, this also means 
that in a deadlock situation no decision can be taken.
The EC Commission fears, in fact, that this power of veto
1 See p. 214.
2 See Newbould, Buckley & Thurwell, p.74.
3 See also pp 61 and 217-218.
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may restrict the partners' ability to act independently 
on any matter of importance relating to the JV.
A 50:50 equity split does not necessarily represent the 
proportions of monetary or physical assets contributed by 
each parent. This depends on how the different inputs are 
valued. A firm supplying technology, for example, may be 
in a strong bargaining position for equity, even though 
the partner supplying finance may be taking the greater 
risk.
4. Minority rights, or 'minorité de blocage', apply with
ownership of at least 25% of the equity in West Germany, 
and 33% in France. Shareholdings of this order give the 
right to prevent changes in fundamental aspects of the 
business, such as the articles of association, the nature 
of the business, divided policies, asset liquidations, etc.
b) Ownership and control^
The key reason for wanting management control is to be able 
to influence JV decisions in all aspects of strategy, so that 
it can fit into a general corporate plan. Thus issues such as 
transfer pricing policies and competition with other parts of the 
corporate group can be designed to suit the, parent company 
rather than the JV directly. It has been suggested that for a 
corporate group united by centralised policies in production and 
marketing, such control over the JV may determine whether it can 
be integrated at all in the group.
There are different means of retaining management control. 
The firm may have the right to appoint directors and managers 
of the JV; it may issue two types of share - voting and nonr 
voting - and retain a majority of the voting shares. It may 
hold options to increase its equity stake; and so on.
1 See pp. 217-220.
2 See Gullander (I), p.110.
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In the case of an acquisition, the acquiring firm has to 
decide whether or not to retain the former owners/managers. It 
is true that they will know the acquired firm better than any­
one else; however, they may also prefer to continue running 
the firm on their own. This may be reflected in an 
unwillingness to conform to group headquarters. Former owner- 
managers may have vested interest in company policies and may 
thus be unlikely to respond kindly to parent company 
interference. In order to ensure an accurate flow of 
information, the parent may decide to put one of its own 
accountants into its new subsidiary.
In doing this, however, there is a danger that the new 
parent might alienate the management of the acquired firm by 
denying them the autonomy to which they have been accustomed.
The effect of imposing control sytems might thus be to stifle 
the very quality which the acquiring firm had sought to 
obtain.
The integration of subsidiary staff into the parent company 
can be a difficult process which may leave much room for 
misunderstanding. Effective integration requires a common 
understanding of the strategies, targets and systems of the 
corporate group. The new parent must consequently be prepared 
to help the staff of the acquired firm to understand their 
role and invite them to make a positive contribution.
c) Nationality of the chief executive
The choice here is usually between a national of the 
parent's country (i.e., the UK in this study) and a local 
national.
The advantage to »a UK firm of using one of its British 
employees abroad is that communications can be greatly improved, 
and the chief executive will willingly institute a full 
reporting system, providing the parent with greater information. 
He will know how the parent operates and is far less likely to 
oppose group strategy which will reduce the profitability of 
the venture in favour of the group as a whole - for example
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on transfer prices, rationalisation, or competition with other 
members of the group.
In favour of the local man will be his understanding of 
the local market and of local commercial, economic, legal and 
social factors, together with his language ability. In the 
acquired firm he may be a former manager, and will be well 
acquainted with the firm and its products and procedures.
Whoever the parent company decides on, language must be a 
vital factor. The chief executive must be able to grasp for 
himself what is happening in the market, and it would be 
unreasonable and indeed impolite to expect customers and 
suppliers to deal with the firm in a language other than 
their own. In addition, however, he must be able to 
communicate clearly and effectively with the parent company.
He therefore needs to speak both languages.
d) The JU agreement.
A well constructed agreement may save enormous subsequent 
1
problems. Although flexibility is certainly necessary in a JV, 
the initial spirit of co-operation is not itself sufficient.
This concord may last only until the first clash of interests 
arises, and then wither away. Once an agreement is signed, 
both partners can, if they agree, choose to ignore it entirely; 
but when a potential argument developes, it provides something 
valuable to fall back on.
As far as is practical, the agreement should cover all 
possible future disagreements. It requires a clear statement of 
the objectives of the venture, and agreements on : future growth 
and profit objectives; duties and obligations; dividends'- pricing 
policies; transfer pricing; competition between the JV and the 
parents in export markets; product quality; accounting practices; 
and so on. Discussions should be quite frank. There is no
1 See also pp. 38, 46, 194 and 218-219.
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reason to conceal true intentions, since this can only lead 
to future disagrements. If the partners cannot agree on an 
issue before they are financially committed, the chances of 
their doing so graceful^ afterwards must indeed be slim.
The agreement by itself is not enough, of course. The 
success of a venture depends on the motivation of the people 
involved, and personalities can count for far more than paper.
1
Problems and Conflicts
These can arise from any issues not adequately covered by the 
written agreement, and are usually the consequence of inadequate 
planning of the venture. They therefore serve to stress how vital 
it is for firms to be quite clear about the objectives of the 
venture and to commit themselves to a written agreement rather than 
to rely on flexibility and co-operation to solve problems as they 
arise; they may well find that they are less flexible than they 
originally supposed.
Inadequate pre-planning may be reflected in: insufficient market/ 
product/country/partner analysis; higher costs than anticipated; 
poor timing; insufficient investment; stronger competition than 
expected; unexpected weaknesses in the partner/victim; lack of 
preparation for integration with a new subsidiary, and so on. In 
short, it adds to the risk.
A lack of flexibility may result in: difficulties between two 
incompatible management systems; inadequate support for the venture; 
insufficient time given to the venture.
Finally, there is the potential problem of ’identity' for an 
1 See pp. 181-192.
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acquired company. This arises where, following a takeover, the new
parent imposes its business systems and substantial reporting
requirements on the subsidiary, removes its policy autonomy and
requires it to perform for the benefit of the group as a whole
rather than as an independent entity. This is likely to alienate
the subsidiary employees and may well result in many of the original
attractions of the takeover being lost. Motivation of the
subsidiary managers is likely to be seriously affected, since they
will have lost control over their own destiny. They may question
their own value in an organisation which is now effectively
managed by someone else, and may be unwilling to carry out
1
dictated policies.
These problems can be avoided by helping the subsidiary 
employees to feel that they are part of the larger group, and 
inviting them to make a contribution. This means showing these 
managers that the parent can provide more support and financial 
backing than was previously available. A group consciousness cannot 
be imposed, but in a well planned and sympathetic integration 
subsidiary employees will develop this themselves.
See pp. 96, 188-89 and 196.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY
This chapter does not seek to provide a complete review 
ot the mechanical engineering sector. Its purpose is merely to 
pick out certain features of the industry which may be expected 
(from the literature) to have a bearing on transnational business 
co-operation and which will later be developed in the questionnaire.
Although some comparison is made with the UK’s principal
competitors in this product area, the general approach will be 
restricted to the UK.
Topics to be covered in this chapter will be :
1. The UK’s performance in trade







5. Non-price factors in export competitiveness.
Much of the chapter is concerned with the first section, which 
through examining the importance of trade in this sector together 
with the UK’s international performance shows the necessity for 
British engineering firms to be able to perform well abroad, and 
the difficulties with which they have been presented in international 
competition. The effects on market performance of exchange rate 
fluctuations and relative unit labour costs are described.
The second section briefly analyses direct investment flows 
between the UK and the EEC, while the third and fourth sections 
examine the structure of the industry and competitive pressures 
within it, which could lead to firms investing in other markets.
The final section is concerned with non-price demand factors which 
can explain price differentials.
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The UK's performance in trade
- Imports and exports
Engineering features very strongly in UK trade. Table 14
1 2 
shows that in 1980, machinery and transport equipment accounted
for 25% of UK total imports and 35% of exports. West Germany's
strength in engineering is demonstrated by the fact that this
sector accounted for 44% of her exports, but only 19% of her
imports.
It is interesting to note from Table 15 that while West 
Germany’s imports of machinery and transport equipment in 1980 
were, at 25.2 billion ECUs (22% of the EEC total), only 16% 
higher than those of the UK (19% of the EEC total), her 
exports were vastly (117%) greater at 61.5 billion ECUs (39% 
of the EEC total) compared with 28.4 billion ECUs (18% of 
the EEC total) for the UK.
72% of the EEC's imports in this product sector and 86% 
of exports were accounted for by W.Germany, the UK, France and 
Italy.
TABLE 14 Trade in Machinerv and Transoort Eouioment. 1980.
% of EEC % of M&T as % of M&T as
Belgium/
M&T imports M&T exports total imports total i
Luxembourg 10 6 22 22
Denmark 3 2 21 24
France 18 17 21 33
W.Germany 22 39 19 44
Greece 2 0 36 3
Ireland 2 1 27 18
Italy 13 12 20 33
Netherlands 10 6 20 17
UK 19 18 25 35
EEC 100 100 21 33
Source: figures derived from 'Eurostat
Review 1971-80’ , EEC Statistical Office, 
Brussels/Luxembourg, Nov. 1981.
1 Most recent available EEC statistics.
2 SITC Order 7, which includes electrical and instrument engineering
and transport equipment besides mechanical engineering.
Table 15 EEC Trade Data
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12357 13 812 17 910 25 015 24 819 31715 35418 38 095 44 053 51632 117 172
4343 4 513 8 334 8 331 8383 11093 11616 11422 13670 14 105 103 14.0
34 431 35 827 44 106 58 046 60 442 78912 88 603 95 405 116 310 135 243 116 16.4
2002 2091 2787 3694 4 301 5426 5999 6150 7028 7634 109 16.0
20262 23 816 30042 44 293 43 682 67647 61 785 64 215 77705 97102 125 19.0
1761 1877 2263 3193 3046 3764 4726 5591 7175 7 999 111 18.3
15298 17 218 22649 34 438 31 122 39485 42132 44 278 56 716 71 813 127 182
14 624 15466 19 799 27 847 28 389 35832 39 970 41532 49 053 55369 113 16.9
22915 24 848 31562 45347 42905 50122 55522 61638 74 746 85853 115 152
127 994 139470 177 462 260204 247 089 313906 348 973 368 226 446488 626 681 118 17,0
4739 6058 7786 12942 13 106 15618 .15578 14 648 18521 24 645 133 20.0
1698 1949 2451 3726 3078 3782 4 341 4 076 4 774 6883 140 16.4
6 751 7229 8830 13947 14 080 17 528 17 524 16 132 20941 24 067 115 162
43467 49 549 56405 84 679 78098 106933 129 564 135 085 151119 173 231 115 16,6
18807 20 933 31 021 52075 46 635 57995 62 570 62254 80 708 101346 126 21.0
«.1J. Tatalaapam
BalgVLua. 12184 14404 18 203 23704 23183 29340 32891 35204 41033 46459 113 16.0
Danmark 3412 3869 6063 6464 7 024 8139 8816 9224 10786 12196 113
BAOawtacWamd 39141 41634 54 397 74 753 72666 91155 103316 111340 125243 138 787 111 15.1
632 776 1 159 1702 1855 2295 2411 2645 2641 3728 131 22.0
Franca 19576 23042 28 902 38469 41 981 49915 55667 60116 71610 80150 112 17.0
Iraiand 1257 1441 1727 2225 2 585 2992 3 852 4459 5220 6101 117 19JZ
Italia 14 465 16583 18 105 25 557 28 240 33504 39688 43 942 52 615 56115 107 18.3
Nadartand 13 468 15 045 19 511 27 745 28 593 36149 38 283 39 292 46434 53 184 115 16.5
Umtad Kingdom 21423 21 706 24 795 32 373 35 288 41458 50 276 56 090 66042 82063 124 16.1
cum 10 125 857 138 802 171 882 232 993 241428 294 947 338 200 302 314 421704 478 783 I K  . 18.0
EapaAa- 2 805 3390 4 188 5 942 6 192 7806 8 942 4 10 250 13278 V 14 956 113 20.0
Portugal 988 1 148 1 491 1 890 1 556 1618 1772 1905 2543 3331 131 14.5
Svariga 7130 7 815 9881 13 317 14 007 16479 16 736 17 081 20132 22249 111 13.5
USA 42119 44 374 57 918 82 592 86 714 102855 105303 112 736 132 839 158 514 120 15.9
Nippon (Japan) 22982 25 546 29937 46 563 44 934 60123 70 800 76 593 75003 93069 124 16.8
NaaWmai, —< aanapart Maeülnaaariiiatanal Jaaamaan
■auiawum ibnaana Impanaaana Iwraar
fiatgVLux. 3275 3887 4 641 6597 6324 7996 8940 9850 10 749 11554 107 15.0
Danmark 1280 1295 1 826 1993 2295 3139 3105 3301 3 336 3022 91 10,0
BR DawtacNand 6 393 6 895 7880 8633 10533 14128 16 993 19649 22455 25242 112 164
*CAAd6o 907 857 1063 1035 1531 2223 2 740 2526 2691 2745 102 13.1
Franca 5210 6257 7772 9335 9613 13383 13 943 14 911 17504 20738 118 16.6
iraiand 472 508 611 700 746 956 1 266 1670 2069 2180 105 185
Italia 3134 3575 4485 5335 5649 6955 7 618 8539 10349 14 467 140 184
Nadartand 3 555 3 692 4 610 5709 6483 7603 9 189 9 932 10993 10951 100 134
um tad Kingdom 4023 5 225 6 556 7655 8 075 10 279 12 688 16019 19678 21 729 110 21.0
CUR 10 28 249 32191 39 644 45992 51 249 66663 76462 66 397 99 824 112626 113 16.8
EapaAa 1 146 1603 2193 2690 2872 3582 3080 2845 3505 4 352 124 164
Portugal 554 .677 823 1001 779 953 1 140 1 131 1 192 1656 139 1Z9
Svariga 2077 2 328 2 754 4 011 4568 5318 5505 4839 5796 6441 111 13.4
USA • 13 270 15 512 17 671 20710 19540 29824 31 797 37373 39162 45849 117 14.8
Nippon (Japan) 2140 2118 2140 3599 3083 4066 3 730 4485 5 330 6026 113 124
9- - . — , -
KA11. M*cMm<v an4 aanaaart aaapimnt :aaaor(i MacWwaa at laaiarW da aamaart
B rn tg J lM . 2566 3306 3896 4442 5405 7210 7963 8534 9430 10026 106 16.4
Danmark 907 1069 1359 1774 2040 2227 2330 2316 2604 2951 113 14.0
BRDautacNand 17665 20101 25 439 31766 33767 43275 49422 52051 56139 61506 110 149
UOB&c 11 18 26 45 72 112 127 81 97 114 118 26.0
Franca 6 686 7719 9341 11403 15 197 18713 20769 21543 25 572 26 534 104 16.7
Ireland 75 119 171 224 288 408 588 618 838 1 128 135 35.0
Itaa» 5082 5856 6 275 8122 9 842 11440 13 355 14 364 16 219 18 348 113 15.3
Nadartand 2 534 2968 3 676 4609 5 397 8892 7 161 7 351 8114 9 053 112 152
Unmad Kingdom 8 967 9 378 9506 11 887 14 706 15291 18 828 20 666 22795 28 352 124 13.6
CURIO 44 393 50 534 59 891 74 272 •6 715 108 588 120 542 127 523 141 809 188 013 111 15.1
EapaAa 694 735 934 1 321 1 566 2150 2298 2628 3513 3922 112 23.0
Portugal 97 135 206 245 206 206 262 259 313 443 142 18.4
Svartga 3 006 3 273 4 027 5 097 6115 7 237 7 295 7 268 8265 8 629 107 12.7
USA 18 578 19 367 23 573 32 321 37 220 49 542 44 042 46 511 51365 59 476 116 13.8
■Nippon (Japan) 10104 12 172 15 257 21 159 22 087 35920 39 228 43 604 40 362 54 491 135 21.0
Source: ‘Eurostat Review 1971-80', EEC Statistical Office,
Brussels/Luxembourg, Nov. 1981.
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Tables 16 and 17 show trends in import penetration and export/ 
sales ratios in the UK mechanical engineering industries. Ratio 1 
(imports/home demand) shows the share of imports in the home market. 
However, this ratio takes no account of the domestic industry's 
involvement in export markets which may compensate for the level 
of imports. Ratio 2 allows for this by reducing as exports increase. 
Similarly, Ratio 3 (exports/manufacturer' sales) makes no allowance 
for the degree of import penetration of the domestic market, and 
Ratio 4 makes the parallel adjustment.
The tables reveal that high export/sales ratios are positively
associated with high import rations in mechanical engineering.
This apparent anomaly has two possible explanations: either a)
firms which are geared to exports are unable to respond to the
1
demands of the domestic market ; or b) the products which are 
exported differ from those which are imported. The tables also 
suggest that import penetration in UK mechanical engineering is 
growing more rapidly than exports/sales, although both have 
increased over the last decade.
These figures may, however, be misleading to a certain extent 
because they do not take account of changes in the volume of 
industrial production in mechanical engineering. An increase in 
the exports/sales ratio, for example, may be due not so much to a 
rise in the real level of exports themselves as to a fall in domestic 
production.
Although at first sight it appears that export performance 
has improved, an analysis of Ratios 1-4 together with Table 19 
clearly indicates that in absolute terms exports have been falling.
Any improvement in the exports/sales figures thus does indeed 
reflect a deterioration in domestic production rather than an increase 
in exports. There has been no question of diverting resources from 
home to export markets or of an export-led recovery. Meanwhile, 
the UK domestic position has been a falling share of a falling 
market.
This point is made by C.Saunders, p.40
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Table 1% Trade in mechanical engineering products £ million
IMPORTS (c.i.f.)
MLŒ 1975 1 9 %  1977 1 9 %  1975 .1980'
331 Agricultural machinery 
(except tracrtors) 70.2 99.1 111.4 121.S 142.9 127a
332 Metal-working^ machine 
tools 165.9 205.3 222.4 319.0 407.0 403.0
333 Pumps^ valves &
compressors 137.2 186.0 227.5 2 4 9 a 288.5 279.6
334 Industrial engines 63.4 50:.6 78.2 86.5 9 5 a 9 8 a
335 Textile machinery @2.1 95.0 96.2 114.0 120.7 104.3
336 Construction & eartib- 
moving equipment 16EL.3 216 a 2 3 S a 274.5 314.7 283.5
337 Mechanical ing 
equipment 120.7 133.9 175.8 217.7 249.4 263.1
Total Mechanrncal Brcgmrr— 
earing (81& Order V/IX> 1601^4 1945.8 2261.1 2812.9 3377.3 3414.7
MEH 331-3377 as ^ of total 50 51 51 49 48 46
M M
REPORTS (f.o.b.) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
331 Agricultural machinery 
(except tractors) 85.3 99.9 135.7 141.2 133.7 129.5
332 Metal-working machine 
tools 227.9 248.5 288.2 339.6. 344.5 427.7
333 Pumps, valves &
compressors 293.7 374.5 435.4 494.6 478.6 601.6
334 Industrial engines 188.3 197.6 244.7 292.5 312.2 390.4
335 Textile machinery 223.7 234.6 187.5 200.0 215 a 241.6
336 C onstruetion & eartib- 
moving equipment 470.6 574.9 718.8. 741.9 734.1 848.4
337 Mechanical handling 
equipment 241.4 286.3 37/4.9 365.1 371.3 460.4
Total Mechanical Engin­
eering (SIC Order VII) 3181.3 3767.8 4402.5 5109.8 5311.7 6142.7
MIH 331-337 as ^ of total1 54 54 54 50 49 50
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Growth in exports in the first half of the decade was aided
by a depreciation in sterling after it was floated in 1972, making
1
UK exports relatively more competitive on world markets. At the
2 3
same time, rising UK prices and growth of the home market resulted
in an increase in import penetration.
Falling markets had an adverse effect on production levels
from 1975. UK exports suffered a loss in competitiveness as a
4
result of both domestic inflation and the appreciation of sterling 
between 1977 and 1980^ - The fact that imports have maintained their 
absolute market share may be due to the fact that imported products 
are not as affected by domestic cost inflation as domestic 
products and may thus more easily remain competitive, and also 
because the appreciation of sterling gave imports more price 
flexibility.
Table 20 Trade Conversion Factors (exports)
Units of national currency per £ sterling
W.Germany France Italy Japan USA
D-mark franc lira yen dollar
1970 8.784 13.333 1500 863.3 2.40000
1973 6.480 10.864 1434 666.2 2.45159
1974 6.044 11.250 1521 683.0 2.34254
1975 5.441 9.470 1447 657.1 2.21439
1976 4.509 8.580 1496 532.6 1.79501
1977 4.047 8.577 1545 469.5 1.74637
1978 3.839 8.646 1627 404.1 1.91949
1979 3.893 9.038 1758 465.4 2.12669
1980 4.223 9.834 2005 526.2 2.32577
Source: Based on trade conversion factors in United Nations Yearbook
of International Trade Statistics, 1980.
Trade Conversion Factors represent exchange rates (annual averages) 
used by the United Nations for conversion of trade statistics.
1 See Tables 20 and 21
2 See Table 22. See also Table 23 for relative price performance.
3 See Table 19.
4 See Table 22.






Effective Exchange Hate Index^ 
1975 = 100
TJK W.Oennany- France Italy Japan USA
1976 85 w6 104r-.:3. 95.6 82.3 104.2 105.2
1977 8ia 113.0 91.3 75.5 115.2 104.7
1976 8lw5 120.1 91.3 71.1 141.7 95.7
1979 S7a2 127.5 93.4 69.4 131.5 93.7
1980: 960. 128.8 94.4 67.2 126.5 93.9
1981 94.9 119.3 84.4 58.3 142.9 • 105.7
1982 90.5 124.3 76.7 53.9 134.8 118.1
Dollar Rate Index
1975 = 100
UK W.(Germany France Italy Japan
1976 81.3 97.6 89.7 76.7 100.1
19T71 76.6 105.8 87.1 73.9 110.8
1976 @6.4 122.4 95.0 76.9 142.3
1979 95.5 134.0 100.7 78.5 135.9
1980 104.7 135.3 101.4 76.3 131.4
1981 91.3 109.0 79.2 57.8 134.9
1982 78.8 101.3 65.5 48.4 119.5
1 The effective exchange rate is an index combining the currency? in 
queartion with the other major currencies, weighted by the estimated 
effect on the trade balance of the country in question of a 1^ change 
in the domestic currency price of one of the other currencies.
Source: International Monetary Fund, •International Financial Statistics*
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Table 22 Wholesale Prices Indices for Mechanical Engineering 
(SIC Order VII) Annual averages 1975 - 100
Output of manufactured Materials purchased by







• 1980 194.5 189.1
1981 210.2 198.8
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1983.
- Price performance
1 2
Between 1975 and October 1982, the unit value of UK exported
non-electrical machinery, as evidenced by Table 23, rose by 132%. 
This was substantially more than the percentage increases for her 
three strongest competitors in this product area, namely the USA, 
West Germany and Japan. The UK increase has, however, over this 
period been diluted on foreign markets by exchange rate movements.
Between 1975 and 1978, during which time sterling was 
depreciating against the deutschemark, the effect of a 
weakening exchange rate was to reduce the sterling price increase 
of 68% to only 18% in deutschemark terms. While this rate of 
increase was still higher than those of the UK’s competitors, the 
uncompetitiveness of British engineering exports was thus greatly 
shielded. Between 1978 and 1981, however, the strengthening of 
sterling not only exposed this uncompetitiveness but contributed 
towards it. With sterling appreciating by 15.4% against the 
deutschemark, the unit value of UK exported non-electrical 
machinery rose by 43.4% in D-mark terms over this period. A 
weakening of sterling between 1981 and October 1982 contributed 
significantly towards the slowing down of this rate of increase.
1 Equalisation of export price indices at a single level.
2 Latest available statistics.
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On the whole over the 1975-02 period, weak sterling had a
beneficial effect on UK competitiveness in this product area. It
reduced a 132% rise in the sterling price of UK exports to 82%
in D-mark terms. Thus although the dollar price of US exports rose
by 82% during this time, the rapid appreciation of the dollar against 
the deutschemark between 1980 and 1982 meant that by October 1982 
US prices had increased by a greater proportion than UK prices in 
deutschemark terms. Similarly, as the Japanese yen strengthened 
against the deutschemark between 1980 and 1982 (and particularly 
between 1980 and 1981) , this pushed up the D-mark price of 
Japanese exported non-electrical machinery to 21% above the 1975 
level by October 1982.
Taking exchange rate movements into account, then, UK export 
unit values in this product area rose between 1975 and 1982 by 34.8% 
relative to West German export values and by 50.4% relative to 
Japanese prices, but fell by 2.15% against US prices.
While a further depreciation of sterling would have a 
beneficial effect on deutschemark prices of UK exports, it should 
be stressed that exchange rates are only one component of export 
prices. The uncompetitive behaviour of UK prices relative to 
West German and Japanese prices between 1975 and 1982 was due not 
to exchange rates but to inflation rates above those of West 
Germany and Japan of the non-exchange rate factors in export 
prices. The favourable performance of UK export prices relative 
to US export prices over this period was due to the strength 
of the dollar between 1980 and 1982.
- Market shares
Table 25 shows that percentage shares of mechanical engineering 
exports by selected market economies in 1980 as follows;
W.Germany 22.7%, USA 22.3%, UK 11.6%, Japan 11.1%, France 8.3%; 
and Italy 8 .1%.
This represents an improvement by the UK on 1975, for which
year the following percentage shares of OECD exports of mechanical
1
engineering were given by Saunders :
C.Saunders, p.52
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W.Germany 24.4%; UK 9.8%; France 8.4%.
This would mean that UK exports fell more slowly than world 
markets over this period.
The improvement was not in mechanical engineering alone, 
however. The following table shows that the UK share of total 
exports by these developed market economies recovered in 1980 after 
falling in the first half of the 1970s:




UK 8.60 7.62 9.08
W. Germany 15.20 15.56 15.19
France 7.97 9.02 8.76
Italy 5.87 6 .0 2 6.11
USA 18.94 18.35 17.06
Japan 8.59 9.65 10.17
Source: derived from United Nations Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics, 1980.
- Unit values
Table 27 shows that the average export unit value of UK 
mechanical engineering products is below that of West German products, 
but above those of France, Italy and Japan. This does not mean, 
however, that UK products are more competitive than their West 
German counterparts. Price is only one element of competitiveness, 
which depends also on factors such as speed of delivery, servicing, 
reliability and quality. Given that these statistics are of actual 
sales (so that they exclude instances where products have been 
priced out of the market), a significant difference in price 
implies either a difference in composition of the categories 
between the countries concerned or differences in non-price factors, 
such as quality.
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The fact that UK import unit values are higher than her export 
unit values certainly implies that UK imports of mechanical 
engineering products are of a higher quality than her exports. If 
this were not the case, UK exporters would instead seek to sell 
their products on the home market at a higher price than they 
could obtain abroad.
In only six of the twenty two product groups in Tables 25-27
was the UK export price higher than the West German, implying that
West German quality is consistently higher, and her products at
a more sophisticated end of the range, than that of the UK. These
1
figures confirm similar results obtained by Saunders. However, 
in only seven instances was the French export price higher than 
the UK export price, and in only three cases was the Italian export 
price higher than the UK export price.
From the data, it would appear that Japan imports a small 
amount (Japan imports significantly less mechanical engineering 
equipment than the UK, France or West Germany) of very expensive, 
high technology equipment, and exports much cheaper products.
Differences in export unit values may of course reflect not 
just differences in quality, but also uncompetitive pricing - though 
not sufficiently so that goods are priced out of the market. It 
has already been shown that absolute export levels in UK mechanical 
engineering fell in real terms between 1975 and 1980. This may 
reflect both falling world markets and uncompetitive pricing 
resulting in a fall in demand for UK products.
The problem with unit values is that they reflect the prices 
of actual sales, and do not therefore include products which have 
been priced out of the market. Thus they are of little use in 
competitive markets in which producers face a world price, although 
they may be of use in imperfectly competitive markets, in which 
competing products are sufficiently different to allow their prices 
to vary, but sufficiently similar for the price to affect the 
volume of sales, so that exporters face a smoothly downward-sloping
demand curve.
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TaTaie Ratias of Export TIn±t ValiiBs/lmport Unxir Yalnes for
MeehaTri’c a l Sigineering Products, 1980,
SITC1 UE W.GERMANT PRANCE ITAIT JAPAN
711 Steam Boilers &• Aus. Plant 1.44
712
713
Steam Engines, Turbines 
Internal Combustion: Piston
L.35 1,82 2.01 0-.44 •
Engines 1.51 1,-27 1.15 0.97 mm
714 Engines and Motors NES 0:39 0.45 0.24 0.26 0.07
716 Rotating Electric Plant 0.79 1.63 1.27 1.53 —
718
721
Other Power Generating Machinery^ 
Agricultural Machinery,
— 1.84 0.33 0.48 0.14
excluding: Tractors 1,11 1JL4 1.00 0.89 1.22
722 Tractors, Non-Road a.;94 1.00 1.06 1.JQ8
723 Civil Engineering" Equipment, etc. 1.16 1,21 1,09 0.96 —
724 Textile, leather Maehirtery 1.04 1,43 0.92 0,70
725 Paper etc. Mill. Machinery 0,65 1.42 1,05 0,71 0.53
726 Printing, Bookbinding
Machinery & parts 1.D5 1.15 o;99 0,95 Ovôâ
727
728
Pood Machinery, Non-Domestic 
Other Machinery for
0'.79 1.’44 0.65 o;s4 —■
Specialised Industries a.'SS 1,06) 1.05 0.60 0,44
736 Metalworking Machine Tools - 0 . 73 1,38 1.07 1.15 0,71
737 Metalworking Machinery NES 0,54 0.85 2.20 1.24 —
741 Seating, Cooling Equipment 1.12 1,25 a.86> 0.60 —
742 Pumps for liquids, etc. 1.04 1.78 1,05 0.57 0.39
743 Pumps NES, Centrifuges, etc. i;oo 1.42 1.11 0.71 0,54
744
745
Mechanical TB^ ndli-n-g Equipment 
Non-electrical machinery.




0.59 1.42 0.76 0.90 0,45.
accessories NES 0;91 1.22 1.00 0.72 0.33
ATEEEAGE; 0.91^ 1,30 0:99 0.84 0.'37^
1 Group (3-digit) leTel of the Standard International Trade Classification, 
Révision 2,
2 Excluding SITC 7ZL8.
3 Excluding SITC 716, 724, 741.
Source: Derived from United Nations Yearbook: of International Trade 
Statistics 1980.
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A Bank of England study^ which considered various measures of
competitiveness concluded that unit labour cost indices perform
best at explaining the volume of manufactured exports, in particular
2
using the IMF procedure to 'normalise' the index. This index is 
displayed in Table 29.
From this table, it may be seen that although relative unit 
labour costs in the UK were reduced during the 'social contract' 
of 1975-77, since then increases in wage costs above that of 
productivity have resulted in the growth of unit wage costs being 
significantly greater in the UK than for her principal competitors, 
particularly since 1979. While relative normalised unit labour 
costs fell between 1975 and 1981 by 4.8% in W.Germany, 6,5% in 
France, 9.2% in Italy and 4.9% in Japan, and increased by 16.1% 
in the USA, they rose by 46.2% in the UK (and by 34.7% between 1979 
and 1981 alone).
This means that where UK export prices are constrained by 
market conditions (i.e., where exporters are unwilling to sacrifice 
sales volume for price increases), a reduction in profit margins 
must follow. A clearing bank report^ states that by the second half 
of 1980 it was widely believed that UK mechanical engineering 
companies were trading at little or no profit in overseas markets.
1
Table 29 Index of Relative Normalised Unit Labour Costs





UK 93.9 90.3 96.2 111.5 137.0 146.2
W.Germany 100.3 106.3 109.8 111.2 107.1 95.2
France 99.2 94.1 94.3 98.8 101.0 93.5
Italy 89.7 88 .2 86 .1 90.1 93.1 90.8
USA 105.8 105.4 97.8 96.4 98.9 116.1
Japan 97.4 102.9 115.8 99.4 87.3 95.1
1
Vis-a-vis other industrial countries, as listed. Unit labour costs are 
defined as compensation of employees, per unit of real output (in the 
value added sense) in the manufacturing sector. Account is taken of 
employer-paid social insurance premia and other employment taxes as 
well as wages and salaries. The index is adjusted to eliminate 
estimated cyclical swings.
Source: International Monetary Fund, 'International Financial
Statistics, April 1983.
1 C.A. Enoch, pp.181-96
2 This process adjusts for cyclical distortions caused by, for instance,




Table 30 shows expenditure on acquisitions of foreign 
companies by UK firms and vice-versa. The statistics are, 
however, limited in two important respects. First they are 
limited to acquisitions mentioned in the press; and secondly, 
only direct acquisitions are counted, so that acquisitions 
by existing foreign subsidiaries or associates are 
not included. This may substantially reduce the number of 
recorded acquisitions from the true totals.
The statistics record that between 1973, when Britain 
joined the Common Market, and 1981 UK firms directly acquired 
171 companies within the EEC, but that in the same period only 
38 UK firms were acquired by Community enterprises.
While allowing for the limitations of these statistics,
the proportion by which the flows from the UK to the EEC
outweighs the reverse flow is also indicated in Table 31, 
which shows that direct net investment by UK mechanical 
engineering firms and manufacturing industry in general in 
the EEC has on the whole consistently outweighed direct net 
investment in the UK by Community firms.
While these annual investment flows reflect additional
direct investment, it may be argued that a more accurate 
indication of the presence of UK firms in the EEC, and 
Community enterprises in the UK, is given by the data on 
net earnings. The earnings figures do not relate directly 
to the investment figures for the corresponding years, as they 
reflect an earnings stream from existing operations and thus 
relate to investments in previous years.
The data show that the earnings of UK mechanical 
engineering subsidiaries in the EEC during the last decade 
were at their highest in 1976, when sterling was relatively 
weak. Earnings decreased over the next three years, during 
which time sterling was appreciating against the French franc 
and the Italian lira and later against the deutschemark, but 
they did recover somewhat in 1980.
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1971 53 62 73.0 19 20 26*5
1972 69 85 90.4 44 49 50.6
1973 80 88 178,5 ■ 53 57 73,7
1974 49 53 120.6 29 30 65,2
1975 17 18 41.3 9 10 29,9
1976 17 17 64,6 5 5 4.9
1977? 18 18 142,8 6 6 8,2
1978 29 30 349.5 10 11 21.1
im s 55 63 344,8 10 11 46.6
1980 51 51 941.0 12 12 138*7
1981 139 150 726,2 25 29 23*6












1971 19 21 32,7 2 2 0*5
1972 18 18 41,4 1 1 0.2
1973 5 8 58*0 1 1 9.0
1974 9 9 184,9 2 2 6.2
1975 9 9 53,5 3 3 4*7
1976 10 10 72,8 1 1 8.6
1977 12 12 79.5 3 3 1.3
1978. 13 13 38.6 5 5 11*3
1979 6 6 47,1 3 3 6.1
1980 23 23 169,7 6 6 27.2
1981 72 75 493,4 12 14 36.3
Source: Business Statistics Office, 'Business Monitor MQ7: Acquisitions 




























































1 9Net Investment Net Earnings
Mechanical Total Mechanical Total
Engineering Manufacturing- Engineering Manufacturing
1972 0,9 17,0 -l;4 33.5
1973 —1.6 28,8 -0.4 33.4
1974 1.6 28,3 -0.1 21.9
1975 7,8 33.2 4,5 17.2
1976 2,1 85,6. 7.9 52.2
1977 4,7 108.7 7,1 94.2
1978 4,1 120.7 8.5 86.7
1979 18,2 105,7 10.4 62,9
1980 13,2 -93,3 8.8 -86.1
1 Direct net investment refers to investment, net of disinvestment, 
that adds to, deducts from, or acquires a lasting interest in an enter­
prise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the 
investor's purpose being to have an effective voice in the maisagement 
of the enterprise. Other investments in which the investor does not 
have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise are mainly 
portfolio investments and are not covered here,
2 Net earnings equal profits of overseas branches plus UK companies' 
receipts of interest from and their share of profits of overseas sub­
sidiaries and associates. Earnings are after deducting provisions for 
depreciation and overseas tax on profits, dividends and interest.
3 A minus sign indicates net losses.
Source: Business Statistics Office, 'Business Monitor MA4: Overseas 
Transacti ons•
- 145 -
Earnings by UK subsidiaries of Community firms rose 
fairly steadily in the latter half of the decade, and in 1979 
exceeded -the flow of earnings to the UK mechanical engineering 
industry. This earnings growth was associated with a growth 
in net investment by EEC mechanical engineering firms in the 
UK.
Growing investment in the EEC by UK mechanical engineering 
firms towards the end of the decade, together with a weakening 
of sterling after 1980-81 may have resulted in a subsequent 
increase in UK earnings from the EEC.
3. Concentration 
1
In 1979 there were 13,788 mecahnical engineering companies 
in the UK. Of these, however, 12,810 (93%) employed under 
100 people. In all, these enterprises accounted for 20.7% 
of the sector's total employment, 18.2% of total sales and 
25.0% of its net capital investment.
At the other end of the scale, 11.6% of employment,
12.0% of sales and 10.9% of capital expenditure were accounted 
for by only seven enterprises (and 16.4%, 16.7% and 15.8% 
respectively by the largest twelve enterprises).
Proponents of the view that efficiency increases with 
size through economies of scale would expect that productivity 
measured through gross value added per head would be highest 
in the largest enterprises. In actual fact this - at least 
in 1979 - was not so. Although productivity for this group 
was well above the average for the industry as a whole, the 




Table 32 Analysis by size of total employment, 1979, SIC Order VII, 
Mechanical Engineering.
Size of IMg . of No. of Employ­ Total Net capit­ Gross
enterprise enter­ establish­ ment sales + al expend­ added
(no. of 
employees)






1- 99 12810 13295 183.1 2918.9 144.3 ) 7673100- 199 452 619 62.4 1164.6 47.9 )
200- 499 263 484 81.2 1531.5 57.1 8020
500- 999 119 345 82.8 1671.9 51.3 8390
1000-1499 40 142 47.9 893.5 30.1 8605
1500-1999 29 123 50.9 936.6 23.6 9476
2000-2999 27 143 66 .2 1203.4 38.2 7779
3000-3999 14 113 49.9 919.3 27.9 8387
4000-4999 10 100 45.6 975.9 27.8 8322
5000-7499 12 292 68.3 1144.0 38.3 8053
7500-9999 5 77 42.6 757.9 28.3 8640
10000 and over 7 99 102.6 1933.0 62.9 8784
TOTAL 13788 15832 883.5 16050.5 577.7
Source; Business Statistics Office, 'Business Monitor PA 1002: Report 
on the Census of Production, Summary Tables, 1979' (1982)
Product concentration
Each Minimum List Heading (MLH) in the mechanical engineering 
(Standard Industrial Classification Order VII) sector can cover a 
number of different products. Concentration ratios at the MLH level 
may thus aggregate a number of different product markets yielding an 
average view which is not truly representative of the situation in 
each market. Prior to considering industry concentration ratios, 
then, it is first necessary to consider the relevant 'specialisation' 
indices; that is, the ratio of total sales of principal products by 
the industry concerned to total sales of goods produced and work done.
Trends in the indices of specialisation for the various branches 
of mechanical engineering between 1975 and 1979 are shown in Table 33.
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Table 33 Index of Specialisation'^by Industry, 1975—79?
ÎILH ' 
331 Agricultural machinery 
( excluding tractors)
1975 1976 197T7 1978. 1979
82 88 90 82 77
332 Metal-working machiner tools 93 93 95 94 93




Cbmpressors and fluid power
31 80 80 80 83
equipment 77 82 88 87 86
334 Industrial engines 68 10- 67 ■ 71 57
335
336
Textile machinery & accessories 
Construction & earths-moving
91 89: 88 91 90
337
equipment 88 91 86 88 84
Mechanical handling equipment 92 90 94 93 92




Printing, bookbinding & paper
85 86 86 8.6 87
339(3) (4):
goods machinery 
Refrigerating machinery, space- 
heating, ventilating and air-
92 92 93 89 91
339(5) (6)
conditioning equipment 
Scales & weighing machinery and
90 91 91 92 90
339 (TX 3)
portable power tools 
Food & drink processing machin­
ery and packaging & bottling




75 77 74 73 78'
machinery 85 86 84 S3 85
341
349(1)
Industrial ( including^proc e ss )'< 
plant & steelwork^




Precision chains and other
95 95 95 94 92
mechanical engineering @5 86 87 85 85
1 The index of specialisation for am industry is the ratio of total 
sales of principal products by the industry to total sales of goods 
produced and work done,
2 Esccludes M Œ  342  ^Ordnance and small arms.
3 indicates that figures are not available.
Source: Census of Production 1979, Summary Tables (1982).
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A high ratio indicates a fairly narrow product range, and a low 
one that products are diverse and that there are a number of 
different markets within the MLH.
The indices range from 57% for industrial engines, implying that 
a number of different products and therefore markets are included 
in this MLH, to 93% in the case of metal-working machine tools, so 
that the MLH is accounted for by a few principal products, with a 
little room for specialised products.
In most branches it can be seen that the great majority of sales 
are accounted for by the principal products.
1
Industry concentration
Table 34 shows clearly that industrial concentration in. 
mechanical engineering fell in almost every MLH between 1975 and 
1979. This suggests a number of different possibilities:
a) New products have been introduced by smaller firms in branches 
in which the index of specialisation has fallen. It is also 
possible that the index of specialisation may have fallen as
a result of demand for specialised products being more stable 
than that for the principal, mainstream products of the MLH.
b) Smaller firms have managed to become more cost competitive 
than larger firms in the face of falling demand and production; 
that is, they have pursued a policy of undercutting the large 
firms in order to survive, either by introducing efficiencies 
or by reducing their own profit margins.
c) Smaller firms have protected themselves against both the large 
firms and market conditions by producing specialised equipment 
which may have only a limited market and thus not appeal to 
the larger firms.
A problem with concentration ratios is that they do not take 
account of export and import ratios. Where these are high, 
concentration figures based on domestic production may be meaning­
less as far as the domestic market is concerned. It is certain that 
UK firms' domestic market shares have slipped as import penetration 
has increased (see pp»l 2 l“1 2 3 )»
1 See also pp. 198—202*
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Table 34- Percentage shares of total sales ^counted for by 

























lST5r- 1979^ (1975 = 100)^
Agricultural machinery 
(excluding tractors) 
Metal-working machine tools 
Pumps 
Valves
Compressors and fluid power 
equipment 
Industrial engines 
Textile machinery & accessories 
Construction &• earthi-moving 
equipment 
Mechanical hand! ing equipment 
Office machinery 
Mining machinery 
Printing, bookbinding & paper 
goods machinery 
Refrigerating machinery, space- 
fijeatmg, ventilating and air- 
conditioning equipment 
Scales & weighing machinery and 
portable power tools 
Food & drink processing machin— 




Industrial (including process) 
plant & steelwork 
Ball, roller y plain and other 
bearings 





















1 Excludes MLH 342, Ordnance and small arms.
Sources: 2:'Business Monitor PO 1006: Statistics of Product Concentrat­
ion of DK Manufacturers 1975, 1976 & 1977^, (1980) ;
3:'Business Monitor PA 1002: Report on the Census of Product­
ion 1979, Summary Tables', (1982);
4: Engineering Employers Federation, Httechanical Engineering 
Short Term Trends Report*, Nov.1982.
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4. Profitability
It is not possible to provide figures for the standard 
measure of profitability, return on capital (trading profit/ 
capital employed), as there are no statistics available for 
capital employed in mechanical engineering. Table 35 contains 
other performance indicators.
Net profits, which discount the effect of depreciation, 
provide a more effective indication of profitability than gross 
profits. The figures show clearly that profits declined over 
the second half of the decade, which is to be expected given the 
fall in output, sales and gross value added. However, 
profitability - as distinct from absolute profit levels - has 
also declined, as evidenced by the fall in profit margins and 
in the ratio of profits to gross value added.
Full data since 1979 are not yet available; however, it is
known that in nominal terms, gross profits in mechanical
engineering fell in 1980 by 24% from the previous year, while
net profits fell by 61%. With wholesale prices rising by 13.7%
2
during this year and mechanical engineering production falling 
by 6.1%,^ this fall in profits would have been even more 
significant in real terms.
Productivity measured in terms of real gross value added 
per employee fell by 9% between 1973 and 1977 and then increased 
by 4% in the next two years. Although real gross value added 
•grew in 1979, the 1977-79 productivity increase was due largely
4
to the fall in employment. Between December 1979 and July 1982, 
employment in mechanical engineering fell to 693,000 - a fall 
of some 190,000 jobs, or 22%. Output volume per employee in 
in this sector was reported to have risen to 8% above its 1975 
level by the second quarter of 1982, but again to have been 
due to reduced employment rather than increased output.
1 National Income & Expenditure Accounts.
2 See Table 22.
3 See Table 19.
4 Latest available statistics.
5 Engineering Employers Federation, 'Mechanical Engineering Short Term 
Trends Report, November 1982.
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Table 35 Performance indicaitors for •fcîle.UK mechacdical
engineering sector, 1971--79.
1973L 1972. ' 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978; 1979
(5ross Output £ar 8847 8505 9247 9638 9524 9085 8952 8800 8705
Total Sales fin? 8657 5373 8850 SS64 9195 8338 8676 8545 8542
Gkoss '\Ealue Added (G7A.) 
at factor cost fia 4201 4224 4205 4005 3886 3823 3862
Stocks fin 525 4S3 449 470 512 566 569 568 550
(^088 profit8 fin 8i02 893 1005 951 853 848 833 . 860 864
Net profits fin 460 524 595 526 443 479 460 449 413
Gross profit TnargTtrii ^ 9.3 10.7 11.4 10.T 9.3 9.6 9.6 10.1 10.1
Net profit margin: ^ 5.3 S.3 6.8 5.9 4 a 5.4 5.3 5.3 4.8
(Sross or of its ^  
Gross lîalue Addea ^  • . # • # 23.9 22.5 20.3 21.2 21.4 22.5 22.4
Net nrofits ^ 
Gross Value Added ^ .. # #' 14.2 12.5 10.5 12 VO 11.8 11.7 10.7
No. of employees
(thnusa^s); 1006i.*2. 899.5 910.5 958.0 926.9 S U M 924.3 900.7 883.5
G %  per head fi 4614 4409 4536 4367 4204 4250 4371
Implied Price Deflator^ 
(1975 = 100). so. 5 60.1 6 6 a 82.9 100.0 119.4 146.4 168.2 187.9
All values are in 1975 prices, deflated by the Implied Price Deflator.
^ The Implied Price Deflator is derived from Gross Output and the Index of 
Industrial Production? (see Table 7/)* The Index of Industrial Production, 
which is based on a number of different indicators, combined with nominal 
output and sales figures suggest that the Wholesale Prices Index (see Table
10) understates the true extent of price inflation. The Implied Price 
Deflator, which reconciles these statistics, thus represents the true tread 
more accurately.
Net profits are equal to gross profits less depreciation.
Profit margin is the ratio of profits to total sales.
Sources: Business Monitor PA 1002: Report on the Census of Production; 
National Income & Expenditure Accounts.
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Rising output per head has not, however, contributed to increase 
profitability through reducing the UK's relative unit labour costs.
As already shown in Table 29, these have risen significantly for 
the UK relative to her main competitors. This rise contributed to 
the fall in profitability in 1980.
Profits have thus come under pressure from both falling demand 
(and hence output) and rising unit labour costs. The strengthening 
of sterling between 1978 and 1980 also reduced the profitability of 
exports.
The parts of the industry which are meet vulnerable to falling 
profitability are low-technology machines, in which price is a most ' 
important element of demand. The price contraint means that these 
products can be seriously affected by rising unit labour costs or by 
any strengthening in sterling, which will reduce profit margins.
Falling profitability may indicate growing pressures for
collaboration since firms may find it more difficult to afford
projects which require a certain minimum input level. This
1
possibility will be explored later on.
2
5. Non-price factors in export competitiveness
The import/export unit price data^ refers to actual sales. 
Differences in price are thus accounted for either by a difference 
in the structure of the branches or because non-price factors are 
more important. These factors may vary from case to case, but may 
include ;
product quality, reliability; delivery; after sales servicing and 
availability of spares; and so on. All these factors contribute to 
the customer's perception of value for money. Inability to compete 
on these terms may put pressure on an exporter to make a compensa­
ting reduction in price.
1 See pp. 170 and 177?.
2 See pp. 202-205.
3 Tables 27 and 28.
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A survey by the Countil of British Chambers of Commerce in 
1
Continental Europe in 1979 described the main factors limiting 
the expansion of UK exports of non-electrical machinery into 






























According to these results, then, while the export price was
consistently important it was certainly not the only factor under
consideration. The National Economic Development Office (NEDO) in
2
fact reported some years ago that probably the most important 
single factor in strengthening the UK industry's international 
performance was improving delivery reliability and communication. 
Elsewhere, NEDO reported that the ability of West German 
manufacturers to maintain export competitiveness in the face of a 
strong deutschemark in the 1970s was due to not only using 
productivity increases to hold prices down, but also to improving 
the quality, reliability and marketing of their products and generally 
moving up-market in the range of goods manufactured.
Thus while the UK has suffered from an uncompetitive trend in 
export pricing in recent years, an improvement in the competitive 
position could be brought about through these non-price factors.
1 Council of British Chambers of Commerce in Continental Europe
(COBCOE), 'European Survey 1979'.
2 NEDO, p.5. See also R.Rothwell.
3 0.Connell (NEDO), p.22
4 See Table 23
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CHAPTER FIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SURVEY
This chapter covers three sections :
i) The research methodology;
ii) The ventures;
ill) Development of the questionnaire.
The Research Methodology
The sampling frame ;
In order to assess the significance of a survey on joint ventures, 
it was decided to compare and contrast this strategy with acquisitions. 
The survey therefore concentrates on these two groups. The absence 
of a control group is a drawback for the study; however, it is hoped 
that the presence of the two separate groups may overcome this deficit 
to a certain extent by acting as control groups upon each other. \
The background research to the present study, presented inihe
first half of the thesis, suggested that the best way to analyse and
compare international joint venture and acquisition operations would
be through personal interviews; a technique not employed by most
1
previous JV studies.
Joint ventures are generally very small in comparison with their
parents, and like other subsidiary companies their accounts are not
published separately, but as part of the group accounts. This means
that it is not possible to determine their effect on the parent group.
Personal interviews mean that enormous problems of analysis and
2
interpretation of possibly circumstantial evidence can be avoided, 
and direct answers obtained instead. It was decided to use a 
structured questionnaire in order to ensure maximum comparability.
1 See p.46
2 For example, the occurrence of JVs in highly concentrated industries 
does not necessarily mean that industry concentration was a
reason for the ventures.
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Another notable absence from previous studies is the covering 
of both partners. This was considered to be an important element of 
the study in revealing differences of opinion regarding the 
objectives and success of the ventures.
1
An immediate problem for the study was the shortage of data on Jvs 
and acquisitions, and on in particular. There are no lists of 
firms engaged in such operations, and an extensive search therefore 
had to be made for the purposes of the study. The constraints of 
funds and time inherent in-a thesis meant that the project had
to be fairly limited in scope; it was initially intended to visit 
about 36 firms. In the event, it was possible to visit 51 companies, 
of which 47 are included in the study.
Given the lack of data, different methods had to be explored in 
order to obtain a list of British mechanical engineering firms 
involved in transnational JVs/acquisitions in the EEC. These fell 
into two main groups : (i) approaches to relevant bodies; and (ii) 
a search of published data.
Bodies which were approached included : 32 British and 3 European 
Chambers of Commerce; Six embassies and industrial development boards; 
the Department of Trade; the Central Office of Information; the 
Confederation of British Industry; the Business Co-operation Centre 
in Brussels; the British Institute of Management; the Industrial 
Credit & Finance Corporation; the Engineering Employers Federation; 
the Institute of Export; the Institute of Mechanical Engineers^ 
the Engineering Industries Association, and six other engineering 
trade associations.
In addition , a search was carried out in newspapers, 
engineering journals, financial analysis publications, and company 
annual reports and accounts.
See p.1 for a note on the lack of statistics, and on estimates 
provided by the EC Commission.
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Given the relevance of the project to their members' international 
activities, the response by the chambers of commerce was surprisingly 
and disappointingly weak, with only 14 of the 32 British chambers 
replying to requests for assistance. Eight of these published detailes 
of the study in their journals or newsletters, but this resulted in 
only one contact being established. With the exception of the 
Birmingham chamber, which offered a good deal of assistance,and 
founds another participant, none of the chambers was able to give any 
other help in contacting firms. Generally, these bodies act as 
centres of trade information for their members, but have no 
detailed knowledge of their members' activities.
Details of the study were also published in 'Management Review 
and Digest' (pub. British Institute of Management); 'Export' (pub 
Institute of Export); and another business magazine, 'Mind Vour Own 
Business', but again without much response.
Embassies and industrial and trade associations were also unable 
to give much assistance in identifying potential participants. One 
industrial association did suggest seven companies, but when approached 
these were found to either not have ventures relevant to the study, or . 
be unwilling to participate in it. One other institute circulated 
its members and was able to find one company which made two 
contributions to the study. Since these two ventures took place 
some years apart in different markets, the contributions were 
counted as being from two separate companies. In many cases the 
study elicited a good deal of interest;, however, many bodies were 
more interested in seeing the results of the survey than in helping 
to construct it.
The Birmingham Chamber of Industry & Commerce was able to give 
considerable practical help, finding one participant directly (who 
was in turn able to suggest another firm) and willingly making 
initial approaches to four large companies in its region, who had 
been found to have relevant ventures. In three cases, this assisted 
in achieving valuable contributions to the survey.
The Business Co-operation Centre (BCC) in Brussels also showed
See p. 13 and Appendix 1 for a review of this Centre's aims and 
activities.
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considerable interest in the study, as it is actively involved in
encouraging transnational business collaboration in the EEC. It
was already known that 36 British mechanical engineering firms had
approached the BCC between 1973 and 1980 in order to make contacts
with firms in other EEC countries for this purpose, and a great
many more had replied to requests for collaboration from companies
1
in other Common Market states. As the BCC s work ends with making 
initial contacts, it is not aware of the exact number of ventures 
which resulted, but it did agree to giving assistance in 
contacting the firms concerned. The BCC is forbidden by its 
constitution from releasing the names of firms which have used its 
services; however, it did co-operate by sending a copy of the 
research proposals to 45 British firms and asking them, if they were 
willing to participate in the study, to contact the Centre for 
European Industrial Studies directly. Contacts with six of the 
British participants were established in this manner.
The newspaper search revealed that a European press agency in
Brussels, 'Agence Europe', publishes a daily new bulletin containing
a section on 'economic interpenetration in Europe and the rest of the
2
world', which included reports of JVs and acquisitions. A search 
of every publication of this news sheet between mid-1974 and early 
1982 was carried out at the offices of the Commission of the 
European Communities in London. This was by far the richest source 
of information, yielding details of 25 British companies involved 
in relevant operations - although not all of these agreed to participate,
Annual reports and accounts of public compaiiies were considered 
as another source of information, but a study of a number of these 
did not reveal this to be a suitable source, as details of JVs were 
not revealed specifically in the accounts. An analysis of Extel
1 See Tables 5 and 6 , pp.11-12.
2 The agency collects its information by having correspondents in
each country. The reports thus depend on how effective the 
correspondents are, and can therefore lead to bias in the overall 
reported pattern.
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company analysis cards, which can give information on 3,000 quoted 
companies, found that these suffered from the same weaknesses 
as the published reports and accounts.
As already mentioned on pJ^ÿ.t was hoped to carry out interviews 
in about 36 companies. This would, it was assumed, necessitate 
contacting some 50 or 60 firms. Also, as a novelty of the study 
was to include interviews with EEC partners, the 36 would be split 
between British and EEC firms. Participating British companies would 
be requested to assist in making approaches to their EC partner 
firms.
Response rates ;
The following list of JV-ing and acquiring firms was compiled: 
Table 36 Sources of firms approached
Source
Agence Europe 
Chambers of Commerce 
Professional Institutes 















These firms were in addition to those approached by the Business 
Co-operation Centre. Four other firms were approached (one on the 
basis of its annual report & accounts; another met at a conference; 
the third after a suggestion by a trade association; and the fourth 
through a personal introduction) and interviewed, but were later 
excluded because their ventures were not strictly relevant (they 
consisted of an agency and a distribution agreement, a sales 
subsidiary and a non-active share participation).
A crucial problem was in deciding the best means of persuading 
the firms to participate in the study. In view of the relative 
shortage of data, it was essential that the most effective approach 
should be taken.
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The information required by this study requires detailed 
knowledge of boardroom decisions on sometimes very confidential 
matters, and of reports on the venture from start to finish. It 
was therefore necessary that the questionnaires should be completed 
by very senior executives of the firms concerned, and an attempt 
was consequently made to seek participation at director level.
A postal survey was not considered to be feasible. Large firms 
are often approached with such questionnaires, and it would have 
been unrealistic to expect senior directors to devote much time to 
answering one. Because of this, low returns were likely to be a 
problem. This difficulty was magnified by the fact that the 
questionnaire was very long and detailed. In addition, it was 
felt that firms may be unwilling to commit much confidential 
information to a postal questionnaire. By visiting the company, 
the questionnaire could be worked through, questions from both sides 
answered immediately, and a far greater understanding of the venture 
achieved. Frequently, the plain answers to the printed questions 
were less interesting and revealing than the comments which were 
made during the interview.
Great emphasis was placed on convincing these companies that 
it would be in their own interests to participate in the study. A 
conviction remains that asking the firms (bearing in mind that only 
the most senior executives would be able to answer the questions) 
if they would be prepared to suffer some inconvenience in the 
interests of furthering the advance of knowledge would not have 
evoked a very effective response. Management time is very important 
at this level, and such executives are not normally willing to put 
aside an afternoon to answer an academic questionnaire. The 
approach to take was instead to attract the interest of these 
executives and offer them, for the sake of a couple of hours giving 
information which would remain confidential, an opportunity to learn 
something about an important area of business strategy.
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The initial approach to the firms by letter thus mentioned the 
lack of previous literature in this field, and that as a consequence 
firms wishing to enter joint ventures in the EEC could only learn 
through their own experience, which could be a very costly way to 
learn. It then emphasised two points :
i) confidentiality would be assured, and the names of the firms 
would not be used in the study; also, in view of the fact that 
some firms would have been recognisable by the mention of 
their product area (where there are only a few competitors
in the field), references to this would also be omitted;
ii) participating firms would receive a report on the results of 
the survey, so that they could see some of the practical 
elements involved in transnational business collaboration, and 
how other firms have faced the same problems.
It was also considered important to make as direct an approach 
as possible, by establishing the names of the managing director, 
finance director, marketing director and company secretary and then 
writing to one of them personally (usually the company secretary or 
managing director) and enclosing copies of the research proposals 
for the others, rather than addressing them more anonymously by the 
terms of their office.
Of course, not all the firms which were approached by this 
method were easily convinced. One company rejected the approach after 
requesting an advance copy of the questionnaire, on the grounds that : 
"Many of the questions relate to information which we would regard 
as totally confidential". In another case, a senior executive was 
willing to speak about a particularly sensitive (and unsuccessful) 
venture, but was advised against it by other members of the board 
and pulled out of the study. In other instances, firms replied that 
the executive concerned was unable to spare the time to participate.
The letters were followed up with telephone calls to help to 
overcome reservations.
Of the firms listed in Table 36, 13 Jv-ing and 12 acquiring firms 
agreed to participate,together with another 4 and 2 respectively which 
were obtained through the Business Co-operation Centre. The remaining
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acquirer in the study had originally participated as ajoint venturer; 
because its two ventures had taken place in different product and 
geographic markets some years apart, the contributions were counted 
as being from separate firms.
The total number of participants inihe survey were as follows;
Table 37 Survey participants, by type of firm
Jv parent JV subsidiaries Acquiring firms Acquired firms
UK firms 1 6 - 1 5
EEC firms 9 2 - 4
These firms covered 15 JV operations, 2 attempted JVs, 13 
acquisitions and 2 attempted acquisitions. One of the JVs covered 
involved an interview with the European partner only. In total, then, 
46 firms participated in the study.
Ideally, the study would have covered all the joint venture
partners and acquired firms, but in a number of cases this was not
possible. In four cases, the planned venture had not finally gone
ahead; in some others the firms concerned had parted company on less
than good terms; and in other instances, the UK firms felt that their
1
partner/subsidiary would be extremely suspicious of a study on the 
venture and did not want a contact to be made. One firm explained 
that its relationship was currently very delicate and wanted to 
avoid any questioning of its partner on potential problems, etc. 
Another company believed that its partner would be disturbed if it 
knew that the British firm had been discussing the venture. One 
more firm stated that its French subsidiary would believe such a 
study to be a subtle attempt by the parent to examine the 
management of the venture I
The term 'subsidiary' denotes an acquired subsidiary.
— 162 —
In other cases, however, the British firms agreed to make an 
initial contact with their European partner/subsidiary and request 
their co-operation in the study. The European firms were then app­
roached directly. One very large German firm provided three 
interviews, but as these concerned different product markets, and 
also at different times, the contributions were counted as being 
from three separate companies. One of its British partners did not 
participate in the survey.
Although as already noted great importance was placed on 
seeing both partners, no attempts were made to contact either a 
present or former partner or subsidiary without the permission of 
the British company concerned, as this may have caused difficulties 
for the firms concerned.
All the ventures were international operations, and all 
involved one UK firm each (although as already stated, in one JV 
the UK partner did not participate). Of the JVs, three were based 
in Belgium, three in the Netherlands, three in France, three in 
West Germany, and five in the UK (of which four were with West 
German firms and one with an Italian firm). Of the acquisitions 
(all by UK firms), eleven were in France and four in West Germany.
Two Dutch participants were JV subsidiaries; one being jointly owned 
by British and German parents, and the other by British and Dutch 
parents.
With very few exceptions (in which the firms concerned were 
in closely related sectors), the firms were involved in the 
mechanical engineering industries. As already noted, a precise 
description of the sectors concerned has been omitted in order to 
preserve the anonymity of the participants, who range in size from 
small and medium-sized firms to some of the largest engineering 
firms in Europe.
The earliest four ventures date from the 1960s, with twenty five 
of the remaining twenty eight being formed between 1976 and 1981.
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The firms were seen at the following levels















The number cfexecutives interviewed exceeds that of the
participants because some firms used more than one executive for 
the interview. One large firm,in fact, put forward its managing, 
finance and marketing directors.
The Ventures
The survey covered ten equity JVs (which include the creation of 
a new entity in which the partners take shares), five contractual 
JVs (which do not take a corporate form) and two attempted JVs, as 
well as thirteen acquisitions and two attempted acquisitions.
Although five of the JVs covered all functions from product
development down to marketing, most were concerned with a single
function only. Five ventures involved joint production only, and
another just marketing. One venture was designed to cover both
production and marketing, while another only involved co-operation
between the parents on the matter of finance for the venture. The





In the case of acquisitions, however, all functions of the 
acquired firms are bought, and in ten cases the acquired firm 
continued to operate in all functional areas. Three firms were 
bought as pure marketing operations, however, while another two 
were required to continue some production but concentrate on marketing, 
leaving research, product development and financing to the parent.
A US study^ found that 55% of JV parents were classified in
the same broad industry group as their subsidiaries, and that 85%
of the non-horizontal relationships between parents and subsidiaries
2
involve some form of vertical integration, and a Swedish study 
that whereas horizontal relationships are more common in 
acquisitions, most contractual JVs involve vertical relationships, 
while equity JVs are weighted towards conglomerate relationships 
(i.e., between manufacturing and other industries). In the present 
study, the distribution of relationships comes closer to that of the 
US study, the majority being in all three cases horizontal, as shown 
below :
Table 39 Competitive relationships
Type of venture Relationship with partner
Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate
Equity JVs 6 2 2
Contractual JVs 4 1 -
Acquisitions 12 3 -
On the question of size relationships between JVs and parents, 
this study does concur with previous work by Pfeffer & IMowak,^ who 
found that JVs are generally very small in relation to their parents. 
In this study, only three of the twenty three parents indicated that 
the JV accounted for over 10% of their turnover. Acquisitions, on 
the other hand, appeared much more likely to form a significant part 
of their parents’ activities, with seven of the fifteen acquiring 
firms reporting that their venture accounted for (or would have done 
in the case of the two attempted acquisitions) over 10% of their 
total sales.
1 See reference to Boyle, p.26.
2 See pp. 31-32
3 See p.40.
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Two-thirds of both JVs (17/25) and acquisitions (10/15) were
aimed at products which the parent also produced, but a clear
distinction needs to be drawn here between this study and the US
1
(and Edstrom's Swedish) literature, which through confining 
themselves to the study of national operations would very likely 
read anti-competitive motives into such results. These, on the 
other hand, are international operations, and the firms concerned 
generally wished to use their ventures to establish themselves in 
a geographic market in their existing product area. Firms which do 
not produce the venture product sought to expand their product 
range into closely related areas.
In one case, the reason for the JV was to bring about a 
rationalisation of the existing operations of the two parents, thus 
enabling them to compete even more effectively against imports from 
a non-European multinational corporation. In almost every other 
case, the effect was to either introduce a new product to the market, 
or a new supplier of an existing product, or to increase the 
resources and backing available to an existing producer, thus 
enabling a more efficient and competitive service to result.
In no instances did an acquisition result in a reduction in 
the number of competitors in the market. Even though some of the 
ventures failed quite badly, the original intention was to provide 
more backing and resources to an existing competitor, thereby 
increasing its competitiveness in the market.
Development of the Questionnaire
The study was intended to look at the whole joint venture/ 
acquisition process, from conception to completion, and the 









the parent company; its market position, 
relationship with the partner/victim; type 
of operation; market concentration and 
competition.
non-price factors in market competitiveness; 
previous experience; financial planning; 
reasons for entering the venture, 
selection of the foreign partner and market; 
host country investment incentives; 
background research.
ownership, choice of the chief executive; 
deadlocks.
areas of control; transfer pricing; problem 
areas.
results compared with pre-stated targets; 
degree of success/failure; lessons learned 
by the firm.
a) General:
This section serves to give background information on the 
type of firms in the survey, the relationships involved, and 
competitive pressures.
1
Much of the US literature has concentrated on the questions
of whether JVs are anti-competitive, through reducing the number
of effective competitors in the market, and whether firms enter
them for this reason - in other words, to substitute a
negotiated business environment for competitive uncertainty.
2
Some authors have proposed that the occurrence of JVs in highly 
concentrated industries confirms this view. An attempt was 
therefore made to examine the competitive structure of the 
industry by asking questions on market share and concentration. 
For reasons outlined on p.45, published concentration figures 
may be misleading. A subjective measure was therefore 
introduced, with firms giving a concentration grading of 1 to 10
1 See Chapter 1-
2 See, for example, pp. 21 & 24 and p. 31.
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(1 being very low and 10 being monopoly). Indices constructed 
on the basis of market shares for the largest four or five firms 
would have been preferable and more comparable, but since 
these data are often unknown, since firms operate in different 
product markets, and since the fact that some of the ventures 
took place some years ago would have made such estimates even 
more difficult, this was not a viable option. 3-digit 
concentration ratios for the mechanical engineering industries 
are shown on p. 149*
A high concentration rating for the industry does not mean, 
however, that the strength of competition has been a reason 
for the venture. The evidence may be only circumstantial.
A better measure of its importance (which has appeared in none 
of the other studies) was to ask the participants directly what 
role was played in their venture decision by the strength of 
competition in both the home and venture markets.
As with other proposed reasons, it was expected that this 
factor would be decisive in some venture decisions, and 
completely irrelevant in others.
b) Motives
In examining motives for the venture, it is important to 
know what qualities are most sought after by customers. The 
participants were expected to believe that a corporate 
presence in the market would be significantly more effective 
than exporting to it (although exporting firms may have answered 
this quite differently). It would then be interesting to see
whether a connection with an indigenous firm is necessitated by
1 2 
local nationalism, and whether firm size or other factors
would be regarded as important issues.
1 The strength and importance of nationalist feelings are frequently
emphasised by Mazzoline (1974), who criticises their basis of 
uninformed generalisations.
2 See for example, pp. 152-153.
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1
A previous study of overseas production subsidiaries found 
that over half the firms in the survey had invested overseas 
without setting financial objectives, and that firms which had 
carried out financial planning were more successful than those 
which had not. It was decided to repeat this form of question 
in the current survey, and also to look at the participants' 
attitude to risk, in order to see how much importance was 
attached to reducing this.
It was also decided to ask whether the participants could 
have produced the product concerned on the same scale by 
themselves, in order to identify their shortage of resources 
and the attractions of the local firm.
Any major differences in the strategic approach to joint 
ventures and acquisitions could be expected to be revealed in 
the reasons for entering the ventures. Both strategies involve 
entering the market through an established local firm and thus 
gaining rapid market acceptance, and both give access to the 
abilities of the local company.
In both cases, the key reasons from the literature for 
entering the venture appear to be; the speed of entry to the 
market (for example, through immediate access to marketing 
expertise or a distribution network), through which the 
acquiring firm also buys the existing market share of the 
acquired firm's own products as well as that for joint or 
future products; and the abilities of the local company, such 
as local knowledge of commercial, legal, social and political 
factors.
The JV-ing firm may be expected to want to (and indeed 
have to) rely more on its partner for participating in decisions 
than an acquiring firm, which may instead seek to impose 
centrally-determined policies on the new subsidiary, and just 
rely on the subsidiary to carry these out. The issue of control 
is likely to be important to such firms.
See p. 107.
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Access to the local firm's technological ability did not 
1
feature in one study of JVs by US multinational companies as 
being an important reason for a venture, but the structure of 
EEC engineering markets is such that this reason would be 
expected to be more important in the current study.
2
Another US study concluded that technologically intense 
firms, such as in the engineering sector, enter JVs as a 
substitute for internal research and development expenditures. 
This may be confirmed by firms entering JVs in response to 
their partners' technological ability. Moreover, this reason 
would not be confined to JVs alone, but should also extend to 
acquisitions. Firms may buy technological ability in order 
to save themselves development time.
A principal difference between JVs and acquisitions is that 
a JV involves giving up a share of the profits in return for 
a reduction in the risk. JV theory would therefore suggest 
this to be a major reason for entering the venture. An 
acquisition may represent a lower risk than a greenfield 
venture^ because the performance and ability of the acquired 
firm is (or should be, if the purchaser has done sufficient 
bkacground research) already known, but 'spreading the risk' 
is unlikely to be an important acquisition reason.
It may be difficult for firms acquiring new manufacturing
subsidiaries in an overseas market to benefit from production
4
economies of scale, since the distance between the plants may 
mean that they cannot take advantage of benefits such as joint 
purchasing or shared services. It is hypothesised that in 
international operations such as this, economies of scale are 
more likely to result from marketing than from production; that 
is, through adding to marketing capacity, firms may see 
increased market opportunities which they can meet from their 
existing manufacturing base. It is certainly possible that 
this can result from a JV.
1 See p.101
2 See pp. 36-37
3 See p. 94
4 See pp 94, 99 and 176#
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A possible reason for transnational joint ventures is that 
because of differences in corporate taxation and company law 
across the EEC, and the lack of a European Company structure, 
firms are unable to form transnational mergers, and thus co­
operate instead. There is no hard evidence to support this 
theory, but the issue was included in the questionnaire.
Another theory is that firms enter JVs because of their 
own past low profitability, so that they are unable to afford
to undertake ventures alone because of a shortage of capital.
2
One project which tackled this theory was unable to establish 
the direction of causality on whether collusion leads to low 
profitability or vice versa. Since JV accounts are amalgamated 
with those of their parents, it is impossible to say anything 
about their profitability, before even considering whether the 
JV is intended to make profits after making transfer pricing 
adjustments, etc. A number of criticisms can be made of this 
approach?
This study seeks to avoid these problems by asking the
participants directly what part was played in their venture
decision by declining profits. It is suspected that this
reason may be more commonplace than a JV study is likely to
indicate, since firms seeking collaboration for this reason
may not be able to find another company willing to make a
capital commitment to a project with a weak partner. It is
also possible that far from being a reason for collaboration,
low profitability may be a reason for less collaboration taking
place, since firms may be unlikely to be able to expand into
4




4 See p. 177*
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c) Search : This study also looks at the search process -
examining the reasons for choosing a particular partner and
country, and whether or not the firm considered alternatives.
It was strongly suspected that firms which did not engage in
adequate background research and planning for their venture
would be less successful than those which did so. This would
1
confirm the results of a previous study.
This section will also examine the importance of regional 
incentives in firms' investment decisions, and whether or not 
these inducements had any effect on the form of venture which 
was adopted. One view is that investment decisions should be 
taken on their own merits, and government incentives only treated 
as a bonus if the opportunity proves to be viable, since such 
inducements will weaken in time, and probably reflect a 
deficiency of the region. Such assistance is unlikely to 
apply in the case of takeovers, to which firms may in fact 
encounter government opposition.
d) Implementation : This section looks at the ownership
structure of the venture and reasons for changes. This also
2
covers the written agreement. Another study has previously 
suggested that potential conflicts can be overcome with a 
detailed agreement, and it was expected that the present study 
would reach similar conclusions. Also examined here is the 
question of deadlocks and arbitration, as well as the issue of 
the nationality of the chief executive. The relative 
advantages of using a national of the parent's country or a 
local national are discussed on pp. 115-116.
IMewbould, Buckley & Thurwell, pp. 84-91. 
See p.38, and also pp. 115-116.
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1
e) Operation ; Issues have been raised in the literature on the 
question of ownership and control of the venture, and the 
questionnaire has therefore included a section on the degree
of autonomy granted to the JV/subsidiary by the parent, and 
to take as an example the question of transfer pricing, by which 
a parent may adjut the profits of the venture in order to 
minimise taxation.
A question on problems encountered with the venture is 
included in this section. The examples offered to the firms 
were taken from suggestions in twelve other studies on 
corporate strategy, which came to the general conclusion that 
the problems are generally the result of two major reasons for 
failure: a lack of adequate pre-planning; and a lack of 
flexibility. If this study shows consistency with the others, 
the same issues can be expected to arise. The questionnaire 
also encouraged firms to make additional comments.
f) Success/failure : This section was designed as a summary of 
the venture. It therefore covers the results against pre-stated 
targets and the firm's assessment of their ventures success rate. 
It was hoped that by asking open-ended questions on lessons 
learned by the firm, many very useful comments could be 
obtained.
A great advantage of the personal interview technique is 
that answers to questions can be illustrated by case examples.
The objective throughout the questionnaire has been to 
encourage firms to expand on their answers, and thus report as 
widely as possible their actual experiences. Bearing in mind 
the highly individual nature of each venture, it was hoped to 
avoid excessive generalisation, but it is believed that the 
survey is wide and deep enough to be able to find lessons which 
are widely applicable.




SURVEY RESULTS : MAIN ISSUES
Because of the difficulties of presenting such detailed 
information, it was considered best to give a general discussion 
on the main results of the survey in this chapter, followed by a 
second chapter dealing with the various sections of the 
questionnaire.
This chapter therefore deals with the following topics :
Reasons for entering the venture;
Results of the ventures;
Problem areas;
Lessons learned by the participants.
Reasons for enterinq the venture
The questionnaire listed a number of reasons for entering 
ventures, and the results are listed in order of importance as follows: 
Table 40 Reasons for enterinq the venture
Rank JV reasons No of firms Average
giving as most Score 
important reason
1 Speeds of entry into the venture market 8 3.50
2 Local commercial knowledge 9 3.39
3 Strength of competition in venture market 8 3.04
-■•4 Economies of scale 5 3.00
5 Access to technological information or
local cost benefits  ^ 4 2.77
6 Strength of competition in home market 2 2.67
7 Local social and poliljical knowledge 4 2.61
8 Local legal knowledge 4, 2.50
9 Cost of capital 5 2.08
10 Spreading the risk 0 2.00
11 Declining profits  ^ 3 1.63
12 Assurance of source of supply 0 1.00
Transnational merger was infeasible 0 1.00
Notes : 1 Firms externa^^^^o the market (i.e. not local) only.
2 Production JV^pnly.
The most important reason for host companies entering JVs was assurance 
of source of supply (Average score: 3.13)
- 174 -
The number of responses exceeds the number of participants because some 
firms assigned equal importance to two or more factors.
1
Rank Takeover reasons No of firms Average
giving as most Score 
important reason
1 Speed of entry into the venture market 11 4.13
2 Access to technological information or
local cost benefits 3 3.20
3 Local social and political knowledge 1 3.00
4 Local legal knowledge '>0 2.80
5 Local commercial knowledge 0 2.73
6 Strength of competition in venture market 2 2.40
7 Economies of scale 0 1.92
8 Cost of capital 0 1.53
9 Strength of competition in home market 1 1.40
10 Spreading the risk 0 1.33 -
11 Assurance of source of supply 0 1.13
Declining profits 0 1.07
Transnational merger was infeasible 0 1.07
12
Notes: 1 Acquiring firms only.
2 Excludes solely marketing ventures.
The most important reasons for acquired firms selling out were :
cost of capital; spreading the risk; and declining profits (all 3.75);
and assurance of source of supply (2.25).
The average score refers to a scale of importance which respondents 
attached to the answers (1: irrelevant; 2: not important; 3: average 
importance; 4: very important; 5: decisive).
In both cases, speed of entry emerged as the main reason for 
1
entering the venture, although the emphasis on this factor was far 
greater for acquisitions than for joint ventures. Eleven of the 
fifteen acquiring firms stated that this was their key reason, as 
against eight of the eighteen external JV parents.
It is clear from the results that the JV-ing firms were much 
more concerned with a variety of benefits which co-operation could 
bring, in order to solve their own shortcomings. Thus a number of 
issues surfaced as being the most important one (and several in some 
cases) for a particular venture. Speed of entry topped the list 
ahead of local commercial knowledge (which more firms considered to 
be decisive) because it was more widely regarded as being an 
important factor.
The term 'venture', as distinct from 'joint venture', may be taken 
to refer to either type of operation.
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Acquiring firms, on the other hand, were generally concerned 
solely with the speed of entry into the new market; victims were 
bought because they provided fast access to the market, and other 
factors were very much secondary factors.
Orfe JV-ing firm stated : "We would rather have gone it alone 
than have a JV, but time was extremely important," and an acquiring 
firm: "üJe considered a greenfield venture - but it would have taken 
us three years."
Local commercial knowledge was rated very highly by JV-ing firms, 
who saw a clear distinction between this and social, political and 
legal knowledge, being a decisive stimulus for nine firms. For 
acquiring firms, this local knowledge was with one exception always 
a subsidiary factor, although its relatively high placing indicates 
that it was consistently important. But acquiring firms did not see 
their victims' commercial knowledge as a purchase reason in itself; 
indeed, its placing below the other two types of knowledge reflects 
the fact that such firms were more willing to rely on their own 
commercial knowledge than on the other types. They felt that the 
technological ability of the victim was a more important factor.
Three of the JV-ing firms believed that they would improve
their competitive situation through eliminating competition (or the
threat of it) with their JV partners.^ One of the acquiring firms,
2
too, was drawn by the fact that its victim had been its main 
European rival. Other firms (one of each) were attracted by the 
absencecf effective competition in the target market, while two JV-ing 
firms, and one purchaser, were forced into their venture markets by 
the strength of competition in their own (UK) markets.
1 This confirms point 4 on p.94.
2 This is standard terminology for the acquired firm. It does not 
indicate that the firm was unwilling to be taken over, nor that 
it does not receive benefits from doing so.
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The hypothesis that in international operations such as this 
1
economies of scale are more likely to result from marketing as 
opposed to production (since the operation of two production bases, 
geographically distant from each other, means that firms cannot 
take advantage of such benefits as joint purchasing or shared 
services), was borne out by the results. Firms looking to benefit 
from economies of scale appeared more likely to favour JVs than 
takeovers; by the former, they could see increased market 
opportunities which they could meet from their existing production 
base. Where a takeover entailed purchasing an additional 
manufacturing base, economies of scale were not so readily 
available.
Despite being widely cited in JV theory as a main reason for 
2
entering JVs, not one of the 27 JV-ing firms interviewed gave 
'spreading the risk' as their prime reason, and three-quarters (18/24) 
of the JV parents answered that this factor was of little or no 
importance. Although this may at first sight appear to be a most 
surprising result, when the question of JV size is taken into 
account the reason for the relative unimportance of risk becomes 
clear. Only three of the 23 JV parents providing such information 
stated that the JV accounted for over 10% of their turnover. JVs 
are generally very small in relation to their parents, so that the 
capital risk is often relatively insignificant. Firms do not 
generally enter JVs because they cannot afford to own the venture 
themselves. Still, the results do indicate that firms which were 
concerned with risk and the cost of capital - and also declining 
profits - were more likely to go for a JV than for a takeover.
These factors are a recognition that the firm's own resources are 
insufficient, and were thus also the reasons why the acquired firms 
sold out.
1 See pp.94, 99 and 169*
2 See, for example, M.Z. Brooke & M*van Beusekom, 'International 
Corporate Planning', Pitman, London, 1979, p.44, and W.J.Mead 
'The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures', The Antitrust 
Bulletin, 1967, p.824. See also the present study, pp. 40, 100 and
169.
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Both firms which tried but failed to find a suitable JV partner
1
cited their own declining profitability as a principal reason for 
making the attempt. As one of them put it, "we would not have 
considered a partner if we had still been profitable, but losses 
over the previous few years had caused a capital shortage."
Although low profitability - so that the firm cannot afford to 
undertake a project on its own - may well be a reason for looking for 
a JV, it may also present a substantial obstacle to achieving one. 
Firms are generally unwilling to risk committing resources to a JV 
when the prospective partner is in a weak position - particularly 
if the partner in question is in a foreign country. But the weak 
firm may be acceptable to a purchaser.
It has also been suggested that firms enter transnational
joint ventures and takeovers as a substitute for a true merger,
made impossible by differences in fiscal and corporate laws across 
2
the EEC . Not one of the firms interviewed in the study, whether 
engaged in JVs or in acquisitions, attached any importance 
whatsoever to this factor.
Apart from these reasons, several other factors were mentioned 
by the participants. Four firms (3 JV-ing and 1 acquiring) announced 
that a decisive factor had been extending their product range.
Buying a company on the basis of its availability appears to 
be a dangerous strategy. One of the three firms which put forward 
this reason saw the venture fall through before it started, but the 
other two both failed badly.
Three firms (2 JV-ing and 1 acquiring) decided that theirs was 
the cheapest way of entering the market effectively; the acquiring 
firm stated that the cost of this strategy was less than a third 
of that of a greenfield venture, and made a profit in a fraction of 
the time required by a greenfield. Another acquisition was made 
on the basis of discounted assets.^
1 See pp. 39, 44 and 170*
2 See, for example, C.Layton, 'Cross Frontier Mergers in Europe',
Bath University Press, 1971. See also the European Company
in Chapter 2, pp. 74-75.
3 See p. 95.
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Two firms (one of each) saw their venture as a defensive strategy 
aimed at bolstering an existing operation, while three companies 
took on local manufacturing because of the importance of having a 
locally-made product in their markets.
Why choose one particular strategy in preference to the other?
A view expressed by the managing director of one medium-sized JV-ing 
firm was: "Owning a small subsidiary is not the way to operate.
Fixed costs form a large proportion of total costs, but the parent 
might not be large enough to support a larger organisation which 
could take advantage of economies of scale." Another firm 
explained its decision to enter a JV rather than adopt another 
strategy as follows: "We felt that after some years out of this
particular product market it would be difficult to gain customer 
credibility and a market share if we went into production on our 
own. A JV gave us the ability to demonstrate to our customers our 
partner's commitment to our products - and of course they had a 
ready market share."
An acquiring firm explained that in its product area "distribution 
is the key factor - so we decided to acquire an established 
distribution network. It's easier to do that and then tell the 
customers that you are now in a position to sell a wider range, 
with more back-up, than they were buying from your distributors - 
especially if you can't demonstrate any significant difference in 
quality".
In general, the reason given for using one strategy rather than 
the other was simply that in the particular circumstances, it was 
regarded as being the most convenient means of entering the market, 
or of improving existing agency/distribution/licensing arrangements.
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Results
The JVs and takeovers in the survey were given the following 
success ratings by their parent companies:
Table 41 Venture results
Joint Ventures Acquisitions
Total success 2 0
Very successful 3 3
Average success 5 5
Not successful 2 1
Failure 3 4
(Not concluded) (2) (2)
The JVs in this study have on average achieved a slightly better 
success rate than the acquisitions; however, a much larger sample 
would be required to form any conclusions about overall success/ 
failure rates for transnational JVs and takeovers in the EEC.
A closer examination of the survey results appears to indicate, 
however, that it is not so much the choice of strategy which contains 
an inherent chance of success, as much as the way in which the venture 
is planned. That is, joint ventures are not naturally more 
successful than takeovers, nor vice versa; but a carefully planned 
venture stands a better chance of success than an unplanned one.
This may seem to be no more than common sense - but the 
message needs to be emphasised if other firms are not to repeat the 
mistakes of some of their predecessors.
The background research undertaken by the firms was as follows, 






















Background research classified by success rating
Joint Ventures Acquisitions









Not necessary - extens­
ion of an existing 
arrangement.
Not necessary - upgrading 




Much desk & field work. 1. 
Product & market research.
Joint research with 
partner.
Not necessary - upgrading 








None - bad mistake.
None - except into part­
ner, which we later 
found was based on false 
information.
None- we're not big 
enough to have a research 
department.
Much desk & field work. 
Our market knowledge + ex­
tensive fieldwork and det­
ailed analysis of victim. 
None.
Desk research, especially 
into victim.
Desk & field work.
Used a merchant bank to 
to this.
3 years to research and 
develop the strategy, but 
none into the victim.
None - just our market 
knowledge.
1. None - wrong decision,
1. None.
2. None.
3. None - just our market 
knowledge.
4. None - just our market 
knowledge.
These results concur with those of a previous study , in which 
60% of the firms covered sought no market information other than what 
they already knew from exporting to the market in question or having 
an agency or sales subsidiary there.
G.D.Newbould, P.J.Buckley & J.C.Thurwell, 'Going International', 
Associated Business Press, London, 1978, pp.84-91.
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It is quite clear that the firms which undertook background
1
research were more successful on the whole than those which did not. 
The more research is done, the better the chances of identifying 
possible weaknesses in the venture and either modifying it or with­
drawing from it. As the managing director of one failed (and 
unresearched) acquisition said: "Looking back, this was a mistake.
We should have done more research - it's always good to know about 
the market and the product, and through adding to one's knowledge 
one reduces the risk."
There may also be other positive spin-offs from the research.
One firm claimed: "We have done lots of research into other^companies 
around the world, filling up a huge file of about 200 firms. As 
a result, we came up with eight or ten really good firms. Unfort­
unately, since they are so good, none of them is available. But 
as an unintended by-product of this research we have now found that 
we may be able to have a JV with an Italian firm in Australia.
We were not looking for this - the position has just come about 
through our knowledge of them in looking for a good buy. If we had 
not done this research, we would not have thought of a JV with them. 
This sort of thing just emphasises the value of research."
2
Problems
A list of potential problems was presented to the participants, 
who marked them in order of importance as follows :
1 This again confirms Newbould, Buckley & Thurwell's results.
2 See pp. 116-117
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Other problems mentioned include human problems, local legislation, 
a lack of financial and other commitment, recession conditions, and 
the very interesting question of the owner-manager.
The order of importance of these problems was broadly similar 
between the two groups, but with competition between the venture and 
the parent rating more highly for JVs than for acquisitions. This 
is only to be expected, as in the latter case the parent has full 
control over the venture's activities.
Marketing/distribution policy:
This was consistently the most important problem, with half 
of the 44 replies to this question reporting at least 'important' 
problems, and one-third 'very important' or 'decisive' problems in 
this area.
Two firms ran into problems over expansion of the operation.
The managing director of one of these said: "We are already well 
diversified both in terms of product area and geographic markets, 
and are not keen on diversifying the JV any more - or at any rate, 
not quickly. Our partners, on the other hand, are much more 
restricted in their range and want to diversify much more. This 
could create future problems." The other firm had made an acquisition 
and retained the former owner-manager as chief executive, only to 
find that he was restricting operations to one area for his own 
reasons, and not for the benefit of the group.
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One acquiring firm confessed to a principal reason for its 
failure: "We couldn't sell their products in the UK because they
were too specialised for us; and since they didn't have their own 
sales force even in Germany - they used different agents who didn't 
want to know our products - there wasn't a marketing organisation 
which could be adapted to sell our products there." Another such 
firm complained; "We thought they had a good name before we bought 
them - but in fact they had a bad name. We couldn't negotiate any 
price increases because we are an English firm; and they couldn't 
because of their bad name." Both these companies admitted that 
they should have spent a lot more time on background research.
Another acquiring firm stated: "We made an unsuccessful (and
costly) attempt to get (the new subsidiary) to sell a type of 
equipment which their existing distribution network was not capable 
of selling - they had no experience in that product." The firm 
learned that if one wants to use a subsidiary to sell a product which 
is additional to its range, one should check that the customers are 
the same - if they are in a different industry to those with which 
the subsidiary is accustomed to dealing, as in this case, marketing 
difficulties may result.
A French JV parent complained of difficulties in launching its 
partner's new products because its British partner was always very 
late with them, and the products were not available when the local 
firm wanted to distribute them. They complained that the British 
were too old fashioned, and not aggressive enough.
Finally, the manager of a Dutch JV related a problem with its 
UK parent. The JV had tried to sell a product (which did not compete 
with the parent'S-range, and which would otherwise not have been 
permitted) into a distant foreign market, and asked the local branch 
of the parent to help with the marketing. The local branch refused, 
saying that the product was out of their range. Then, when customers 
found out that the JV belonged to the parent, they thought something 
must be wrong with the product since the local firm would not deal 
with it. The Dutch chief executive concluded that the corporate 
group does not work where different product areas are involved.
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Language:
Sixteen of the 44 firms replying to this question reported that 
language had been at least an important problem, although most firms 
had not been unduly troubled by it.
In one JV/, three different languages were involved. The 
British parent spoke no German or Dutch, the German parent little 
English and no Dutch, and the Dutch JV/ spoke all three languages.
At the negotiating stage it was a big problem. The personal 
contracts had to be translated into each language, then go through 
three different legal systems. Translation of technical terms was 
also difficult. Another British firm involved in a JV/ in Holland 
assumed that since the Dutch could speak excellent English and they 
could speak no Dutch, English would be used as the JV/ language, so 
they did not have this written into the agreement. As a result, 
they found that whenever their partners wanted to conceal something 
from them, they would switch into Dutch.
Several firms have encountered language problems in France, 
none more so than the one which admitted: "None of the French spoke
English, including the Président-Directeur General^ (chief executive), 
and none of us spoke French. Ue sent out an English engineer but he 
had to come back after a couple of days - he couldn't speak French 
either. The PDG's inability to speak English was a significant 
difficulty." No attempts were made to rectify this situation, and 
the complete lack of communication, and the failure of the parent 
to integrate the French subsidiary effectively into its organisation, 
led to the venture's eventual collapse.
Another firm reported that although they and their French 
subsidiary had people who could speak each other's language, it was 
still a problem. A lot of this was due to cultural problems and 
differences rather than the actual language itself.
A number of firms believed that a local man must be in charge 
of the venture, and one company went as far as to say that a British 
manager would not be able - or allowed - to survive in France. But 
two purchasers had British PDGs running their French businesses
Hereafter referred to as the 'PDG'
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capably - though it should be noted that both men were perfectly 
fluent in French, and quite at home with the culture. One of these 
firms noted that language had been less of a problem since this 
PDG (who already worked for the parent) was appointed: "It's
easier to communicate with him, not least because it gets round the 
problem of a culture gap between the venture and ourselves." The 
PDG himself added that before he took over, he had been the only 
person at the parent company to whom the previous PDG could talk.
As the other firm's PDG said, "the seller needs to speak French - 
but if he doesn't also speak English he has a problem with his 
suppliers." Thus when the French PDG of another acquired firm took 
up his position, unable to speak English, and found that the British 
parent's capacity to speak French was well below what he had 
expected, he decided: "I had to learn English quickly. But when
you have to speak a language, you can do so quickly. After only 
three weeks I could make myself understood. At first they would 
do translations - I would send them things in French - for 
accuracy." Eight years later, his English is extremely good.
Most firms did not see language as being much of a problem, 
although this is more likely to be due to their partner's/ 
subsidiary's ability to speak English than to their own ability to 
speak the other language. Where precision is required at board 
meetings, firms simply accept that board meetings last longër, 
while translations are being made.
Product quality standards :
Eleven firms experienced at least important problems in this 
area. One acquiring firm reported: "We sometimes had to replace
their faulty equipment with our own (from the UK) for nothing. Their 
products were of rather poor quality. Even though we started selling 
our own parts through them, but under their name, customers would 
request our products, with our name - even though the actual products 
were the same i" The firm admitted that background research would 
have revealed this point beforehand.
— 186 —
Another firm found that there wasn't a market for its new 
subsidiary's products, since customers wanted machines with more 
uniform components. An acquired French firm complained that: "The
UK companies (in the corporate group) are very jealous of their 
prerogative in new product development and do not allow sufficient 
imput from the overseas subsidiaries before developing a new 
product. For example, if we tell them that a particular product 
made in a particular way would sell well in France, they will 
reject it if they do not want to do it for the whole world , Then 
they will develop a uniform product which they want to be sold the 
world over - even though it might not suit are market. We get round, 
this problem by doing some of our assembly, so that we can adapt 
things to the French market."
Competition between venture and parent :
This was an important problem for six JV-ing firms, against 
three involved in acquisitions. When a parent wishes to 
restrict the operations of a venture, to avoid competition with 
itself or other members of the corporate group, this can cause friction 
either with the venture itself or with the other partner. One of 
the participants saw another JV collapse as a direct consequence of 
the heated arguments with its JV partner on this issue.
Transfer pricing:
This was an important problem for three JV-ing firms and six 
involved in takeovers. Three of these, who had made French 
acquisitions, claimed that the problem did not arise directly from 
their own policies, but from the strengthening of sterling against 
the French franc since 1980, which has made British goods much less 
competitive in French markets. But there have also been other 
problems - one French firm raged that a member of its partner's 
corporate group was demanding to be paid in cash without even the 
standard 30 days credit period, "as if we were some unstable Third 
World Company." And the chief executive of a Dutch JV reported :
"Group transfer prices are supposed to be at book value plus 4% - 
but this policy does not always apply in practice. One of our 
employees used to make (a particular piece of equipment), so he 
knew that they cost 50,000 NFl each. Then he was transferred to
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the Middle East. He saw a market there for this product and asked 
(the UK parent) for two machines to start with. The price they 
quoted him was 400,000 NFl - hardly book value plus 4% i Making 
profits out of other members of the group at intermediate stages 
should be eliminated, since it does not arise from extra 
production. We can't be sure when we do buy from the group that 
it is at book value plus 4% - the individual companies all look out 
for themselves to a certain extent."
1
Production rationalisation by the parent, affecting the venture :
This caused problems for five firms. One managing director 
summed up the issue: "Production rationalisation has caused 
problems, with plants competing against each other to escape the 
axe. This causes parochialism, which would happen anyway if they 
were just all UK plants. It is worse across borders, though, 
especially when local management are convinced of their own 
efficiency."
One of the British chief executives running a French company 
gave an interesting insight into this problem: "Ceasing production
was not a problem because I am a (parent company) man, had worked 
for them for many years, and the proposition was very reasonable 
and realistic. But if it had been an owner-manager PDG instead, he 
would have done everything he could to prevent the move. He would 
have put up all sorts of barriers to prevent losing the production - 
tried to convince the (parent) board, for example, that to sell 
in France the product has to be made in France, which is not true, 
etc."
Dividend payment versus retention of earnings:
This issue affected three firms. One, a German parent of a 
Dutch JV, stated that under Dutch/German double taxation it was taxed 
more heavily on repatriated profits than its UK partner under Dutch/ 
UK taxation, and was therefore not as keen as the British to take 
out profits. The firm added, however, that this has now become less 
of a problem since the state of the industry is such that the profits 
are no longer there to take out.
See also pp 104-105.
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Other problems:
Three firms complained about local legislation. One of these 
came up against very strict French labour laws which created 
difficult and very expensive problems when they tried to make 
redundancies as a result of closing down their manufacturing.
Another firm failed in its attempt to acquire a French firm 
because the French authorities would not give it persmission 
unless it also acquired another firm, which was a most unattrac­
tive prospect. The firm was forced to pull out. By contrast, 
a Dutch chief executive stated: "Some of the (UK parent's)
directors get very worked up about Dutch legislation - especially 
with regard to the workers' council. They do not seem to realise 
that they are wasting their time and breath raging about these 
things - they should just accept that it is the law."
In another case, a French firm set up a contractual JV (with
consequently no capital requirements), with a UK firm. The French
company then set up its own wholly-owned subsidiary to manage the
operation, spending FF 6-700,000 in the process. But since it owned
100% of the new company, its British partner spent nothing. Hence
while the benefits of the contractual arrangement are shared, the
risks and potential losses are all down to the French. They should
1
have gone for an equity JV.
Three other firms reported problems over inadequate capitalisation 
of their ventures. One manager stated that his firm should also 
have given the JV a longer gestation period and developed a five- 
year plan. As he said, "you have to do it properly if you are going 
to do it at all."
Several other firms encountered significant human problems,
ranging from a lack of willingness to get together and sort out
problems with their partners, to inadequate communications resulting
from personality clashes (which in one case should have been
identified by sufficient prior research into the subsidiary), to a
2
problem of 'identity'. This problem arises where, following a
1 See p.106
2 See also pp.96, 116-117 and 196*
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takeover, the new parent imposes its business sy^ems and substantial 
reporting requirements on the subsidiary, removes its policy 
autonomy and requires it to perform for the benefit of the group 
as a whole rather than as an independent entity, without ensuring 
a programme of sympathetic integration into the group. This is 
likely to alienate the subsidiary employees and may well result 
in many of the original attractions of a takeover being lost. 
Motivation of the subsidiary managers is likely to be seriously 
affected, since they will have lost control over their own destiny. 
They may question their own value in an organisation which is now 
effectively managed by someone else, and may be unwilling to 
carry out dictated policies. This was certainly the reason for 
one failed acquisition, and occurred to a certain extent in other 
ventures.
The Owner-manager:
When a firm acquires an owner-managed firm, of which there are 
a great many in France and West Germany, it has to decide whether 
to retain the previous owner to manage it, or to replace him. The 
advantage of retaining him is that he will understand the firm 
better than anyone else; but there may be important disadvantages 
to letting him have management control. Eight firms contributed 
(sometimes very strong views) to the discussion.
One firm, inspired by a lack of confidence in its French 
distributor, bought up 51% of the equity. The firm imposed a great 
many reporting requirements, but allowed the old owner-manager to 
continue running his firm. The result was that the subsidiary's 
problems - based on the owner-manager's inability to distinguish 
between stocks and money in the bank - continued. He was also unable 
to understand or get to grips with reporting the sort of data which 
a large firm such as the parent requires. Moreover, he never kept 
any records, since most of his selling was done by telephone. 
Eventually he had to be replaced.
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Another firm had similar problems with their French PDG who, 
although not strictly a previous owner-manager, had been with the 
firm for 40 years and retained old loyalties to the previous owners. 
Suddenly, upon acquisition, he was expected to fit into the 
management style of a multinational company, which demanded that 
every month he should send in cash flow forecasts for the next 12 
months, a balance sheet, a profit & loss account - in all, a total 
of seventeen financial schedules, all to be at group headquarters 
by a set day each month. He had never done anything like this before, 
and could not understand the need for it - so he did not want to 
be bothered with it. Eventually he too had to be replaced.
In another case, a British firm initially bought 50% of a 
French distributor and retained the old owner-manager as PDG. This 
man restricted his sales to one small but highly profitable area 
and was unwilling to spread into other areas because this would have 
meant reducing his profit margin, even though in absolute terms 
profits would have increased. His view was that although a larger 
firm may bring higher absolute profits, it is also more risky. He 
would not comply with the British firm's instructions to expand 
his operations, and eventually he had to be bought out.
In other cases, firms found that they simply could not trust 
the owner-manager. One man had to be sacked because he was mixing 
the company's money up with his own. It was not a substantial amount, 
but he could not be trusted. Another previous owner, who carried 
on as the chief executive of a German company, wanted to behave in 
a manner which was best for him and not for the British parent.
He had ensured that he retained 25.1% of the equity, so that the 
parent just lacked full control under German law. Significant 
problems followed. For example, the written agreement stated that 
the use of a particular subcontractor should cease "as soon as is 
practical." However, unknown to the British firm, the owner-manager 
had a financial stake in the subcontractor, and so never regarded 
it as practical to sever this link. After five years of such problems, 
the British firm managed to conclude a new management agreement by 
which there would now be two chief executives, and they brought in 
another man - also a German - from outside. This move effectively 
prevented the owner-manager from acting as he had done beforehand.
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In another case in Germany, the British firm concerned agreed 
initially to form a partnership rather than an equity JU or majority 
shareholding, and left management control in the hands of the previous 
owner-manager. This man acted very much in his own interests, and 
concealed a good deal of information from the British firm, which as 
a result lost a large amount of money on the venture. The company 
commented on the problem: "The owner-manager is a very dangerous 
concept - but it would also be dangerous to buy from an owner who 
disappeared too quickly. What would we find there? One should 
perhaps keep him on for a year or two, until everything is sorted 
out. The difficulty with the owner-manager is that he takes things ' 
as his right, and regards your involvement as interference. Someone 
you bring in regards you as thé boss - and rightly so. People should 
have to account regularly for what they are doing, rather than 
taking all responsibility and authority and not have to justify 
their actions. This is a problem of the owner-manager".
A French chief executive suggested that owner-managers should 
be assigned an assistant, with knowledge in every field - production, 
accounting and management, and that this would result in all round 
benefits from the owner-manager's experience and knowledge, together 
with improved communications and trust between the two sides. He 
added that the company must have people who are sufficiently open 
to act at a group level, not at a company level.
The managing director of one acquiring firm enthused: "The
previous owner who stayed has been marvellous. It's difficult to 
take over a firm and then tell them how to run their own business.
His performance has prevented any 'identity' clash. It is useful
to have such a man, who knows the business well."
The chief executive of another French firm, on the other hand, 
believed that the acquiring firm should put its own man in charge 
from the start. He argued that an assistant would only learn what 
the owner-manager wanted him to learn, and that the PDG has all 
the power. He added, however, that the PDG must be able to speak 
French and know the culture - he cannot expect customers to speak 
his language. The problem with bringing in a manager from outside 
is that he would not know the subsidiary. He suggested hiring 
someone from another firm in the industry.
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Another firm argues strongly in favour of replacing the owner- 
manager: "You need to be more than a firm managed by an owner-
manager interested in the firm surviving as long as he survives.
You need to be competitive - which means that you need money and 
utilisation of your profits. Whereas an owner-manager would 
understandably prefer to channel profits into his retirement fund and 
let the business bump along, you need to commit your money to the 
business. Also, former owners tend to be autocratic and very 
non-professional regarding book-keeping, auditing, etc. If you 
take over their firm, they can't get used to the fact that it is not 
their business any more. Second line managers are the same - very 
local to the old owner. From the new parent's point of view, 
there is no way you can leave it entirely to local management. You 
must have your people there. You must bring in outside professional 
management, not leave the old people in charge. How do you know 
they are telling you the truth otherwise ? Saying that they must 
do more financial reporting is not enough. What is the use in 
finding out about something after a decision has been taken 7 
Financial reporting is only historical, so you can't rely on it.
The first person you need there is the financial controller, who 
holds the key to everything." These views were echoed by a French 
chief executive.
Real problems can arise where the owner-manager has aims which 
differ from those of the acquiring firm, and has the ability to 
achieve his aims and frustrate attempts by the acquirer to force 
a change in policy. Wherever this is possible, the firm should 
ensure that the owner-manager's onus of responsibility is shared, 
preferably by putting in an accountant with real management power.
A basic problem with the owner-manager, of course, is that if 
the purchaser is not willing to keep him on as chief executive, he 
might decide not to sell. If he is to be retained, extreme care 
needs to be taken over his contract.
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Lessons
A number of lessons were learned by the participants, the most 
important of which was the need to do sufficient background research. 
This was emphasised by no less than twelve firms, some of which had 
fared badly as a result of their failure to do this. As one firm 
said "it is extremely important to do your homework properly.' Some 
potential partners can get uptight about this, but you should not 
be put off. One firm we looked into, for instance, was found to 
be seriously overtrading, and our money would have disappeared into 
a great big hole. We get a reputation for taking so long to commit 
ourselves - but we are sure it is the right thing to do." This 
research falls into different categories: the firm; the market; 
the product; and the country.
The firm needs to be closely examined - looking at productive 
capacity, product quality standards, specifications, volumes, speeds, 
etc. The firm's managerial competence has to be assessed, together 
with its reasons for selling/wanting an agreement and possible language/ 
communication problems. One purchaser stressed that simply looking at 
the books is not sufficient, and that the purchaser should spend 
some time in the other firm before making commitment.
Market research involves spending some time talking to suppliers, 
customers and potential customers, finding out about attitudes to 
the product, faults, room for development, and the company. As one 
firm said, "don't commit resources without knowing that a market 
exists - even if the product is good."
Product analysis means examining the strengths and competitive 
advantages of the product with respect to other competitors, the 
manufacturing process, costs, and how well it fits in with existing 
products.
Country analysis concerns taxation and company law, labour 
laws, local finance, etc.
This research is described in greater detail on pp. 108-111.
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The objections to research commonly concern the time and money 
required - but information reduces uncertainty and hence risk. One 
firm stated: "Sometimes you have to take a decision to make a 3\J 
or a takeover very quickly in order to exploit a market opportunity. 
But this doesn't mean that the decision should be any more risky 
than if you spent a long time on it - you should continually be 
updating your market knowledge and researching other companies and 
fields just so that you can take advantage of opportunities 
quickly. This continual research is very important."
It is difficult for some of the smaller firms to spare the
resources required for this research; without it, however, these
1
firms are always going to encounter problems.
Six firms mentioned the importance of having a strong written
agreement which is very detailed and hqa responsibilities and
2objectives clearly stated. In one case, the document was really 
a series of agreements. It took six months to work it all out, 
was very complicated in parts and the partners do not refer to it
in practice - but it is always there to fall back on, and there is
very little room for conflict. Two other ventures had similar 
agreements, and in all three cases the firms agreed that their 
complete lack of problems was due to the extent and thoroughness of 
the agreement.
This does not apply only to JVs, but also to less-than-100% 
takeovers in which the former owner-manager remains as chief 
executive. One firm confessed: "We didn't even take legal advice 
for this agreement the first time. The owner-manager had his legal 
advisers and they wrote the agreement. We gave him far too much 
room. We only took a few weeks over it, but should have taken much 
longer and done it properly. It would have saved us years of 
problems - and in the end we have to renegotiate the agreement anyway, 
so it didn't save us any time at all I"
1 See also pp. 38 and 110.
2 See also pp. 38, 46, 115-116 and 2 1 ^ 2 1 9 *
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Another six firms believed that if one undertakes a project, 
one must give it enerything it needs in resources, time, commitment, 
etc. The venture needs to be strong in working capital, and requires 
a good deal of time and effort to exploit synergies. One firm 
summarised this group's attitude: "If one says that investment 
funds are not available in such amounts, or that head office is a 
bit thin on the ground for the necessary personnel and cannot spare 
them for the venture, then one should not go ahead with the 
operation. This also means forecasting the venture's capital 
requirements and capitalising it sufficiently. Do it properly 
or don't do it at all."
Local market knowledge and capable management are vital. For 
this reason, four firms stated that foreign subsidiaries should be 
run by local nationals. One of these believed that it is 
important to maintain French control for the customers' benefit, 
and that the customer would rather deal with other Frenchmen. But 
aTother four firms wished that they had put their own management 
alongside that of their new French subsidiaries. Opinions were 
divided on whether this should be through English-speaking Frenchmen 
or French-speaking Englishmen, but all four firms wanted them in 
the finance function, and to improve information flows to the parent. 
They stressed the importance of financial control.
Five firms believed that the best way of improving communication 
between the two sides is to create a cross-training programme - by 
bringing key employees from the subsidiary/partner to train with 
the UH firm, and vice versa. Two partners who did this extensively, 
even at the shop floor level, claimed that their programme had 
resulted in a far greater appreciation of each other's products and 
indeed organisations. Suggestions for areas of product development 
were encouraged, and achieved, at all levels within the organisations, 
and internal relations - and a willingness to work together - were 
greatly helped by the fact that individuals at all levels were 
personally acquainted with their counterparts. As one managing 
director put it, "it really doesn't cost that much, and is well 
worth it for the increased understanding, pride in work, elimination 
of alienation, etc., in which it results."
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The question of identity"* is extremely important in acquisitions, 
and was specifically mentioned as a lesson by four firms involved 
in such operations. One of them commented on its failed purchase:
"We were perhaps insensitive to the subsidiary's desire for 
managerial autonomy, as opposed to membership of the group. We 
should have promoted a group identity by cross-training." The 
managing director of another firm, which claimed a very successful 
acquisition, stated: "It is difficult to change the subsidiary's
mentality to that of a large company - but we have not forced the 
pace on them. It is important that the French feel that they are 
in control. Other firms have failed in the past because they have 
tried to force new subsidiaries to become large international firms 
more quickly than they could cope with the change."
The human aspect of the venture is quite crucial, and its 
importance cannot be over-emphasised. Problems can arise in all 
sorts of areas. For example, the chief executive of one company 
recommended: "If you take over a company whose products compete 
with a part of your range, do not try to sell that part of your 
range through them. It will lead to problems immediately. How do 
you propose to get a firm to sell your products in competition with 
their own? We did this with one company and there were problems 
from the very first day. The subsidiary priced our products out 
of the market so that they could still sell their own products.
They defended this by saying that our product was more efficient, 
so they had to price it 15% higher, which was nothing but an excuse. 
The venture didn't work out at all, and we sold it back to the former 
owner after incurring losses." He continued: "Too many firms have 
had problems and run into similar losses through trying to sell their 
whole range through a subsidiary which has a competing product.
It just won't work, and the ill-feeling and distrust which it creates 
can spread to other areas and affect the whole venture adversely 
- and the venture will fail if the people at the subsidiary are 
unhappy with it. If they had been more sensible and not so 
inflexible and greedy, they would have sold just part of their range - 
the complementary part - through the operation and made a success of 
it. Then an additional benefit would have been that the subsidiary
As discussed on pp. 96, 116-117 and 188— 189*
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staff would have felt that they were getting solid servicing and 
backing from the parent company, instead of feeling pressure and 
resentment."
A lesson from this study is that co-operation can work, and 
that problems can be overcome with care. It can and has led to 
other benefits, with firms doing other work for each other as a 
result of their venture. The level of ownership can be less 
important than the venture itself. As one firm, which chose a 
takeover because it meant 100% ownership and control rather than 
a smaller share in a more viable venture, commented after seeing 
its acquisition fail : "You don't necessarily need a majority for 
a good venture. A minority share in a good firm is better than a 
majority share in a bad one." Flexibility, co-operation and a 
genuine desire to work together are vital, but without proper 
planning this flexibility may only last until the first clash of 
interests arises - especially if, as one firm warned, "when you 
start a venture you are usually more optimistic than realistic." 
But backed up by sound research, a strong agreement, consideration 
and a real willingness to commit resources, there are many 
possibilities within this field.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SURVEY RESULTS, BY QUESTIONNAIRE SECTION
Continuing from the previous chapter, the present chapter 
gives further details of the result of the survey, by following the 
form of the questionnaire. The sub-sections covered are therefore 








A major issue in the 'structuralist* literature on JVs
2
(as opposed to the 'strategic' literature) is the question of 
the effect of co-operation upon competition within the industry. 
It has been proposed^ that firms enter JVs in order to overcome 
interdependencies, and that the occurrence of JVs in highly 
concentrated industries confirms this view.
For reasons outlined on pp. 45 and 166-67 the, participants 
were asked to make a subjective estimate of the strength of 
concentration in their home market, based on a scale of 1 to 10 
(1 being very low and 10 being monopoly)• The results for 
firms involved in both JVs and acquisitions were as follows:
1 i.e., regarding effects upon the structure of the industry. The
same issues also apply to acquisitions.
2 i.e., concerning corporate strategy.
3 See, for example, pp. 45 and 21. For further detail on concentration
in the mechanical engineering industries see pp. 145-149.
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Table 44
'External' *JV parents 















•External to the 3\I market.
The results show that the JU-ing firms had slightly more 
concentrated home markets than the acquiring firms, although the same 
size is not large enough to draw any conclusions from this. These 
figures cannot, unfortunately, give any indications as to competitive 
dependency because they relate to the companies' home markets. It 
would have been better to ask the participants to grade concentration 
levels in the venture market instead. Figures provided by the host 
country firms alone in the survey are inadequate.
However, evidence of high concentration in the external firms'
home markets can give indications of 'push' factors, causing the
firms to expand into other markets as a result of the strength of
1
their domestic competition. Three firms in fact reported that this 
factor was a decisive element in their venture decisions. As one 
of them stated: "Strength of competition in the UH pushed strongly 
towards establishing outselves in Europe, and the lower strength 
in France presented a competitive gap for us to exploit." and another: 
"Domination of the UH market by a few large firms was certainly a 




The US literature on the anticompetitive effects of JVs, which 
is confined to national ventures, so that both parents are within 
the market, does not apply in the case of transnational JVs, which 
are between one partner within and one partner external to the 
market, so that no reduction in the number of competitors can 
result.
Where a firm makes a JV or acquisition in another geographic market 
in which it does not already have a corporate presence, its experience 
(if any) being limited to exporting or using an agent/distributor, 
there are three possible effects;
i) It can result in a new product becoming available on the market,
thus constituting an improvement on the previous situation.
This was the effect in five of the JVs in this study.
ii) It can result in a new supplier for an existing product. This,
through increasing the number of domestic competitors, increases 
the level of domestic competition but, if it replaces previous 
exports of the external firm, reduced imported competition.
But the increase in marketability of the external firm's 
products, through having the benefits of a local corporate 
presence, means that the first effect should exceed the second. 
This occurred in four of the JVs in the study.
iii) It can result in increased backing and resources for an existing
producer. This again has the effect of reducing imported 
competition if it replaces the external firm's exports, but 
increases the competitiveness of the local firm. The overall 
effect on competition is uncertain. This was the case in seven 
JVs and also applied to the acquisitions.
In the remaining JV, the British firm already had a European 
operation. The JV resulted from a rationalisation with its major 
European competitor of their operations in Europe, a measure which 
was forced on the two firms concerned by a declining market and the 
need to compete effectively against imported Japanese competition.
The partners have benefitted from greater operating efficiency, and 
although the number of competitors in the market has effectively 
decreased, consumer benefits have resulted from the firms' greater 
ability to compete against the Japanese.
See also pp.20 and 57.
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A better measure of the importance of concentration and 
competition than examining concentration figures - which could, 
after all, be purely circumstantial evidence - was to ask the 
participants directly what part this played in their venture 
decisions.
Three of the JU-ing firms admitted that one reason for their 
ventures was that it would eliminate competition between themselves 
and their partners - although one firm stated that this was only a 
minor reason. A German firm commented:“We preferred to co-operate 
in the JV market rather than fight with (the partner). This JV 
has not, however, taken the edge off our competition with them in 
other areas." And a French company reported: "The key reason for 
this venture was the threat presented by (the partner's) potential 
competition with ourselves. They had a good name and a wider product 
range than us; they were more concerned with volume selling than 
with profits; and the exchange rate then was just over 9 francs to 
the €, which made them extremely competitive. We realised that a 
JV would offer us a wider range with a good name and so rather than 
have them compete with us we accepted their offer."
Another JV-ing firm believed that the effect of the JV would 
be to make it the dominant firm in Europe, and thus to achieve its 
objective.of becoming a European market leader, while a purchaser 
was drawn by the fact that its target firm had been its main European 
rival.
On the other hand, two JV-ing firms and three acquirers reported 
that it was the lack of competition in the target market which was 
an important factor.
Thus although comments by some of the participants confirm the 
beliefs of some US writers to the extent that competitive 
interdependence in the market can be a reason for JVs, such operations 
can also occur when firms are drawn to a market by the opposite case, 
an absence of competitive interdependence, and use the ventures 
merely as a means of entering the market.
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In many other cases,Ihe strength or absence of competition had 
no impact at all on the venture decision. Such results indicate 
the dangers of making excessive generalisations on the reasons for 
business collaboration.
b) Motives :
Nearly all the firms concerned (20 out of 22 JV-ing firms 
replying to this question, and 18 out of the 19 involved in 
acquisitions) agreed that having a corporate presence in the 
market concerned would be significantly more effective than 
exporting to it. Of course, this response is only to be expected 
from firms which have decided to set up European operations. It 
is unclear how exporters would answer. A larger study using a 
control group could answer this question.
Almost as convincing a response was given to the question of 
1
customer nationalism. 23 JV-ing firms and 15 involved in take­
overs believed that local customers in the venture market were much 
more likely to purchase from national suppliers than from foreign 
firms, as opposed to 3 and 4 respectively which did not.
The firms which did not encounter local customer nationalism were
united in their explanations that product quality, price, delivery,
2reliability and servicing matter much more than the nationality 
of the supplying firm, although as one company admitted, a local 
presence makes servicing much easier. Most firms believed that 
qualities such as these are not in themselves sufficient to overcome 
the question of customer nationalism. In other words, it is not 
enough simply to provide such a service; the firm has in addition 
to be able to put a local image on the product.
1 See also p.43
2 See also pp. 152-153.
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Firms are particularly vulnerable to this issue where the 
public sector is a major customer# Ten of the 23 JV-ing firms providing 
such information reported that over 20% of JV sales were to host • 
country central or local government or nationalised industries.
The proportion was somewhat lower for acquisition firms, with 13 out 
of 19 such firms reporting that less than 10% of venture sales were 
to public bodies.
Three firms (2 JV-ing and 1 acquiring) reported that they would 
have been unable to win public sector contracts without their local 
invovlement, and a French firm stated: "Customers would buy from 
any active (i.e. developing technically) and reliable company which 
could provide an immediate servicing capability, be it French or 
foreign; but there is great pressure from the government now to buy 
French products. For this reason, it would probably be better if we 
assembled our partner's products to give them a 'French-made* label." 
These views were echoed by another French firm, particularly regarding 
the pressure from the French government to buy local products in the 
public sector. The chief executive believed that it was very 
necessary to give the image of being a French company, and had 
therefore fought hard to prevent the UK parent from changing its 
subsidiary's name to match its group name.
It is possible that some people read nationalism into their 
failure to sell, whereas the real reason may be the firm's inability 
to provide an effective service without having abase in the market, 
or indeed their own inability to communicate with customers. As a 
Dutch chief executive comments: "Dutch people like German equipment - 
it is high quality and very new. They find UK equipment a bit old- 
fashioned, and are afraid of bad delivery because of strikes, etc. 
Nevertheless, when our German co-owner's senior man tried to sell his 
own products at a trade fair, he drew an absolute blank. Nobody 
wanted to speak to him - maybe because of historical anti-German 
feelings; or maybe just because he couldn't speak Dutch." Any firm 
which tires to sell in a market without knowing the language faces 
enormous difficulties.
- 204 -
A great many generalisations on the question of nationalism 
were made by the participants, along the lines of those frequently 
reported by Mazzolini (1974), and, because of their sweeping 
statements about national characters, are mostly not worth repeating. 
It may be because more ventures were involved in France (14) than 
anywhere else, but the severest criticisms were reserved for the 
French. A comment made by a Belgian joint venturer, and echoed by 
several British firms, was that: "The French are not so much 
nationalists as chauvinists."
Customer nationalism has not been entirely French, however, and- 
complaints were widespread. The most extreme case was reported by a 
Dutch firm which had offered to supply its British parent with a 
particular product at two-thirds of the parent's cost of UK 
manufacture. The Dutch received a short reply which read simply:
"Ue are a British company. Our customers expect us to buy British."
An interesting difference in responses between JV-ing and 
acquiring firms arose in the question of the importance of firm size. 
Whereas over half (13/24) of the JV parents believ^. that firm size 
is an important facto^- agreed with this. Despite this, JVs were 
generally smaller in relation to their parents than were acquisitions, 
with only three of the 23 JV parents reporting that the JV accounted 
for over 10% of their turnover, as against seven of the 15 acquiring 
firms. This may reflect the fact that the greater the relative size 
of the venture, the greater the importance which the parent attaches 
to having control over it. This is quite understandable - the larger 
the relative size of the venture, the more it affects the nature and 
direction of the firm's business, over which it will quite naturally 
wish to retain control.
Among the firms which believed firm size to be an important factor, 
three reported that a successful operation requires a minimum infra­
structure based on an extensive distribution network. One of these 
added that size gives the firm "a lot more muscle with suppliers."
This point was extended by another company, which stated: "You gain 
more respect from customers, who know that you will have better 
technological ability, servicing ability, etc." Another firm
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commented: "The more local people get used to seeing our equipment 
about, the quicker we can become established. It helps us to 
develop a reputation if we have a wide range." And a purchaser 
claimed: "Firm size is important anywhere - small firms require 
just as much attention as large firms, and are more difficult to 
turn around. Larger companies tend to beat you to contracts."
One firm encountered problems with the size of its French partner, 
which was too small to be able to contribute towards expanding the 
JV as quickly as the British firm wanted."* However, the larger 
firm was unable to buy out the operation since it would not have 
been able to win French public contracts without the involvement 
of its French partner.
Firms which replied that firm size is not important consistently 
argued that speed of service, reliability, quality and reputation
are more important. No less than 16 firms made comments to this
2 3
effect. Another important issue can be continuity. Customers
may want to be sure that their distributors are not going to change
suppliers, and also that the supplier is not going to change its
distributors. The customers will wish to avoid any possible future
problems over the availability of spare parts, additional products
and servicing.
Nearly all the participants reported that they had some 
previous experience in the market concerned, listed as follows :
1 See p.105.
2 The importance of these non-price factors in competitiveness is
described on pp. 152-153.
3 See also p.86.
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None (in that product area)
One of the firms with a production subsidiary stated that the 
JV was based on its existing operations. The other had its production 
subsidiary in a different product area.
For the rest, the JV/acquisition operations represented the 
firms' biggest involvement yet in thermarket. They therefore appear 
to represent a stage in corporate development of a particular market, 
parallel to each other - since none of the firms had carried out a 
previous JV or acquisition in that geographic and product market.
A disturbingly high proportion (40%) of firms carried out no
2
financial planning for the ventures. This included six of the 14 
equity JV-ing firms^ and six of the 15 acquiring firms. Three of 
these JV-ing firms did no background research either, and it can be 
no surprise that two of these failed in their ventures. The other 
failed JV-ing firm did some financial planning, but this was 
unfortunately based on false information supplied by its partner.
This firm also failed to carry out any background research.
Similarly, of the six acquiring firms which did no financial 
planning, four also did no background research. This included 
three of the firms which reported failures. The remaining failed 
acquirer did carry out some financial planning, but also failed to 
support this with any background research.
1 See Chapter 3 for descriptions of these strategies.
2 See also p.107 for a comparison with other results.
3 Firms involved in contractual JVs did no financial planning 
because they did not make a financial commitment and therefore 
carried no risk.
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Where firms had failed to carry out any financial analysis, 
the reason given was invariably the same - that it had been a 
•strategic' rather than a financial decision. However, in cases 
where no planning is done, and especially where no background research 
is carried out either, the firm may fail to identify a potentially 
disastrous venture, and also lacks information on the requirements 
of the operation. The chief executive of an acquired firm whose 
parent had not used any financial analysis complained: "(The parent) 
should have done more financial planning. They would have invested 
more if they had done so. (The subsidiary) was heavily under­
capitalised. Our gearing was wrong for a number of years, so that we 
relied too much on short-term loans from banks. This proved very 
expensive." Fortunately, this venture was rated an 'average success'.
A firm which failed badly, on the other hand, confessed: "We didn't 
make any financial estimates - this was a strategic decision. In 
short, it was a gamble which didn't pay off."
This firm, incidentally, was the only one of the seven companies 
which had carried out neither financial analysis nor background 
research which considered its investment to be a very high risk, 5 
on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very low risk, 5 = very high risk). None 
of the other six rated the riskiness of their own project higher 
than '2'. Four of them also failed.
Business risk on such ventures can never be completely eradicated, 
but it can be significantly reduced by proper preparation. One 
purchaser (rated 'very successful) reported: "We thought the risk 
was fairly low because we had looked at (the acquired firm) in every 
conceivable way and they seemed a good, honest company. We did our 
own review of them, and also hired an international accountancy firm 
to do a business management review. They too could find Nothing 
wrong. Basically, the risk factor came down to two points: (i) 
were they telling the truth (i.e., were they really a bad company 
in disguise) 7; and (ii) could we make them into a bad company 
through our own mismanagement? Even though we had investigated them 
as thoroughly as possible, it still had to be an intuitive decision."
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Another firm, which also boasted a 'very successful' acquisition, 
summed up this point: "There wasn't much risk attached to the 
venture, since we had done sufficient research to know how (the 
subsidiary) would be run, and what the prospects were. In-depth 
research reduces uncertainty, and hence reduces risk for a viable 
project".
The participants were also asked, if they were unable to carry 
out the venture project on the same scale by themselves, what their 
shortage of resources was. The following factors were listed, by 
numbers of firms:
Table 46 Participants' shortage of Resources
JV parents Acquiring firms
Local management knowledge 7 0
Time 1 4
Technological ability 1 2
Larger product range 2 0
Finance 3 1
Insufficient market size 4 1
Market access & position 3 3
Distribution network 0 3
The results show some interesting differences - especially
concerning local management knowledge. None of the acquiring firms
indicated that their lack of this knowledge was a factor preventing
them from undertaking a project alone. This is reflected in the
far lower figure for acquisitions than JVs for the number of firms
giving local management knowledge as a prime reason for entering
the venture (see pp.173-175 ). Six of the above seven JV-ing
firms which lacked this knowledge put it forward as a principal
reason for entering their ventures. The importance of acquiring
technological ability and saving development time confirm Friedman,
1
Berg and Duncan's findings that firms use knowledge-acquisition 
JVs as a substitute for internal R & D expenditure - although these 
results indicate that this reason applies very* much to acquisitions 
as well as JVs.
See p.36.
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Four other JV-ing firms believed that independent action would 
have been wasteful, since their output would have been ccTBtrained 
by market demand and not by the limits of their own resources. As 
one firm put it: "Ide could have produced the JV product on the same 
scale on our own, but this would have meant doing a lot of tooling up - 
duplicating our partner's tooling. In addition, the market would not
have been large enough to support production by both firms, and so the
exercise would have been wasteful. It was better to rationalise 
through a JV - which would also help to eliminate duplicative research 
and product development."
Several firms felt that they needed fast access to the market 
and looked for a local company with an established market position. 
Three acquiring firms believed that the key to success was to buy 
a sound, established distribution network. Having done so, all three 
reported successful outcomes.
c) Search :
There were two main reasons for choosing the country. Nine JV 
parents and eleven of the purchasing firms did so on the basis of
market size and potential. On the other hand, six JV parents and
four acquirers were primarily interested in the potential partner/ 
subsidiary. In general, market size mattered where firms were 
interested in expanding into a new geographical market. Where they 
wanted to expand into a new product market or expand their current 
share of an existing product, the partner/subsidiary was the most 
important issue, and location was often largely irrelevant.
Of the firms which aimed at the partner first, two of the JV-ing 
ones had had previous contact with their partners as competitors.
The firms were in both cases interested in developing a new product, 
and from their knowledge of the other firms in the industry, approached 
the companies which they believed could help them develop the product 
most effectively. In another case, a British company wanted to enter 
a new product market and sought to co-operate with an established 
European producer in order to save itself the time required to 
build up a reliable reputation in the product area. In a further 
instance, a British firm infringed the patent of another major producer 
in Europe, in a product area containing very few firms in the world. 
When the European firm challenged it on the issue, negotiations for
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a licence followed, during which the firms decided that a fuller 
co-operation agreement would be more beneficial. Another firm, 
under pressure from large competitors and declining profits in its 
home market, attempted to find new opportunities through the Business 
Co-operation Centre in Brussels. This firm was just looking for 
opportunities rather than attempting to find a way of exploiting 
one. Its lack of clarity and precision in its objectives 
contributed greatly to its eventual failure to conclude a suitable 
agreement. Two other firms which used the BCC had already 
identified their target markets on the basis of market size, and 
were looking for firms in a specific area.
Of the acquiring firms which chose their subsidiaries before 
considering their location, one did so on the basis that its 'victim' 
had been its main European rival. In another case involving very 
few world producers, all of whom were known to each other, a British 
firm heard that another producer was short of finance at a time 
when the UK company had money to spend. The firm had made the 
acquisition before it realised that it should have spent more time 
investigating the subsidiary.
In another case, a British firm was told of a good takeover 
opportunity by a merchant bank, again arising from the German 
target firm's shortage of finance, and quickly stepped in.
The fourth firm was approached directly by the owners of an 
established French company, who wished to sell out. The firm 
realised that this would give it quick entry into the French market, 
in a sector marked by French nationalism in purchasing.
Of the firms which selected the market first, one German 
company reported that it wanted to break into the British market, 
but needed a British involvement to do so. There were only a few 
British producers, and the Germans sought a partner whose product 
range they could extend.
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A British firm had developed a strategy to expand in Europe, 
but at the same time wanted to reduce its dependence on the French 
market, to which it was heavily committed. It selected a German 
partner on the basis of its availability. The venture unfortunately 
failed badly. Another company had already spent 2-3 years 
formulating a strategy of acquiring a French firm when it was 
approached by just such a firm. The British had actually considered 
and rejected this company some time before, but the French had 
overcome their problems in the meantime and were now considered 
by the UK firm to be a good buy.
Two British acquirers learned of their opportunities through 
personal contacts. In one case, the personal connection did not 
affect the takeover decision in any way, and the firm carried out 
a good deal of research, especially into the acquired firm, before 
making its commitment. The second company, which learned of its 
German subsidiary's availability through a personal contact, now 
suspects that the Germans' former owner had this information 
deliberately leaked to the firm, which at the time thought it was 
on to a bargain and snapped it up without researching it. The 
venture was a disaster.
A company whose experience in the French market was limited 
to an agent believed that it knew all the local firms in the 
acquired market without backing this up with research. It 
approached the owners of a firm which it believed had a good name 
but actually had a bad name and persuaded them to sell. The venture 
failed.
Another company which was eager to break into the French market 
chose its subsidiary on the basis that it was one of the only local 
companies not to have been taken over already by international 
competitors.
One more firm which had some knowledge of the French market 
after operating through a distributor considered that this knowledge 
was not sufficient. The firm employed a bilingual man solely to 
find it a French manufacturer of its product. It gave him a list of 
firms which interested it and he investigated them all, talking 
to the firms, other competitors, customers, etc. He drew up a 
short-list of four firms, of which the acquired one was the best.
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The venture has been very successful.
Three firms acquired their own distributors, in one case when 
the firm responded to its distributor's plea for more help and 
products by demanding management control in return.
In another case, the British firm was principally concerned 
with achieving economies of scale and would only consider firms 
with which this could be done. Its aims have been attained, and 
the firm regards its venture as a total success.
One further venture came about when a European firm had grown 
to the point where it could no longer finance itself, and looked 
for buyers. A venture capital company saw an opportunity and 
stepped in. This company, however, has a policy of only taking 
minority shares in firms, in order to save itself management problems. 
So it asked a British firm, the largest European firm in the industry, 
to enter a JV with it and manage the acquisition. The British 
agreed, taking a majority share in the equity and managing the 
business.
Altogether, 16 JV-ing firms had a particular partner in mind 
when they considered a JV. However, only three of these firms had 
looked at other local companies, despite the fact that in only four 
ventures had a previous relationship existed between the partners.
Six firms had not decided on a particular partner but were 
considering several; five of these firms were also considering other 
strategies. Seven acquiring firms also decided on their strategy 
with only one local company in mind, while eight others were still 
considering alternatives. Previous relationships existed between 
purchaser and subsidiary in five cases.
Most firms, whether involved in JVs or acquisitions, were
attracted to partners/subsidiaries who produced complementary goods.
This included 19 JV-ing firms (of which 7 were also involved in
competing products) and 10 purchasers (of which 2 were also involved
in competing products). Only 3 JV-ing and 3 acquiring firms formed
1
operations with companies manufacturing competing products only.
The problems of trying to sell competing products through a 
subsidiary are discussed on pp.l96— 19T*
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Only three companies in the whole survey felt that regional 
incentives were important, although nine (including seven 
purchasers) had looked into the question. As one firm commented: 
"Investment incentives are important - even if we aren't short of 
cash at the time. We will always look around to see what we can 
pick up." One company bought a 10 acre site in northern France 
because of regional incentives - but then found that the cost of 
moving production there from elsewhere in France would have been 
too great. Another British firm was approached by a French 
regional development agency as soon as the latter discovered that 
the former was interested in investing in France.
In not one case did these incentives have any influence at all 
on the form of venture adopted.
Other comments were less than favourable. One firm complained 
that rather than benefitting from inducements, all it had received 
was government hindrance in the form of, for example, taxation and 
competition law. Another company dismissed regional incentives as 
"A lot of codswallop", while the managing director of an acquiring 
firm stated: "The existence of regional incentives, etc, is a good
enough reason for not investing in an area. There is bound to be 
a catch - lack of a transport network, suitable labour force, etc. 
Such incentives should be ignored for the purposes of making the 
investment decision (which should be based on standard business 
principles) and should be treated only as a bonus - ^  the 
investment decision is in favour of that area."^
The length of the decision making process for the two types of 
firms was as fallows:
See p. 171.
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Table 47 Length of the decision making process
JV parents Acquiring firms
0 - 2  months 3 4
3 - 5  months 2* *
6 - 11 months 7 2
12 - 18 months ^ 3
over 18 months / ' 2
The spread over the different time periods was fairly even 
for purchasers, whereas most of the JV parents took between 6 and 
18 months to make their decision. The firms which took the longest, 
however, spent much of this time developing a market strategy 
rathar than looking at one specific venture.
firms took only a few weeks from first contact to signing
the agreements. Of these, three (of which two were joint partners)
failed badly, while another was graded 'not successful'. This
firm should have negotiated a different type of venture, and is
still having problems over this. Another company signed a poorly
written agreement and suffered five years of problems before being
1
able to renegotiate it.
Four firms making French acquisitions complained that they had
2
to wait six months for French government approval before being able 
to carry out their operations. They were not happy about this, and
one managing director stated: "This long bureaucratic delay is a
big barrier to entry." In addition, acquirers are not normally 
permitted to purchase more than 80% of the equity of a French 
company, on pain of paying a tax either on the value of the 
subsidiary's stocks, or on thé value of 'goodwill' involved in the 
purchase. In contrast, one firm obtained French government 
permission quite easily and was impressed by the authorities, who 
allowed the firm to buy up to 95% of its subsidiary's equity without 
incurring the extra taxes.
1 See 'Lessons', p.194.
2 See also p.96
3 See p. 112,
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Another company, however, related a less fortunate experience: 
"The reason why this takeover did not go ahead was that the French 
authorities told us we could not have permission unless we also 
took over another company, which was a dead duck. We had even 
reached the stage of making representations to the French workforce. 
In the end we pulled out, although it's possible that the French 
authorities may have been bluffing."
Two firms (one of each type) reported that they also had to 
spend a good deal of time convincing their French associates (who 
were immediately very suspicious) of their good intentions. As 
one managing director reported: "It took many months of reassuring
them that we weren't going to change the company or switch our 
products for their, that we didn't want to take a good French 
company and make it into a bad British company, that our word was 
good that we were going to back them up, and that we were genuine 
and sincere, before they would trust us."
Just under half the participants had considered alternative
strategies (11 JV parents and 7 acquirers, against 13 and 8 
respectively which had not). Five firms considered and rejected a 
greenfield venture. One of these had been unable to develop a
financial model for such a strategy which gave a return within five
years, "and we were unwilling to extend the pay-back period any 
further because uncertainty grows with time." A JV-ing firm 
reported: "A greenfield would have cost £7-8 million, and would
have been for our own use only - there would have been little 
probability of selling elsewhere. Ue couldn't have justified it. 
The J\y cost £3 million." One acquiring firm rejected a greenfield 
venture on the grounds that it would have taken three years to 
develop, while another such firm stated: "A greenfield would have
cost £3^ million and not made a profit for the first 3-4 years.
This cost us £1 million and made a profit in the first year." A. 
joint venturer rejected the alternative of a greenfield because it 
did not have sufficient experienced management with the ability to 
speak European languages.
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Among the firms which did not consider alternative strategies, 
one German joint venturer stated: "We would not have considered a
takeover or a greenfield - both would have been too expensive. We 
just wanted a share of the UK market." And a British JV-ing firm 
reported: "If we had entered the field in (the partner's) product,
we would have been 3-4 years behind them in technological ability.
We wanted to get into the market quickly, so a JV suited us well." 
Another firm gave its reason for only considering acquisitions:
"It is company policy to acquire control of all our European 
bases."
In other cases, two alternatives were considered. One German 
firm commented : "A greenfield or a takeover would have been no
good at all - a waste of a lot of money. We needed a British front - 
and we wanted someone else to do the manufacturing. A licence or 
a JV - getting our products into the British market - were the 
ideal strategies. Which it was would have depended on our partner.
If they had only wanted a licence, we would have settled for that - 
as long as they had good enough equipment to do the job." And a 
British purchaser stated: "Greenfields were not considered, since 
we needed an already existing distribution network. Takeovers 
and JVs were considered, with takeovers being considered the best 
choice - we would rather use the existing facilities of an 
established distribution system than commit other resources - bearing 
in mind that the French are very nationalistic in their purchasing."
Only eight of the 23 JV parents providing such information, and 
six of the 15 acquiring firms, had considered alternative partners/ 
victims. Just six firms in the survey (2 acquiring and 4 JV-ing) 
considered both different strategies and different partners/victims, 
supported by background research and financial planning, before making 
their commitment. Two of these ventures were rated an 'average 
success', three 'very successful' and one a 'total success'. This 
shows the value of a careful and well planned approach.




The question of ownership of the venture is an extremely 
interesting area, on which a number of comments were made by the 
participants. One firm admitted to a certain uneasiness over the 
50:50 structure of its JV: "There is no board chairman for the JV,
and decisions are taken by consensus. We don't really like 50:50 
ownership - we would prefer either a majority or a minority share.
It is unrealistic to think that two people can run the same firm, 
with different ideas." Another firm in the same position made 
exactly the same point, and eventually gave up 0.1% of the capital, 
leaving itself in an overall minority position, for the sake of 
having a uniformity of purpose behind the running of the company.
One acquirer comments: "We like to work on the basis of full
ownership or no ownership at all." But 100% ownership cannot by 
itself solve problems. One company which increased its share­
holding in a French subsidiary from 51% to 100% because it believed 
that it could ensure that its policies were carried through and 
problems minimised with full control, found that in fact the 
problems became even worse after the French lost any effective 
rights in management decisions. As the managing director of a 
very successful acquirer said: "Even if you own 100%, you cannot
succeed by dictating to the subsidiary. It should be their company,
2
with our backing. The question of identity is very important."
A similarly successful acquirer reported: "Although we have 05%
of the equity, we have not taken boardroom control, so that control 
of the company, being French and going hand-in-hand with the French 
day-to-day management, is more consistent and homogeneous. However, 
as majority shareholders we can always remove the board if it goes 
against our wishes, and appoint others instead." This firm joined 
with another in stressing the importance of paying regular visits 
to the subsidiary, and maintaining good communication and financial 
reporting links.
1 See pp. 60-61, 112-114 and p.197#
2 See pp. 116-117,188-189 and 196 .
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Another company was not concerned over its lack of control over 
its venture. Since it manufactured the venture product, it would 
simply stop supplying the goods if it disagreed with the venture 
policy. One more firm, which owned a majority of its venture, 
described its associate as being very much a sleeping partner, and 
then added: "They wouldn't have any choice anyway - we don't take
minority interests into account."
After having disagreements with their partners on the speed of
expansion of their ventures, two companies expanded their equity
shares, reducing their partners' exposure to the increased risk,
1
but also their share of the venture profits.
There were differences of opinion on whether the chief
executive should be a local manager or a national of the parent's 
2
country. It is quite clear, however, that whoever is appointed, 
the ability to speak the language is not enough. The chief 
executive needs to be able to understand colloquialisms and the way 
local people work and think - in other words, to understand the 
local culture. In addition, one firm commented on the necessity 
for a strong relationship between the chief executives of the JV 
parents: "Chief executives need to have a common understanding -
objectives must be clear. They must also be flexible enough to 
work together without always referring back to the agreement - 
and on occasion to be able to do things in a different manner to the 
agreement. Co-operation and a desire to work together are vital.
In the end, it all comes down to individual people."
The importance of having a strong written agreement is emphasised 
on pp. 115-116 and p. 1-94^ and is a matter for careful
consideration. As one firm stated: "Be careful in setting up the
agreement - what happens if key people on your side (or the other) 
leave 7 Don't overvalue what you bring to the table - you must be 
sure of what you can contribute." Of course, the agreement itself
1 See also p. 182.
2 See pp. 114-115 and pp. 184— 185^ on this issue, and also
pp. iS9—1 9 2 on the question of retaining former owner-managers.
- 219 -
will not solve everything, and the right attitude is also required.
As the finance director of one UK company commented,"with the best 
will in the world, nothing will work if one firm wants an easy 
ride." The managing director of a JV-ing firm gave the following 
insight into this matter: "There are undertakings on what each
side should do on all sorts of issues - but you can't cater for 
everything. A co-operative venture is like a marriage - you can't 
settle everything beforehand, there has to be some give and take.
It is two partners working things out together. I took the written 
agreement out of the safe for this interview; it is the first time 
it has been out of the safe since it was signed, three years ago". 
This attitude was reaffirmed by another joint venture: "So far,
neither party has even had to look at the agreement since it was 
signed. Both of us know that if it reaches this stage, then we do 
not think much of the agreement."
Where disagreements do arise, the agreement should also specify 
a means of solving them. As one firm confessed: "Our failure to
ensure an adequate way of solving deadlocks in the original agree­
ments has caused us no end of problems. This is a big lesson we 
have learned - to get the agreement right first." Where one side 
has control, deadlocks cannot arise. Where there is no dominant 
partner, or in a contractual JV, which has no capital structure, 
methods have to be devised of solving the issue. Two JVs had such 
detailed agreements that the partner could not see the question 
arising. Other firms had introduced 'escape' clauses into their 
agreements, so that the venture could simply be wound up in such an 
event. In three cases, the JV board members would just sit together 
until they could produce a mutually acceptable policy. Two ventures 
had agreed on arbitration in the case of disagreement - but the 
managing director of one of the firms involved was unhappy about 
this arrangement, commenting: "Arbitration has three weaknesses:
it shows that the two sides cannot decide on a policy together, and 
that the spirit of co-operation necessary in a JV is probably not 
strong enough for the venture to survive; it means asking someone 
else to make your commercial decisions; and it can take a very long 
time - several months- This is a time lag that you cannot afford 
to wait for a decision." Arbitration is thus not an available method 
of solving management problems, but it can be effectively used as 
a last resort to prevent partners from going to court over an issue.
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Finally, the finance director of a Dutch company explained a 
way of ending an equity JV: "The solution whereby Company A offers
its JV shares to Company 0 at a particular price, being compelled, 
if Company 8 says the price is too high, to then buy Company B's 
shares at the same price, is one which we have used several times 
in the past. We have found that this solution works well."
e) Operation:
In seven JVs, at least one partner was a major supplier to the 
venture, against six ventures in which neither partner was. Five 
of the 13 acquiring firms providing such information were major 
suppliers to their subsidiaries. The following table shows trade 
between parents and ventures :
Parent - venture trade
Table 48 Percentage of venture inputs/output 
0-10 11-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100
a) Purchased from 
parents :
JVs 6 0 1 1 0  5
Acquired
firms 9 0 1 0 2 2
b) Sold to parents:
JVs 11 0 0 1 0 1
Acquired
firms 13 1 0 0 0 0
Very few firms were major customers of their ventures, with 
such trade as did occur being mainly from the parent to the venture,
Three firms sold on a 'cost plus' basis to their subsidiaries, 
and five parents on a normal 'arm's length' basis. Two others gave 
some discounts, while one company charged higher prices to its 
subsidiary than to outside customers, in order to keep profits in 
the UK. Another firm used transfer prices to minimise taxes.
In another case, one parent did the manufacturing, with the JV 
itself being a marketing company. Transfer prices were designed to 
change over time, so that to help with development costs the 
marketing company (i.e. the JV) would contribute towards the 
manufacturing costs, with the relationship reversing later on.
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In another instance, the JV sells to one parent at prices well 
below those charged to other customers. The other partner does not 
mind about this arrangement but as the purchasing parent noted, 
volume is low at the moment.
In an attempt to measure the autonomy of the ventures, the 
participants were asked which functional areas were controlled by 
the JV/subsidiary, and which by the parent. The results were as 
follows:
Table 49 Areas of control










Marketing 12 3 11 3
Capital expenditure 3 12 1 13
Pricing 12 3 14 0
Dividend policy 2 12 1 13
Organisation a 7 11 3
Production planning 
& control 6 3 11 1
It may be seen that JVs/subsidiaries generally (though not always) 
have control over marketing, pricing, production planning and control 
(where relevant) and organisation (although for this function there 
is much more parental involvement in the case of JVs than for 
acquisitions). Parents retain control over capital expenditure 
(although both types of ventures are usually given discretion over 
expenditure up to a certain limit) and dividend policy (i.e., on 
profit retention and repatriation). Parent companies tend not to 
become involved in the day-to-day management matters, but to confine 




The following numbers of firms achieved cost benefits from 
their ventures:
Table 50 Cost benefits achieved
JV-ing firms Acquistion firms*
Reduction in unit costs 4 3




Reduction in R&D costs due 
to the elimination of
duplicative research 7 2
•Includes subsidiaries.
On the whole, then, more firms involved in JVs received cost 
benefits than did those involved in acquisitions, although three of 
the latter protested that their ventures were not aimed at achieving 
these benefits. Benefits were not possible where the firms involved 
did not manufacture or sell the same products.
The results of the ventures compared with pre-stated targets 
(or where no planning took place, with original estimates) were as 
follows:
Table 51 Venture results compared with pre-stated targets
JVs Acquisitions
Much greater than target 0 0
Greater than target 3 2
Met target 3 3




The subjective success rates of the ventures, shown on p. 
appear to be better than the actual performance, since it was not 
considered to be the fault of the ventures, nor of the way in which 
they were handled, where the market fell off due to external 
economic forces. Thus some ventures which had fallen short of their 
pre-stated targets were still held by their parents to be 
successful.
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In only three cases (2 JVs and 1 acquisition) were there 
significant differences in the way the parties concerned rated the 
venture.
In the case of the acquisition, the parent (which rated the 
venture as 'slightly short of target', and 'average success') 
included the early performance of the venture in its appraisal.
The venture got off to a bad start, and one part of it was sold off 
after incurring losses. The subsidiary felt that considering the 
venture's inauspicious beginning, which was due to bad planning 
and unrealistic expectations by the parent, performance since then 
had been good, and the remaining part of the venture had 
exceeded its targetted performance. Hence it rated the result as 
'greater than target', and an 'average success' overall.
In one JV, despite the fact that the market has not been very 
buoyant, the UK (external) firm felt that it had not fared too 
badly. Sales were slightly below target, but the cost of the 
venture to the firm was very low. Hence it rated the venture 
'slightly short of target' but an 'average success’. Its partner, 
on the other hand, felt that the UK firm had lacked a sense of 
urgency in developing new products in time to match the French 
firm's promotion of them. Also, the French partner, through setting 
up its own wholly-owned subsidiary to handle what is a contractual 
JV, had spent all the money and taken all the risk involved. Sales 
have not been high enough to pay off its investment. It therefore 
rated the venture 'considerably short of target' and 'not 
successful'.
In the other JV, one partner was a huge European conglomerate 
which decided that the activity concerned did not fit in well with 
the rest of its group. The market had shown a considerable fall 
in recent years, and a good deal of rationalisation had taken 
place within the industry. The conglomerate decided that the high 
R&D costs, and the fairly low return, did not justify the retention 
of this activity and sold the company to its UK partner, rating the 
JV as 'slightly short of target' and 'not successful'. The UK firm, 
left the whole operation, felt that as a venture it was successful 
and rated it 'met target' and an 'average success'.
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Taking the survey as a whole, it must be said that there have 
been very few instances of disagreement on answers. The 
participants have sometimes made criticisms of each other, and 
these have been mentioned under the relevant points in the results; 
but they have not arisen from major differences in opinion. Minor 
points of disagreement were, for example, over customer nationalism. 
Three external firms felt that this was a strong barrier, while the 
local firms concerned believed that other factors were more 
important.
On the whole, there was very little disagreement between 
participating partners about what had actually happened. Everybody 
concerned knew why ventures had gone wrong or done well. The firms 
were (sometimes remarkably) honest, being quite prepared to accept 
blame for their mistakes and to point to their own failings, without 
attempting to blame their partners for their own faults.
It must be admitted, however, that in only one instance did 
the survey cover two partners which had parted on less than 
amicable terms, and even in this case the firms concerned were 
agreed on the reasons for the collapse of their venture. In other 
instances it was not possible to interview one partner. Such cases 
can be expected to be the most likely source of disagreements and 
divisions between the partners.
In addition, no former owner-managers took part in the survey. 
Such a contribution would have been most valuable, and would have 
given interesting insights into the problems of the acquired firm.
A satisfying aspect of the survey was that the participants 
were willing to talk about their ventures whatever the outcome had 
been, from total success to dismal failure, and the answers given 
can thus be held to be a reliable guide to the practice of 
transnational joint ventures and acquisitions in the EEC.
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Finally, eleven 3\l parents and seven acquiring firms 
announced that, as a consequence of their ventures, they were 
more likely to undertake another such venture in the EEC in the 
future. Eight and six respectively replied that the venture had 
made no difference to their attitudes or to the way in which they 
would approach future opportunties; and only four JV parents and 
two acquiring firms announced that they were less likely to 
undertake such ventures in future as a result.
Many of the participants reported that they have learned a 
good deal from their ventures, and that if future opportunities do 






The aim of the Business Cooperation Centre is to encourage 
cooperation between firms in different Member States of the European 
Community, with a view to increasing their competitiveness and hel­
ping them to adjust to the expanded market.
The Business Cooperation Centre was set up by decision of the 
Commission of the European Communities on 21st June 1973 and is a de­
partment of the Commission, by which it is financed, but it enjoys 
considerable autonomy in carrying out its functions.
The staff of the Centre are under an obligation to observe 
conf identiali ty.
The Centre's services are free of charge.
DUTIES
The role of the Centre is to:
- try to find partners for firms interested in cooperation;
- provide firms with information and advice;
- keep the Community informed on.obstacles of a general nature en­





1. Liaisons of the kind which it is the Business Cooperation Centre's 
role to encourage should be understood to mean long-term reciprocal ties 
which go beyond the stage of purely commercial relations.
Cooperation agreements may involve, e. g.:
— R & D  (joint research, exchange of licences and know- bw);
- purchasing (joint buying of raw materials, reciprocal supplying 
of primary products);
- production (specialization agreements, joint production or a 
product, standardization of products);
- marketing and sales (joint market research, joint trademarks, 
reciprocal use of sales networks, joint organization of sales 
in a market outside the Community);
- management (joint use of management facilities).
Cooperation initiated by the Business Cooperation Centre may 
also take the form of financial link-ups between firms:
- setting-up of a joint subsidiary;
- acquisition of a minority holding;
- mutual acquisition of holdings;
- acquisition of a majority holding;
- setting-up of a joint holding company;
- mergers or takeovers.
On the other hand, the Business Cooperation Centre plays no 
part in relations of a purely commercial nature or where no mutual 
long-term reciprocal link is involved. Thus the following are exclu­
ded, for example:
- finding of buyers or suppliers;
- subcontracting;
- offers of or requests for commercial agencies;
- ordinary licencing agreements.
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2. The Centre offers its services to all business firms of whatever 
legal form, financial structure or branch of activity (production, di­
stribution, services).
The Business Cooperation Centre was created primarily to meet the 
needs of small- and meduim-sized firms. Large undertakings will naturally 
have little or no reason to make use of the Centre, since they have their 
own economists, lawyers and tax experts who can solve the problems of in­
ternational cooperation.
No strict definition,of small- and medium-sized firms can be drawn 
up at Community level, since such a definition would of necessity vary 
from country to country and from sector to sector.
In a sector where activity is highly concentrated, a firm may well 
employ 1000 or 2000 people while nevertheless being a medium-sized firm.
The typical firm aided by the Business Cooperation Centre is one 
which has already made considerable use of possibilities offered by its 
national market and which feels ready to take advantage of the opportuni­
ties for expansion offered by the Common market.
3. The Business Cooperation Centre can deal only with cooperation bet­
ween firms from the hine member countries of the European Communities (Bel- 
gium. Federal Republic of Germany, France,/\freland, Italy, Luxembourg, Ne­
therlands, United Kingdom). The partner firms must be of different natio­
nalities (nationality being determined by the location of the head office).
The cooperation may, however, cover activities outside the Community 
(e. g., joint exports to non-member countries, establishment of a joint pro­
duction subsidiary in a non-member country).
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4. When a firm asks the Business Cooperation Centre to help it
to find a partner with whom it can cooperate, the Centre will ask 
the firm to provide details about itself and to specify what type 
of partner and what kind of cooperation it is looking for.
The necessary additions to this written information are usually 
made during an interview at the firm's offices between one of the firm's 
directors and a member of the Centre's staff.
As soon as the Centre has a sufficiently detailed idea of the 
profile cf the partner required and the type of cooperation or link­
up wanted, the process of locating a partner is begun:
- by first of all checking whether there are suitable candidates among 
the offers already registered with the Business Cooperation Centre;
- by circulating an anonymous summary of the application selectively 
to its network of correspondents (busines associations, chambers of 
commerce, government bodies, banks, brokers, accountants etc.), ac­
cording to the countries and sectors involved, and asking them to no­
tify the Centre of firms which indicate their interest in the applica­
tion concerned;
- if necessary by distributing this anonymous summary directly to firms 
which might be interested and whose names are given in directories or 
company lists.
When the firms reply to the Centre expressing interest in the 
application which has been distributed, they are usually asked to supply 
details about themselves corresponding to that which they have received 
on the applicant firm. If the firm making the reply matches the profile 
required, a meeting is arranged between the two potential partners.
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B. SUPPLYING INFORMATION TO FIRMS
As a rule the Business Cooperation Centre takes no part in the 
negotiations between firms or in the conclusion of agreements, but the 
Centre is always prepared to attend as a neutral third party and to pro­
vide information or advice on the opportunities for and limitations on 
international cooperation between firms.
The questions may deal with areas such as the following:
- company law;
- right of establishment;
- rules relating to foreign investment;
- exchange control;
- tax arrangements applying to foreign shareholders.
The questions must obviously be specific, as the Centre is not 
in a position to provide information covering every aspect of every 
type of liaison.
If the Centre receives applications which fall outside its terms 
of reference it will endeavour to tell the firms what persons or organi­
zations are more competent to deal with their enquiries.
Firms may also ask the Centre for information if they have found 
partners by other means than through the Business Cooperation Centre.
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C. THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE COMMUNITY
Every year the Centre makes a written report to the Commission of 
the European Communities containing overall figures (without disclosure 
of the actual firms involved) showing particularly the sectors, size of 
firms, types of cooperation and nationalities involved and the number of 
successes and failures experienced; findings on the obstacles to coopera­
tion which the firms and the Centre have encountered; and any suggestions 
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1. The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market: all agreements between undertakings, all
decisions by associations of undertakings and all concerted 
practices which are liable to affect trade between Member 
States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition within the Common Market or which have this effect.
This shall, in particular, include:
a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling 
prices or of any other trading conditions;
b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical 
development or investment;
c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
d) the application of unequal conditions to parties 
undertaking equivalent engagements in commercial trans­
actions, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage;
e) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the 
acceptance by the other party to the contract of additional 
obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial practice, have no connection with the subject
of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this 
Article shall automatically be null and void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared 
inapplicable in the case of :
- any agreement or type of agreement between undertakings;
- any decision or type of decision by associations of undertakings, 
and
- any concerted practice or type of concerted practice
which helps to improve the production or distribution of goods
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or to promote technical or economic progress, whilst allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting profit and which does 
not :
a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the achievement of the above 
objectives;
b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the goods concerned.
ARTICLE 86
Any improper exploitation by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial
part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common 
Market and shall be prohibited, in so far as trade between Member 
States could be affected by it. The following practices, in 
particular, shall be deemed to amount to improper exploitation:
a) the direct or indirect imposition of any unfair purchase or 
selling prices or of any other unfair trading conditions;
b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development 
to the prejudice of consumers;
c) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking 
equivalent engagements in commercial transactions, thereby 
placing them at a commercial disadvantage;
d) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance 
by the other party to the contract of additional obligations 
which by their nature or according to commercial practice 
have no connection with the subject of such contract.
The regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 are contained in
Regulation No. 17 of the Council of 6.2.1962, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p.204.
In its notice of 29.7.1968 (OJ 0 75, 29.6.1968) the Commission 
took the view that the following agreements do not restrict competition:
1. Agreements having as their sole object:
a). An exchange of opinion or experience;
b). Joint market research;
c). The joint carrying out of comparative studies of enterprises or 
industries;
d). The joint preparation of statistics and calculation models.
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2. Agreements having as their sole object:
a). Co-operation in accounting matters;
b). Joint provisions of credit guarantees;
c). Joint debt-collecting associations;
d)• Joint business or tax consultant agencies.
These are cases of co-operation relating to fields that do not concern 
the supply of goods and services and the economic decisions of the 
enterprises involved, so that they cannot lead to restraints of 
competition.
3. Agreements having as their sole object;
a). The joint implementation of research and development projects;
b). The joint placing of research and development contracts ;
c)• The sharing out of research and development projects among 
participating enterprises.
It is the essence of joint research that the results should be 
exploited by the participating enterprises in proportion to their 
participation. For the assessment of the compatibility of the 
agreement with the rules on competition, it does not matter what 
legal form the common R&D takes. (In the Henkel-Colgate case, however, 
it was held that the prohibition of Article 85(1) can apply to joint 
research by two large enterprises; these two had world-wide markets 
and had a very strong position on the Community markets, which were 
characterised by their oligopolistic structure).
4. Agreements which have as their sole object the joint use of 
production facilities and storing and transport equipment. These 
forms of co-operation do not restrict competition because they are 
confined to organisational and technical arrangements for the use of 
the facilities.
5. Agreements having as their sole object the setting up of working 
partnerships for the common execution of orders, where the particip­
ating enterprises do not compete with each other as regards the work 
to be done or where each of them by itself is unable to execute
the orders.
It is not a question of whether the enterprises compete with each 
other in other industries so much as whether in the light of the 
concrete circumstances of a particular case there is a possibility
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in the foreseeable future they may compete with each other with 
regard to the products or services involved. If the absence of 
competition between the enterprises and the maintenance of this 
situation are based on concerted practices, there may be a 
restraint of competition.
6. Agreements having as their sole object;
a). Joint selling arrangements;
b). Joint after-sales and repair services, provided the participa 
ting enterprises are not competitors with regard to the products 
or services covered by the agreement.
7. Agreements having as their sole object advertising.
However, if the participating enterprises are partly or wholly 
prevented, by agreements or concerted practices, from themselves 
advertising or if they are subjected to other restrictions, there 
may be a restraint of competition.
a.  Agreements having as their sole object the use of a common label 
to designate a certain quality, where the label is available 
to all competitors on the same conditions.
But there may be a restraint of competition if the right to use the 
label is linked to obligations regarding production, marketing, price 
formation or obligations of any other type, as is for instance the 
case when the participating enterprises are obliged to manufacture 
or sell only products of guaranteed quality.
Regulation 2821/71 of the Council, dated 20.12.1971, added the 
following categories to which Article 85(1), in accordance with 
Article 85(3), would not apply:
Agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertak­
ings and concerted practices which have as their object
a), the application of standards or types;
b) . the research and development of products or processes up to the
stage of industrial application, and exploitation of the results, 
including provisions regarding industrial property rights and 
confidential technical knowledge;
- 237 -
c). specialisation, including agreements necessary for achieving it.
Regulation 2822/71, of the same date, adds to c). : where the products 
which are the subject of specialisation do not,'in a substantial 
part of the common market, represent more than 15% of the volume of 
business done in identical products or those considered by consumers 
to be similar by reason of their characteristics, price and use, 
and where the total annual turnover of the participating undertakings 
does not exceed 200 million units of account (raised to 300 million
u.a. in 1977^).
This latter regulation is for 'block' exemptions.
The limits for agreements of minor importance, below which restrictive
practices in agreements between firms would not be regarded as
appreciably affecting trade between Member States or competition,
are a sales level of 50 million units of account (set in 1978) or
2
a 5% market share.
1 Seventh Report on ^Competition Policy, point 36,
2 Ibid., points 23 and 41.
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APPENDIX 3.
t r a n s n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  c o l l a b o r a t i o n in t h e EEC 
QUESTIONNAIRE
SECTION A : GENERAL 
Reference No. :
1. What was the date of the agreement? ..............
2. When did it come into force? .......................
3. How long was it to operate? ..................
4. What nationality was your partner? ................
5. Please give your partner's name: ..................
6. Please give the name of the Joint Company: .......
7. What type of operation did your firm enter? (tick)
Greenfield
Takeover
Share participation (state %)
Equity JV
Contractual JV
Your firm taken over by another
Another firm took a share in yours (state %)







9. What market was the cooperation aimed at?
10. What products were involved?




12. What percentage of your firm's total output is accounted for by the JV? (tick)
0-10%j 21-40%! 161-80%
11-20%! 41.60%! 51-100%*
13. Does your firm also produce the JV product? Yes/No
14
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If so, what percentage of your fimi's output was accounted for by this 
product before the JV? (tick)
0-10% 21-40% 51-80%
11-20% 41-60% 81-100%
15, How have your firm's exports to the JV market performed since the JV was set up, 
in terms of units of machinery? (tick)












17. How concentrated is your own industry?
Scale 1-10, with 1 being very low concentration and 10 being monopoly:
18. What is your firm's share of the domestic market? (tick)
0-10% |21-40% 61-80%
11-20% 141-60% 81-100%
was your firm's share of the
0-10% 21-40% 61-81%
11-20% 41-60% 81-100%
20. How many product lines do you have? ......
21. Approximately what percentage of your sales is accounted for: (tick)







22. How do imported goods in your UK market compare in terms of unit price with your 
own products? (tick)






lower bv 20% or more
23. If there is a difference in price, does this reflect a difference in quality 
between UK-produced and imported products? Yes/No
24. What is the trend in UK demand for your product?
Sill) ON I:. Mornr.s — 240 —
1. Did you consider that a corporate presence In the market would be significantly
more effective than exporting to It? Yes/No
2. Are local customers in the JV market much more likely to purchase from national
suppliers than from foreign firms? Yes/no
3. Is firm size an important factor in selling effectively to the JV market?
Yes/No
4. Before setting up the JV, what experience did you have in that market? (tick)
Exporting direct Overseas production subsidiary
Foreign agent Previous Joint Venture
Distributor Other (please specify)
Overseas sales subsidiary
5. What were the major tools of financial analysis used in making the investment decision?
* litDiscounted Present Value (DPV)/ 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
Net DPV (DCF)
Internal Rate of Return
t=l (l+r)t
! - 1 
t=l (l+r)t
Find S such that
“ lit___
t=o (l+s)t ^






r Ht > T
t+1
Pay-back period
Direct profit estimates 
Other (please specify)
6. What did you estimate on the above basis would have been the return?
□
□
6-10% loss 11-15% profit
0-5% loss 16-20% profit
0-5% profit 21-30% profit
6-10% profit over 30% profit
7. What was the alternative strategy?
8. How would you have evaluated the riskiness of the project on a scale of 1 - 5 
( 1 = very low, 5 =  very high)?
9. Could you have produced tjtie JV prodcut, on the same scale as the JV, on your own?
Yes/No
10. If not, could you have acquired the resources to do so?








12, ^To what extent were the following factors important in making the JV decision? 
(Grade 1-5: 1 very unimportant; 2 fairly unimportant; 3 average importance;
4 fairly important; 5 very important):
Access to local cost benefits or technological information
Local management skills including knowledge of: legal
economic
________________social and political affairs and customs
Economies of scale
Cost of capital make venturing alone impossible
Spreading the risk
Assurance of source of supply
Speed of entry
A merger was infeasible because of differences 
____________________in tax and accounting systems
Other (please specify)
o r  c o r V ’e - r m o i O  //m H n r n g  nA^kS^
S-7g.-e.rJgTH o r Cpnr&TiXiO»^
SECTION C : SEARCH
1. How was the foreign partner selected?
2. Did your firm have a particular partner in mind at the time
a decision to try for a JV was made? Yes/No
3. Did your firm have a previous relationship with the foreign
partner - e.g. agent, distributor, licence? Yes/No
4. Does your partner produce complementary goods? Yes/No
5. Why did you choose this particular country?
6. Did you find out about host country inducements/regional 
incentives, and if so at what stage?
7. How important an influence were such incentives in your investment 
decision? (Grade 1-5 in importance, as before with 1 being very 
unimportant and 5 being very important) ......
8. How important an influence were such incentives in your decision 
to set up a JV, as opposed to other forms of market entry?
(Grade 1-5, as above).................................................. ......
9. How strong is the overseas industry concerned compared with your 
home industry? (Grade 1-5: 1 much weaker; 2 slightly weaker;
3 about the same; 4 slightly stronger; 5 much stronger) ......
10. What methods of research were used in the search process?
11. How many months did the decision-making process take? ......
12. In that time, were alternative strategies (e.g. takeover, 
greenfield venture) considered? Yes/No
13. In that time, were alternative partners considered? Yes/No
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SECTION D : I.VÎPLFIÆKTATION
1. What was the original ownership structure of the JV?
2. How has this changed, if at all?
3. What were the reasons for any changes in the ownership structure?
4. What was the nationality of the chief executive?
5. On what basis was he chosen?
6. Did the initial agreement ensure that there was an adequate way of solving deadlocks
without asking an arbitrator to make commercial decisions?
7. Did the initial agreement ensure a suitable way of terminating the venture, if
cooperation broke down?
SECTION E : OPERATION
1. What were the following figures, in the first year and the last (or last year, 







2. Is one partner a major supplier of materials or services to the JV? Yes/No 
Which partner?
3. Is one partner a major customer of the JV?
Which partner?
4. What percentage of JV inputs was purchased from the parents?
Yes/No
0-10% 26-50% 76-100%' 1
11-25% 51-75%
5. What percentage of JV output was sold to the parents?
0-10% 26-50% 76-100%! 1
11-25^ 51-75%
6. One advantage of a JV can be to reduce the cost of a parent's inputs through the 
use of transfer pricing. Was there in this case a difference between transfer 
prices and prices to the J V s  outside customers?
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Production planning and control
8. Were problems encountered over any of the following?
(Grade 1-5 in importance, with 1 being 'very unimportant’ to 5 being 'very important')
Marketing/distribution policy
Competition between the JV and one of the parents
or another subsidiary
Production rationalisation by one parent, affecting the JV
Royalties





L A M Q U A O e
SECTION F : SUCCESS/FAILURE
1. Did the JV result in any of the following benefits to your firm? (tick)
Reduction in unit costs
Savings in costs of: Marketing
Engineering
Administration
Reduction in R&D costs due to the 
elimination of duplicative research by the parents
2. What was your most important lesson learned from the venture?
3. What was your second most important lesson learned?
4. How did the results of the JV compare with pre-stated targets? (tick)
Much greater than target
Greater than target
Met target
Fell slightly short of target
Fell considerably short of target






6. With the benefit of hindsight was the decision to undertake the JV correct? Yes/No
7. What, if any, factors would you now like to have changed?
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8. “'’s a result of this venture, are you more or less likely to undertake another
'*» JV in the EEC in the future?
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